Save Our Vote
Stand with Laura Pressley
Many irregularities occurred as Travis County conducted the City of Austin’s City Council Runoff election:

a) More Ballots than voters during Early Voting
b) Ballot by Mail voters appear to be recorded up to 3 times on different days
c) Systematic, repetitive mathematical patterns found in election results
d) Recount was conducted with Cast Vote Records vs Ballot Images
e) Mandated election records are missing
   a) Ballot Images are missing
   b) Zero Tapes are missing
   c) Precinct Returns from Election Night (Results/Tally tapes) are missing
f) Numerous “Corruption” Errors occurred during vote tabulation on election night

And other issues occurred:

a) Countywide Polling Centers were used and are not allowed by state law
b) Poll Watchers were prevented from signing official election records

Our Texas elections must be held legally and our vote needs to be verifiable.

Dr. Laura Pressley has filed the first election lawsuit in Texas challenging vote tabulation errors by electronic voting machines and the lack of retaining mandated election records.
More Ballots than Voters for Early Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pct</th>
<th>Total Ballots Cast per Canvass and Recount</th>
<th>Voters Names per Early Voting Rolls from County</th>
<th>Ballot Discrepancy (Over votes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>265</td>
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<td>140</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>116</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>142</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>81</td>
<td>77</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>55</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Overall** | **2701** | **2622** | **80**
Duplicate Ballot By Mail Entries During Early Voting
Reporting by Travis County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VuID</th>
<th>EV or BBM</th>
<th>PC</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Request</th>
<th>Date Received</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1139206144</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>133</td>
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<td></td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1139206144</td>
<td>BBM</td>
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<td>Duplicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1140440803</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Duplicate,</td>
<td></td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1140440803</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Duplicate,</td>
<td></td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1140440803</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Duplicate,</td>
<td></td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1142970306</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Duplicate,</td>
<td></td>
<td>26-Nov</td>
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<tr>
<td>1142970306</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Duplicate,</td>
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<td>26-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1144792960</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Duplicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>22-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1144792960</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Duplicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>22-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1139184973</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Duplicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>22-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1139184973</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>Duplicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>22-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1132448011</td>
<td>BBM</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>Duplicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1132448011</td>
<td>BBM</td>
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<td>Duplicate</td>
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<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1132448011</td>
<td>BBM</td>
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<td>Duplicate</td>
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<td>24-Nov</td>
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<td>BBM</td>
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<td>Duplicate</td>
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<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>BBM</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>Duplicate</td>
<td></td>
<td>24-Nov</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ballot by Mails Reported/Recorded up to three times on different days
Pressley’s Election Results show repetitive mathematical patterns for the November General Election and the December Run Off Evaluation of the Top 9 Precincts that comprised over 80% of the Total Vote in District 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pct</th>
<th>November 4th</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>LP%</th>
<th>Dec 16th</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>LP%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139--HH</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149--Ave G</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>53%</td>
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<tr>
<td>164</td>
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<td>34%</td>
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<td>133</td>
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<td>223</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Election Overall Results refer to the total number of votes Pressley received divided by total Votes (Casar + Pressley)

Average of unweighted precincts refers to taking the average of the Pressley’s Precinct results.

The Election Results and Average of unweighted precincts have no natural reason to correlate and they are virtually equal.

The next slides show a comparison of these values for other City Council Candidates vs Pressley’s.
Pressley’s results for the General and Run Off races are virtually equal (all four data points on top of each other). Comparing results for other council races, for precincts that comprise 80% or more of voters, no other Council race shows results to be identical.
Pressley’s standard deviation (0.06%) for General and Run Off are outside the distribution of other Council races.

The race with the next tightest distribution is 10x higher at a standard deviation of 0.67 (Scruggs).

The race with the largest distribution is over 100X higher at 7.65% (Almanza).
Pressley’s Runoff shows a linear correlation between her November General Election Results vs December Runoff. Other Candidates do not show such a tight correlation.
Texas Law requires that Ballot Images are used for Recounts

During the Recount, the Travis County Clerk and Secretary of State claimed “ballot images,” and “images of ballots cast,” were not retained, could not be printed and thus could not be used for the Recount. They in turn printed and counted Cast Vote Records which are not referenced in Texas law and do not meet the statutory requirements of an official Texas ballot.
Texas Constitution and Texas Election Code

Ballot Image, as a matter of plain language, requires a “Ballot” and an “Image”

Ballot — Defined by Texas Constitution and Texas Election Code:

A) Unique number — Texas Constitution, Article 6, Section 4
B) Sequential numbering — Texas Election Code 52.062
C) Election name — Joint Special Runoff Election, Travis County — Texas Election Code 52.063
D) Date of Election — December 16, 2014 — Texas Election Code 52.063
E) Designation of Official Ballot — Texas Election Code 52.064
F) Voting square to left of Candidates’ names — Texas Election Code 52.070
G) Voting Instructions — Texas Election Code 52.070 and 124.062

Ballot Image Storage — Required by Texas Election Code:

A) “...ballot image storage...” — Texas Election Code 128.001(a)(2)
B) “...images of ballots cast...” and “...printing of the images...” — Texas Election Code 213.016
Note: Travis County’s Cast Vote Records do not contain the legal components of a Texas ballot:

a) Unique serial number
b) Date of Election
c) Name of Election
d) Voting Squares
e) All candidate names
f) Label of “Official Ballot”
Ballot by Mail are the only legal ballots that were recounted and those are exactly tied. The electronic Cast Vote Record results are not consistent with the legal ballot results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pct</th>
<th>Pressley</th>
<th>Casar</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Pressley</th>
<th>LP % - BBM (EV)</th>
<th>LP % - BBM (ED)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>46.8%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>50.0%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>41.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>15.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
</tr>
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<td>258</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>64.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 240 240 480 50.0% 33.5% 33.8%

Ballot by Mail are the only legal ballots that were recounted and those are exactly tied. The electronic Cast Vote Record results are not consistent with the legal ballot results.
Ballot Images are referenced in numerous locations (1990 – 2015)

• Texas Election Code – 1997
• Secretary of State requires ballot images in the certification of electronic voting systems – 2000
• Federal Election Commission Reports – 2002
• Hart InterCivic Patent – 2003
• Hart InterCivic Patent – 2006
• Texas Election Code – 2009
• Secretary of State claims ballot images remain on equipment – 2014
• Secretary of State defines Ballot Image in their Glossary of Election Terminology – 2015
• Travis County’s Election Website – 2015
2000 – SOS Certification documents reference Hart system and “ballot image.”

“...ballot images are gathered...”
—Terry Vickers, 2000

“The voter’s ballot image is stored in random locations...” —Tom Watson, 2000

Once a voter has cast their ballot the machine is disabled until another valid voter code is entered. The voter’s ballot image is stored in random locations on the EVU, and the JBC’s flash memory and the EBB. The ballot images cannot be erased from the JBC or the EVU without a utility program that is

Conclusion

The Worldwide system is a nicely integrated system. It is easy to use and accurately recorded and accumulated the test ballots cast. It is good system with a few significant deficiencies. I recommend certification if the problems noted are corrected.

Tom Watson
Examiner
Ballot Images are defined by Secretary of State

Per the SOS Glossary:

**Ballot Image:** The ballot as it appears on a direct recording electronic (DRE) voting system.

http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/glossary.shtml
Ballot Image is Referenced in Hart Patents awarded in 2003
Cast Vote Record not referenced (2003)

(12) United States Patent
McClure et al.

(10) Patent No.: US 6,581,824 B1
(45) Date of Patent: Jun. 24, 2003

(54) ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM

(75) Inventors: Neil McClure, Lafayette, CO (US); Kermit Lohry, Boulder, CO (US)

(73) Assignee: Hart InterCivic, Inc., Austin, TX (US)

(*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this patent is extended or adjusted under 35 U.S.C. 154(b) by 36 days.

(21) Appl. No.: 09/812,178
(22) Filed: Mar. 19, 2001

Related U.S. Application Data

(62) Division of application No. 08/953,003, filed on Oct. 16, 1997, now Pat. No. 6,250,548.

(51) Int. Cl.7 ........................................... G07G 13/00
(52) U.S. Cl. .................. 235/51; 235/50 R; 235/50 A; 235/50 B

53/49 Field of Search

(74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm—Lathrop & Gage L.C.

(74) ABSTRACT

An electronic voting system with a headquarters unit, a plurality of precinct units, a plurality of voting stations associated with each precinct unit, and a plurality of mobile memory units (MMUs) to contain data that can be transported back and forth between the headquarters unit and the precinct units. The MMUs include FLASH memory, wherein each memory location can be written to once and read many times. Each memory location can thus only be subsequently written to after all the data in the entire FLASH memory has been erased. The system includes the ability to store images of the cast ballots at multiple locations for verification and authentication. The system includes the ability to store a direct representation of the voter's selections as displayed to the voter as a redundant image of the ballot. The system also includes the ability for each voting station to automatically read the particular ballot overlay thereon to verify the proper ballot style is being used. The system also includes the ability to communicate between the various components of the system when the components are

Until the voter presses the "Cast Ballot" button 84, his/her vote is not recorded. The TNC 50 and the voting tablet 56 maintain the voter's selections in temporary memory until he/she activates the "Cast Ballot" button 84. At that point, the TNC 50 moves his/her selections, or cast ballot image, into FLASH memory, both internal to the TNC 50 and in the voting tablet 56 while at the same time stripping any link between the cast ballot image and the voter's identification. An exact copy of the cast ballot image is moved into the MMU 58 and a copy is read back and sent back to the voting tablet 56. The MMU 58 is the primary storage location while the TNC 50 and voting tablet 56 are back-up copies. The voting tablet 56 has two copies of the ballot. One version comes directly from the voting tablet V, sup 3 electronics and the other version is the one that has been stored by the TNC 50. These two versions are always the same except in the event of a communication error or malfunction when storing the ballot. The voting tablet 56 is essentially auditing the TNC 50 and provides for a third copy of the cast ballots.
First time Cast Vote Record is referenced (2006)

United States Patent
McClure et al.

Precinct Voting System

Inventors: Neil L. McClure, Louisville, CO (US); Ralph David Wieland, Broomfield, CO (US); Victor L. Babbitt, Berthoud, CO (US); Robert A. Nichols, Thornton, CO (US)

Assignee: Hart InterCivic, Inc., Austin, TX (US)

Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this patent is extended or adjusted under 35 U.S.C. 154(b) by 661 days.

Appl. No.: 09/754,423
Filed: Jan. 3, 2001

Prior Publication Data

Primary Examiner—Michael G. Lee
Assistant Examiner—Jamara A. Franklin
Attorney, Agent, or Firm—Lathrop & Gage LC

Abstract
An electronic voting system includes a controller and one or more voting stations. The voting stations each have a liquid crystal display that is electronically configurable to present

Preferred Processing for Ballot Image Storage

In step P444, the cast vote is preferably but optionally stored randomly in memory to add to the voter's anonymity. The mobile ballot box 112 is the primary storage location, and the JBC 112 provides a backup copy. A third copy of the ballot image is stored in the LCD DREs, and a fourth copy may be transmitted to the election administration station 116 or election headquarters using the telecommunications connection 114. When each vote is stored, it is kept intact so that an exact electronic replica of the cast vote can be reproduced, if necessary. Additional information that is stored with each ballot image includes ballot style information, each selected and non-selected option, write-in data and challenged retrieval number, if required.

As shown in FIG. 6, the ballot images are stored to preclude any determination of which order the votes were cast, and this is accomplished through the use of a random multiple stack register 600—in this case a dual stack register. This storage is accomplished by storing each new cast vote record comprising a ballot image from volatile memory 602 in one of two stacks 604 and 606 of nonvolatile memory 608. A random generator 610 is used to determine which of stacks 604 and 606 will receive the stored ballot image. The stacks 604 and 606 have a common starting point 612 in memory. Stack 604 grows up in memory and stack 606 grows down in memory. The starting point 612 for storage of the first ballot image is determined randomly by selecting an address near the middle of the allocated memory space 612. Because the starting point 612 is randomly selected and no record of this starting point is maintained, the beginning of the list cannot be determined when data is viewed after the election. It is not necessary that the stacks 604 and 606 grow from a single starting point 612, and additional random stacks may be created in a similar fashion. The dual stack configuration that is shown in FIG. 6 represents the most efficient use of memory for these random stack assignments and, consequently, is much preferred for situations where limited memory is available in an embedded system.
Travis County’s website states, the Hart eSlate “Captures an Image of each ballot cast... for manual recounts...”
September 30, 2014

Mr. Michael Winn
Director of Elections
Travis County
P.O. Box 149325
Austin, Texas 78714-9325

Dear Mr. Winn,

Your office submitted a request for approval to use modified voting system procedures for the November 4, 2014 election in which the county will utilize countywide election precincts under Section 43.007 of the Texas Election Code. As you note, the use of countywide precincts creates challenges with voting systems generally designed for use at traditional precinct polling places. Specifically, the county’s proposed procedures address the printing of the zero tape required at the beginning of election day and the “Tally” tape printed at the close of election. The Secretary of State approves these procedures after the polls are closed on election day. However, prior to the local canvass, we require the Tally tapes to be printed out and the results compared to those of the printed precinct reports, as required in our Election Advisory No. 2010-16 (Checks and Balances for the Central Accumulation Station, 10).

The Hart Voting System ("HVS") used by Travis County is designed to print a zero tape listing all the candidates and positions for the precinct at which the specific voting machine will be used. In this election, Travis County has chosen to use 188 election day precincts, so each zero tape will consist of all the candidates and measures for each of these precincts. This is also true of the "Tally tape" printed at the close of polls. You have explained that the process of printing of the zero tape and tally tape at each countywide precinct location could take hours in both the morning and the evening of election day.

To avoid delays associated with the printing at the countywide precinct locations, the county suggests allowing the complete zero tape to be printed at the county warehouse prior to election day, and an abbreviated version of the zero tape be printed and left on each machine to show there are no ballots resident on the machine as voting begins on election day. Similarly, rather than printing the complete tally tape off of each machine at each countywide precinct polling place on election night, the election officials at each countywide precinct location will print an access code report, which provides information on how many votes have been cast, to compare to the number of signatures on the combination form.

The procedures were developed based on early voting procedures in which the voting systems are suspended at the close of each day’s early voting and final results printed at the end of the early voting period and were approved by the Secretary of State on September 19, 2011 for the November 2011 election and again for subsequent elections. Again, the election will be adequately auditable through the review of the public counter before voting begins to verify there are no votes prior to the polls opening, and the comparison of the combination form to the audit log provides a method to ensure the number of votes cast matches before the machines are taken to the warehouse for printing the tally tapes. Post-election, the zero tapes and tally tapes will be available for review (and the Tally tapes printed and compared to the precinct reports) and also, in the HVS, ballot images remain on the voting machines themselves for recounts, contests, and other post-election reviews until archived by the county for the following election.

Again, thank you very much for your participation, and we look forward to working with you to make this program a success.

Sincerely,

Keith Ingram
Director of Elections

KLAF

CC: The Honorable Dana DeBeauvoir
There are three sets of election data Texas Legislature mandates:

1. Precinct Election Returns (Results/Tally tape) from election night — **Texas Election Code 66.001 – 66.054**
2. Ballot image storage — **Texas Election Code 128.001(a)(2)**
3. Result tabulation — **Texas Election Code 128.001(a)(2)**

In the Travis County December Runoff elections, two of the three election records are missing: Precinct Returns and Ballot Images.
Poll Watchers were prevented from monitoring and signing official election records

“I was prevented from signing the official Results/Tally tapes because election officials ...were instructed to not print them.”  
--Paul Williams  
Official Poll Watcher
Election Night Judges’ Envelope

JBC REPORT ENVELOPE

Precinct: 130-133-118  Date: 12-14-2014

Beginning Public Count: 

To be completed after the last voter in line at 7:00 pm has voted

1. After the last voter has voted, print an Access Code Report. (Leave it attached to the JBC.)
   a. Press “OTHER”
   c. Press “Polls Open Menu”
3. Press “Close Polls” on the JBC.

ACCESS CODE REPORT

NUMBER OF ACCESS CODES:

ISSUED: 354
VOTED: 353

7. DO NOT PRINT THE TALLY.

6. The Close Polls Report Prints. Tear off the whole tape and place it inside Envelope #1.
7. DO NOT PRINT THE TALLY.
8. Record the Public Count in the section on the right. The Public Count is found on the JBC screen in the lower right hand corner.
9. Count the number of signatures on the Combo Forms and enter the number in the section on the right. Place the Combo Forms in this envelope.
10. Place the EDay Poll List tape (printed from the laptop) in Pink Envelope #3.
11. Count the number of Provisional Voters listed on the “Lists of Provisional Voters” and enter the number in the section on the right.
12. Count the number of error ballots logged on the
Hart InterCivic Equipment Audit Logs
During Run Off Election Tabulation

Mobile Ballot Box (MBB)
Where Ballot Images are stored
Expert witness, Dr. Jeffrey Jacobson, Ph.D.: “an adversary may ‘Introduce corrupt MBB’s into the legitimate flow of MBB’s from the precincts back to Election Central [Calif. SoS report, p.48]’ this could damage the credibility of the vote counting process.”
Security Logs show Voting Tabulation Systems Wide Open — Security Vulnerabilities

Security Breaches for Vote System Long Periods System was Vulnerable

10 Extended Logons Starting with Early Voting thru Election Day and Recount

DeBeauvoir states, "I don’t think that’s true [extended logons]...I doubt it’s true..."
Title 4. Time and Place of Elections

Chapter 43. Polling Places

Subchapter A. Number and Location of Polling Places

Section 43.007. Countywide Polling Place Program.

(a) The secretary of state shall implement a program to allow each commissioners court participating in the program to eliminate county election precinct polling places and establish countywide polling places for:

1. Each general election for state and county officers;
2. Each election held on the uniform election date in May;
3. Each election on a proposed constitutional amendment;
4. Each primary election and runoff primary election.

Countywide Polling Centers were used and are not allowed by state law.

The Austin City Council Runoff was a Joint Special Runoff Election and is not listed in Texas Election Code as being allowed for Countywide polling locations: