Guest Editor’s Introduction: Iraq from the Outside
Louis Hicks

Talking War: How Elite U.S. Newspaper Editorials and Opinion Pieces Debated the Attack on Iraq
Alexander G. Nikolaev and Douglas V. Porpora

The Microlevel Discourse of Social Movement Framing: Debating Antiwar Protests on a University Listserv
Mark Hedley and Sara A. Clark

Greedy Media: Army Families, Embedded Reporting, and War in Iraq
Morten G. Ender, Kathleen M. Campbell, Toya J. Davis, and Patrick R. Michaelis

The Making of Heroes: An Attributional Perspective
Gregory C. Gibson, Richard Hogan, John Stahura, and Eugene Jackson

Globalization and the Invasion of Iraq: State Power and the Enforcement of Neoliberalism
Daniel Egan

Copyright © 2007 North Central Sociological Association
A Word from the Editors

Welcome to the second of our two special issues on the war in Iraq. This issue, which our special guest editor, Louis Hicks, introduces in more detail below, examines the Iraq war from the outside. The November 2006 issue covered events inside Iraq—the abuse at Abu Ghraib, the capture of Saddam, problems with policing, the challenges of managing humanitarian information, the impact on soldiers when reality differs from expectations, and the monumental difficulties encountered during counterinsurgency operations. The current issue presents five papers that examine reactions to the war. The approaches range from attribution theory to globalization, but they share an emphasis on how perceptions are shaped and opinion made.

At this point, we want to reflect on our first two years. We inherited the journal in excellent shape and quickly went to work lining up manuscripts for our issues. Part of the effort involved simply reminding potential contributors that we, as the new editors, were looking for manuscripts of all theoretical and methodological persuasions. In addition, we talked with colleagues and put out a call requesting that potential guest editors contact us with ideas for special issues. These two issues on the war in Iraq are the first fruit of those labors. Louis Hicks has been great to work with—he helped identify a set of truly excellent scholars who submitted papers, and he effectively and expertly shepherded those papers through the various cycles of the review process. He has helped us meet some very tight production schedules.

We also contracted with new printers—the University of Cincinnati Printing Services, who have been good-humored and accommodating during our sometimes harried production process. Two people in particular stand out—Mike Clark and Joel Brennecke. Mike answered every question about every detail (sometimes twice) with speed, accuracy, and good cheer. Joel has worked with us on every issue for the last two years, turning our electronic files into a professional publication. He has always been fun to work with, even taking time to pick up proofs—meeting us after hours when we had last-minute changes, and talking through issues late at night when deadlines loomed.

In keeping with the efforts of previous editors, however, we continued to look for a publisher who could help promote the journal to broader national and international markets. About the time the November 2006 issue went to press, NCSA signed a
contract with Paradigm Publishers to print and distribute the journal. Our arrangement with Paradigm means that the journal will receive much better promotion worldwide and—as we hope you have already noticed—a brand new look. Our hats are off to Dean Birkenkamp, Paradigm’s president, and Melanie Stafford, Paradigm’s managing editor for working with us to find a mutually agreeable arrangement, and to Publication Services for the new design and typesetting that gives the journal its bold new look.

One thing will stay the same, however. Everyone at Sociological Focus is dedicated to bringing you the best sociology available. In May you will find a set of fine articles on group processes; in August, along with our yearly reflection from the NCSA Teacher of the Year and the annual Presidential Address, we anticipate publishing a set of articles that highlight the continuing relevance of Herbert Blumer’s symbolic interactionism. In the meantime, we hope you find the current set of articles—introduced by our guest editor, Louis Hicks—both stimulating and thought provoking.

Steve Carlton-Ford, Editor
Paula J. Dubek, Associate Editor
Guest Editor Introduction: Iraq from the Outside

Welcome to my second special issue of Sociological Focus. In the November issue, I presented six articles that focused primarily on internal aspects of the Iraq war. In this, I present a group of articles that address various external aspects of the Iraq war.

In the November introduction, I reviewed some sociological aspects of the Iraq war that seemed relevant to me. I have little to add to that analysis except to note that events continue to move toward one of three strategic possibilities: the return of a Sunni authoritarian regime; the rise of an explicitly Shiite government; or some form of partition. At the same time, domestic support for continuing the U.S. military effort in its present form seems to have evaporated.

Alexander G. Nikolaev and Douglas V. Porpora conducted a content analysis of 292 editorials and op-ed pieces in four newspapers, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Wall Street Journal, and two magazines, TIME and Newsweek. Their analysis reveals that these media outlets were divided on the war and included a plethora of substantial arguments. However, they found little explicitly moral consideration of the war in the op-eds. Such consideration might have been expected in view of the characterizations by the administration of the “evils” that it faced.

Mark Hedley and Sara A. Clark analyzed an exchange of emails on a university listserv to describe the microlevel framing processes that emerged. These processes were contests among the participants to justify their frame and discredit others’ frames. The authors carefully explain each frame and show how the debate moved in and between them.

Morten G. Ender, Kathleen M. Campbell, Toya J. Davis, and Patrick R. Michaelis studied the effect of “greedy media” on the wartime experience of family members of soldiers deployed to Iraq. Live television reporting from units on the battlefield led some spouses to ration their consumption of information about the war. At the same time, viewing the coverage brought extended family members into contact as they attempted to interpret what they saw on television. TV coverage also energized attempts by family members to gather information through other means. Mass media coverage of the Iraq invasion has moved the U.S. military another large step toward a panopticon of war.

Gregory C. Gibson, Richard Hogan, John Stahura, and Eugene Jackson used the stories of Todd Beamer, Jessica Lynch, and George W. Bush to discover what aspects of dramatic situations cause people to attribute heroic status to individual actors. A nonprofessional making a choice to risk his own life gets the highest heroism ratings from respondents. The authors carefully disaggregated the factors that led to the attribution of heroism in each of their three vignettes. They also looked at the characteristics of respondents, discovering, for example, that single women were more likely to consider Jessica Lynch a hero.
Daniel Egan made the argument that the invasion of Iraq demonstrates that existing critical theories of capitalist globalization have underestimated the coercive power of states. The means of production do not structure the world alone; they are complemented by the means of destruction. Contrary to some models of globalization, the nation-state is not yet fading away as an organizing principle of the world order. The global supremacy of the armed forces of the United States remains crucial to world events. Nation-states field (and wield) armed forces, not labor unions, not corporations, not NGOs, not the media, not the World Bank, not the WTO.

As in November, I hope that you find these articles as valuable as I did in coming to a deeper understanding of the war in Iraq.

Louis Hicks
Professor of Sociology
St. Mary's College of Maryland

Louis Hicks is Professor of Sociology at St. Mary's College of Maryland. He is chair-elect of the Peace, War, and Social Conflict Section of the American Sociological Association. During academic year 2006–2007, he is serving as a Visiting Professor of Social Sciences in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. Address for correspondence: lehicks@smcm.edu.
Talking War: How Elite U.S. Newspaper Editorials and Opinion Pieces Debated the Attack on Iraq

Alexander G. Nikolaev*
Drexel University
Douglas V. Porpora
Drexel University

This paper examines how elite newspaper editorials and opinion pieces (hereafter collectively called op-eds) debated the attack on Iraq. The period examined was the two months preceding Congress’s October 2002 authorization of the use of force against Iraq. The 292 op-ed pieces examined represent one of the most extensive looks at such op-ed activity in the United States.

There were several major findings. First, contrary to some liberal charges, the commentary overall was more critical than supportive of the administration. On the other side, however, if the elite press was not slavishly supportive of U.S. foreign policy, its criticisms were also rather muted. Supported therefore is the view that the elite media keep respectable opinion on foreign policy within a narrow range that excludes the most damaging criticism. Most notably missing from the print debate on Iraq in this period was much objection to the attack on specifically legal or moral grounds. The avoidance by the elite press of legal and moral language arguably helped convey the general impression that no legal or moral considerations were at stake. At the very least, it is shown, this sector of the public sphere did little to help the nation as a whole to deliberate morally about war.

How did it happen that the United States, the world’s only superpower, made what it termed a “preemptive” attack on Iraq in 2003? As much of the world, including the American Sociological Association, disapproved, this question is more than just of academic interest. The simple answer is that the attack was an executive decision of President George W. Bush, and we know at least something of the dynamics internal to presidential administrations that eventuate in such decisions (e.g., Paul 2004).

The simple answer, however, does not suffice. The Bush administration made its decision neither alone nor in a political vacuum. Although the United States may not be as democratic as it perceives itself to be, it is at least a pluralistic society in which even executive decisions reflect wider societal sanction. So it was in this case. The executive decision under discussion here was authorized by Congress. The authorizing congressional vote was, in turn, preceded by considerable public debate. Thus, to

*For all their helpful work on this paper, the authors wish to thank Dina Awerbuch, Diana Dang, Imaani El-Burki, and Ann Kushmerick. For more information, please contact Alexander G. Nikolaev at alexander.g.nikolaev@drexel.edu.
fully understand why the United States acted as it did, it is important to examine the wider debate.

Public debate takes a variety of forms. It includes political leaders making speeches or just commenting informally to the press. It includes the protest activities of social movement organizations. The opinion pages of the press are also one major forum in which public debate takes place. Together, these and kindred practices constitute what Habermas (1989) called “the public sphere,” which he imagined as the steering mechanism of a democracy, the mechanism formative of considered public judgment.

This paper examines one central portion of the debate on Iraq in the public sphere. Specifically, it examines the debate in the opinion pages of the nation’s elite news publications—the New York Times (NYT), the Washington Post (Post), the Christian Science Monitor (CSM), the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), TIME, and Newsweek. Opinion pages include both editorials, which are unsigned and represent the position of the publication, and opinion pieces, which, signed, represent the opinion of an individual, a regular, or a guest columnist. Originally, and technically still, the term “op-ed” refers exclusively to the signed opinion pieces found on the page opposite a publication’s editorials, but popularly the term has come to refer indiscriminately to both unsigned editorials and signed opinion pieces. For the sake of convenience, we also use the term “op-ed” that way here to refer to editorials and opinion pieces together. The study presented includes both.

The time period studied is the pivotal period between August 15 and October 15, 2002. In August 2002 the Bush administration launched what White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card described as its “marketing” of war. On October 10, Congress authorized President Bush to use armed force against Iraq. This study covers the elite op-ed debate from the months preceding until just after the crucial congressional vote.

The purpose of the study was to determine how, beyond the president and Congress, America more widely deliberated about war. Which arguments were entertained the most in the elite press? Were the opinions largely of one accord, and if so, was that accord for or against going to war? Some (e.g., Parenti 1993; Thomas 2006) have described the press—or at least the elite press—as slavishly supportive of the government in foreign affairs, either generally or in this particular instance. Others (e.g., Bennett 1990; Herman and Chomsky 2002; Mermin 1999) argue that, although some press criticism of foreign policy can be expected, such criticism will do no more than echo prevailing disagreement among political elites. Thus, this argument goes, the opinions expressed in the elite press set a narrow agenda of acceptable opinion that excludes the most damaging criticisms of government policy. Most recently, Entman (2003) has argued that since the end of the cold war, press criticism of foreign policy will go beyond such narrow limits when, as is arguably the case here, the situation to which the government responds is sufficiently ambiguous.

The data presented here help adjudicate among these various perspectives. In particular, it will be shown that opinion in the elite press was not of one mind on Iraq and that there was, rather, considerable opposition to presidential policy—opposition not aptly described as merely reflecting elite disagreement. At the same time, the opposition expressed in the press kept within fairly strict boundaries, addressing
almost exclusively prudential considerations and only rarely broaching criticisms of a moral or legal nature.

**THE PUBLIC SPHERE, THE PRESS, AND HEGEMONY**

The study of op-ed debates coincides with the new sociological attention to discourse that comes with sociology’s so-called cultural (Wuthnow 1987) and rhetorical (Brown 1992) turns. In a sense, study of op-eds can be viewed as taking Gamson’s (1996) *Talking Politics* and Eliasoph’s (1998) *Avoiding Politics* to the next level, a level of public discourse to which Wuthnow (1987) has called for more attention. Whereas Gamson and Eliasoph explore the cognitive frames deployed when small groups of people talk politics among themselves (or avoid such discussion), op-eds represent, in a sense, national-level talk about politics.

Op-eds are not just a form of public talk. As a body, they represent one of the central forums that constitute what Habermas referred to as the “public sphere.” As indicated, the public sphere is an institutionalized site (or sites) of citizen discourse operating between the state and market. Ideally at least, in the public sphere, citizens from all levels of the social hierarchy abandon their official ranks to come together as equals to discuss and debate the national interest.

Along with other sites, such as electronic discussion groups, the op-ed pages of the press fit this model in various ways. First, the op-ed pages are an institutionalized forum. Second, as such, the op-ed pages bring together politicians, generals, journalists, academics, writers, and others, writing not in an official capacity but as private citizens. Third, in the op-ed pages, writers address each other, the government, and the public at large on matters of public interest. They do so, finally, in the form of rational argument. In such a way, the op-ed pages are, as Calhoun (1996:1) describes the public sphere generally, “an institutional location for reason in public affairs.”

According to Habermas, whereas public opinion polling registers only passive, pre-reflective distributions of attitudes, the very practice of argument in the public sphere is a process of collective will formation. In the process of rational public argument, according to Habermas, a citizenry develops what Rousseau called a “general will” in a way that makes it a rational subject of history, a concrete embodiment of the Hegelian Geist. If, as Kant believed, there is some mechanism that makes democracies less inclined to war with each other, it is their distinctive responsiveness to their respective national public spheres.

The major theoretical question about the public sphere is not whether it exists. Even many critics of Habermas, like Fraser (1996:111), concede “that something like Habermas’s idea of the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and democratic political practice.” The major question, rather, is how close to Habermas’s ideal the public sphere actually functions. Habermas himself was not sanguine about this matter.

Ideally, according to Habermas, the public sphere should constitute an “ideal speech situation,” in which all members of a society have equal opportunity to be heard without regard for rank or distinction. Under such circumstances, Habermas
(1993) maintains, the only social force that operates is the “unforced force of the better argument.” Societal decisions, then, are determined by reason rather than power.

To the extent that speech situations depart from this ideal, they tend toward what Habermas (1984) describes as communication that is “systematically distorted” as, for example, by agenda setting (see Lukes 2004). The question then about any forum of the public sphere is the extent to which residual sources of inequality operate to systematically distort the pattern of communication.

Residual sources of inequality certainly do operate in op-ed pages, especially in the op-ed pages of the nation’s elite news publications. In our corpus, for example, 25% of the op-eds were editorials, written by the publications’ editors, with another 50% written by the publications’ regular columnists. Thus, only 25% of the op-ed space was allocated to voices unaffiliated with the publications. About half of this space was occupied by politicians, generals, or other public figures. Lesser-known people were without equal access to the op-ed pages of the nation’s elite news publications.

If unequal access to a speech situation is likely to produce systematically distorted communication in that situation, then one question to ask of elite op-ed pages is how communication there might be systematically distorted. That question must be addressed by asking not only which points are present in elite op-ed discourse but also which points are absent. The question, in other words, is about the agenda or range of acceptable opinion set within the op-ed pages of the elite press.

This Habermasian question coincides with wider interest in the agenda-setting function of the press. Virtually all commentators on this issue agree that democracy needs a press independent of both government and partisan bias (Mermin 1999). Few—except perhaps journalists themselves—take a view from the political center that the press truly is independent in this way. Instead, most commentators think news reporting and opinion are politically distorted somehow. On the right are continual charges that the elite press has a liberal bias (see Alterman 2003). On the left are a range of views that see both foreign policy reporting and opinion as too ideologically supportive of the U.S. government.

The simplest of the left-wing views is sometimes called “the hegemony” model. According to the hegemony model, government influence is so hegemonic over elite press reporting and opinion on foreign policy that the elite press simply mirrors the government line. In such cases, the press utterly forsakes its role as the so-called “fourth estate.” In a Nation article entitled “Lap Dogs of the Press,” Helen Thomas, dean of the White House Press Corps, accuses the press of behaving so on Iraq: “Of all the unhappy trends I have witnessed—conservative swings on television networks, dwindling newspaper circulation, the jailing of reporters, and ‘spin’—nothing is more troubling to me than the obsequious press during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. They lapped up everything the Pentagon and White House could dish out—no questions asked” (2006:18).

A more complex view is called the “indexing” model, which holds that the elite press will index or indicate disagreement, if it exists, among political elites (Bennett 1990; Herman and Chomsky 2002; Mermin 1999). In this view, the press may act independently of the president, but it does not act independently of official Washington (Mermin 1999). As a result, critical commentary remains within narrow boundaries.
In particular, it will largely be the execution of foreign policy that tends to be critically scrutinized, not the definition of the problem itself.

A still more complex model has recently been offered by Entman (2003). He calls it the “cascade model,” because of the way he believes information spreads in a cascading fashion from the top to the bottom of the social system. In terms of agenda setting, Entman argues that with the end of the cold war, the elite press does act more independently of official Washington in certain circumstances. Entman claims that the circumstances under which the press is most likely to act independently are when elites and public opinion are divided over a foreign policy issue and the issue itself is of an ambiguous nature that eludes easy framing in terms of U.S. self-perception. One such case, he argues, was the first Gulf War, and in the approach to that conflict he does, indeed, find considerable dissenting opinion registered in the elite press.

THE CONTEXT

The context for the present study began in January 2002 with Bush naming Iraq as part of an “axis of evil” in his speech to a joint session of Congress on the state of the union. A few days later, Secretary of State Colin Powell reinitiated talk of “regime change.” By April, a number of journalists had begun asking whether the White House was planning to take the United States to war with Iraq.

At the end of August, Bush’s Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer, advised reporters that, according to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, the president had no need for “explicit authority from Congress to wage war with Iraq.” Similarly, on August 10, Richard Perle, head of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, told the London Daily Telegraph that, if necessary, the United States would act alone against Iraq.

These pronouncements conveyed the impression that the Bush administration was quite prepared to “go it alone” on Iraq—both nationally and internationally. Democrats were not the only ones alarmed. Retired generals and even elder Republican statesmen urged on the administration the prudence of constructive debate, an international coalition, and consultation with Congress.

The administration’s hard stance conditioned the subsequent debate. The Democratic leadership, in an effort to get the White House to consult Congress, began signaling that, if consulted, Congress would largely comply with presidential wishes. With the Democratic leadership in such supine posture, the outcome of Congressional debate was determined before it began. Thus, the subject of debate would soon shift from substance to scheduling, that is, when the debate should be held—before or after the congressional midterm elections in November.

At this moment, the White House initiated a media blitz. It began with an August 26 address by Vice President Dick Cheney to a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. The entire last third of this speech was devoted to Iraq and contained a refrain that would often be repeated: “The risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action.”

Cheney’s speech was soon followed by a series of television appearances by Bush cabinet members—a massive PR campaign within a span of just two days. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice went on CNN’s Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer to
deny that Saddam Hussein was a “peace-loving” man. Cheney appeared on NBC’s *Meet the Press* to speak of aluminum tubes and Saddam’s imminent development of nuclear weapons. On *Fox News Sunday*, Secretary of State Colin Powell supported skepticism about weapons inspections. There were also attempts to connect Iraq to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. All these points were brought together by President Bush in his September 12 speech to the UN General Assembly, which also made a major point of Iraq’s violation of UN resolutions.

After Bush’s address to the United Nations, congressional Democrats were ready to give the president the authorization he wanted to use force against Iraq. According to a *New York Times* editorial (2002) urging much more debate, Democratic acquiescence coalesced virtually overnight. Asked why, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle explained that as the president had now done much of what Democrats had requested—going to the United Nations and consulting Congress, the Democrats were now “reciprocating.”

There was, to be sure, still sporadic opposition. Senators John Kerry and Edward Kennedy argued against war until all other options had been exhausted. In an address to the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Kennedy questioned whether Saddam Hussein really had the alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and further argued that an Iraq war would be both a distraction from the war on terrorism and destabilizing to the Middle East. Kerry, like many others, further argued against “going it alone.”

Few argued that what the United States proposed to do would be aggressive or illegal. Even Al Gore (2002), whose oppositional speech was widely considered hard-hitting, painstakingly defended the legality of a U.S. attack. What instead concerned Gore were prudential considerations—that the United States act with a broad coalition and that it develop a clear postinvasion plan.

Yet, even within the elite circles of official Washington, some voices did raise moral and legal objections to war. Senator Robert Byrd (Democrat, WV) was tireless in arguing that Congress was about to sell out its constitutional war powers to a president who was “changing the conventional understanding of ‘self-defense’” (Byrd 2002). Representative Dennis Kucinich (Democrat, OH) similarly denounced Bush’s war plans as both illegal and immoral. Such arguments of principle, however, remained marginal in official Washington, which, instead, focused on matters of prudence.

If anything, the case for a second war with Iraq should have been more difficult than the first for the White House to frame. The first Gulf War was prompted by an indisputable act of aggression by Iraq—invasion of Kuwait. The second war was being urged for reasons nowhere nearly as clear-cut. Yet by August 2002, even before any significant debate in the public sphere, public opinion had already solidly aligned itself behind an invasion of Iraq and would remain there until well into the subsequent occupation. It was such strong public support for the president, whose stature was high after September 11, that made the Democrats so timid about challenging the march to war.

Thus, overall, in this context, any resistance to war in the press would be registered against dominant public opinion in the absence of strong opposition among political elites. Although political conservatives might still expect strong media criticism in
these circumstances, that expectation would not be entirely consistent with either the hegemony or the indexing models. Not even for Entman’s cascade model were these conditions most propitious for much media opposition.

METHODS

We examined opinion in six of the news publications generally considered elite (see, for example, Entman 2004; Mooney 2004): New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, TIME, and Newsweek. Op-eds were selected for inclusion if they were written between August 15 and October 15, 2002. To be selected for inclusion, an op-ed had to contain somewhere in the full text the words “Iraq” and “war.”

“War,” it turns out, was a widespread designation for the impending hostilities with Iraq. Thus, in a follow-up check of the NYT using the word “invasion” rather than “war,” only one op-ed was found over the three-month period that had not been picked up by using “war” as an identifier. This one did not differ in any noticeable way from the op-eds that were selected. As it stands, the use of the word “war” generated a corpus of 292 op-eds.

In a discussion of the state of the art in political communication, Graber (2005:492) notes how content analyses often suffer because of “the common practice of coding only small portions of news stories, thereby omitting many important themes and nuances.” This shortcoming was avoided here by coding op-eds at both a micro and a macro level of analysis.

The macro level of a piece concerns the piece’s overall characteristics (van Dijk 1985). At this level, two features were coded. First, each piece’s overall argument was coded as broadly in favor of Bush’s approach to Iraq, opposed, neutral, or other. The other macro level feature coded was whether or not the overall argument was clearly and entirely moral in nature—as opposed to an entirely prudential argument, an argument that mixed moral and prudential concerns, or an argument that was morally ambiguous or indistinct. Although originally an attempt was made to capture all such finer distinctions, they proved too latent to identify reliably.

At the micro level, following Entman (2003), pieces were coded for the presence or absence of 67 individual argumentative points, assertions, or assertion-types. These argumentative points were culled not only from the discourse in the elite press but also from beyond. One point of the study, after all, was to determine the nature of agenda-setting, if any, in the elite press. That question requires asking not only which kinds of points are present in the discourse but also which are absent.

Of the 67 argumentative points identified, 25 were points or arguments in favor of war, and 38 were points or arguments against. There were also four neutral-assertion types indicating such elements as textual reference to other op-eds or meta-commentary on the debate. In some cases, different argumentative points seem very close but, in fact, represent the nuances of different idioms. Consider, for example, v8 (“It is an unprovoked, aggressive war”) and v34 (“It is an immoral and unjust war”). Although
close, the two points are not identical. V8 expresses a legal point, whereas v34 expresses a moral evaluation with possible reference to Christian “Just War Theory.”

To determine the inter-rater reliability of the categories employed, two coders co-coded a sample of 50 pieces drawn randomly from the larger corpus. Reliability was measured via simple percent agreement, the most prevalent measure in social science (Neuendorf 2002:148). For whether or not a piece agreed overall with Bush's approach to Iraq, reliability was 86%. For whether or not a piece was clearly and exclusively making a moral argument, overall reliability was 98%. The inter-rater reliabilities for the individual argumentative points were uniformly high. Only two—v12 (“Saddam is dangerous to international security”) and v503 (“Criticism of the debate”)—had reliabilities under 80%. Specifically, the reliability for v12 was 76% and for v503 70%. The following variables (see Table 2 for variable identification) had reliabilities above 80% but below 86%: v8, v9, v32, v490, v499, and v504. All the other variables had reliabilities of 86% or above, most well above.

Overall, the median number of arguments per piece was two; the median number of arguments opposing war was one, as was the median number of arguments supporting it. That an assertion appears in a piece does not mean that the piece as a whole endorses it. A piece in favor of war, for example, might make one assertion advancing that position but also counter two argumentative assertions against war, which would then necessarily also appear in the piece. Coding this way permits examination of which points were simply considered, even if not endorsed. Which pieces actually endorsed which arguments can generally be inferred by cross-tabulating micro and macro arguments. The brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime, for example, showed up in 30% of pieces, making an overall argument in favor of war, as opposed to only 15% of pieces making an overall argument against war ($\alpha = .01$). On the other side, charges that the administration had not made its case (“Facts not proven”) showed up in 40% of pieces, making an overall argument against war, but in only 5% of pieces making an overall argument in favor of war ($\alpha < .001$).

There was a statistically significant difference ($\alpha = .009$) between the average number of microarguments contained in pieces making an overall argument against war ($\bar{x} = 4.2$) and those making an overall argument in favor of war ($\bar{x} = 3.2$). In general, the pieces making an overall argument against war considered an average of 2.7 microarguments against war and 1.4 arguments in favor of war. In contrast, pieces making an overall argument in favor of war considered an average of 0.9 microarguments against war and 2.3 microarguments in favor of war.

RESULTS

Table 1 indicates how op-ed arguments were distributed overall for or against war with Iraq. The first feature of the distribution to be noted (see Table 1a) is how both overall and within each individual publication any strong preponderance of arguments for or against war is diminished by a substantial number of pieces on the topic that take no side. A full 30% of the op-eds in the corpus neither approved nor disapproved of Bush’s approach to the war.
As Table 1c indicates, with the exception of the Post, the distribution of arguments in each paper becomes more one-sided when neutral pieces are removed from consideration. Thus, considering only those pieces that took a definite position for or against war, 70% of the pieces in TIME and Newsweek and 79% of the pieces in the NYT were against war. On the other side, 95% of the pieces in the WSJ were in favor.

As would be expected, one-sidedness generally becomes more pronounced in publications’ editorials. Thus, considering again only those pieces that took a definite posi-

### Table 1. Overall Op-Ed Position on War by Periodical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periodical</th>
<th>Prowar</th>
<th>Antiwar</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. All Op-Eds</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY Times</td>
<td>16% (13)</td>
<td>57% (46)</td>
<td>27% (22)</td>
<td>100% (81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>37% (43)</td>
<td>34% (39)</td>
<td>29% (34)</td>
<td>100% (116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>18% (5)</td>
<td>32% (9)</td>
<td>50% (14)</td>
<td>100% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>67% (35)</td>
<td>4.0% (2)</td>
<td>29% (15)</td>
<td>100% (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME and Newsweek</td>
<td>20% (3)</td>
<td>47% (7)</td>
<td>33% (5)</td>
<td>100% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34% (99)</td>
<td>36% (103)</td>
<td>30% (90)</td>
<td>100% (292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Editorials Only</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY Times</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>85% (17)</td>
<td>15% (3)</td>
<td>100% (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>28% (5)</td>
<td>39% (7)</td>
<td>33% (6)</td>
<td>100% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
<td>36% (4)</td>
<td>55% (6)</td>
<td>100% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>68% (17)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>32% (8)</td>
<td>100% (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31% (22)</td>
<td>39% (28)</td>
<td>30% (21)</td>
<td>100% (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. All Op-Eds with Neutral Removed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY Times</td>
<td>22% (13)</td>
<td>78% (46)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>52% (43)</td>
<td>48% (39)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% (82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>36% (5)</td>
<td>64% (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>95% (35)</td>
<td>5.0% (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME and Newsweek</td>
<td>30% (3)</td>
<td>70% (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49% (97)</td>
<td>51% (102)</td>
<td></td>
<td>100% (199)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*α < .001
**α = .02
tion on the war, all 17 of the editorials in the NYT were opposed, and all 17 of the editorials in the WSJ were in favor (see Table 1b). More curious in this regard is the Post, where the editorials were split. How can a single publication write editorials both for and against a policy? In one early editorial, the Post (2002a) describes itself as having argued for years that Saddam Hussein was a danger and, specifically, a danger against which the United Nations needed to act more forcibly. Yet, even in this prowar piece, the Post criticizes the failure of the Bush administration to make a coherent case for war.

In a subsequent, antiwar editorial that urges the administration against unilateral action and toward the continued building of a broad international coalition, the Post editors (2002b), nevertheless, warn that continued inspections could become a “trap.” It is, in other words, the Post’s ambivalence about Bush’s policy that inclines its editorials sometimes more negatively and sometimes more positively.

Bias is not something that can be identified in a value-neutral way simply by counting. Identification of bias depends also on a necessarily value-laden judgment of the actual truth of a matter. Hypothetically, for example, if some policy (say, either going or not going to war) is judged to be objectively and manifestly wrong-headed, then it is not an indication of bias to find even overwhelming opposition to it. Rather, in such a case, strong opposition would be an objectively appropriate response; on the contrary, in such a case, agreement or even weak opposition would, arguably, represent bias.

Yet, whatever the limits of counting alone, counts can tell us something. In particular, the observed distributions in Table 1 begin to counter the two more extreme views of the elite media. Overall, among those op-eds that take a position, the distribution of arguments for and against war is almost even. Such a distribution is hardly the mark of a press that is decidedly liberal. Of course, a disproportionate number of the supporting arguments are found in one publication—the WSJ, where support for war was almost total. Yet, even excluding the WSJ, the numbers fail to support a charge that the elite press as a whole has a liberal bias. Overall, the Post also published slightly more pieces supportive of than opposed to war. Furthermore, before a charge of liberal bias can be lodged against even the NYT, both the severity of its opposition and its merits would need to be judged.

On the other side, the observed distributions of op-ed arguments for and against war likewise count against the extreme view voiced by Helen Thomas that the elite press “lapped up everything the Pentagon and White House could dish out—no questions asked.” With the exceptions of the WSJ and the Post, op-ed opinion was predominantly opposed to administration policy.

The predominance of opposition over support for administration policy applies not only to the overall arguments of the pieces but also to the prevalence of micro points considered. As Table 2 indicates, 17 different argumentative points against war were considered by at least 5% of the pieces. In contrast, only 10 argumentative points in favor of war received that much attention.

The elite press, thus, cannot fairly be characterized as slavishly supportive of U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand, as will become evident, there are definite limits to how severely the elite press will criticize the government.
Table 2. Percentage of Op-eds Citing Each Argument (N = 292)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antiwar Argument</th>
<th>Citations (%)</th>
<th>Prowar Argument</th>
<th>Citations (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>v29 Facts not proven</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>v8 Iraq has WMD</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v43 Distraction from terrorism</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>v10 Brutal Saddam regime</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v47 Prudent to ask Congress</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>v9 Link with terrorism</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v44 Provoke counterattacks</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>v13 Saddam violated UN resolutions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v32 Need support of Allies</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>v486 Saddam crazy, evil</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v37 Have other options</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>v15 To promote democracy</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v30 Iraq not a threat</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>v499 Saddam a threat</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v46 Poor postwar plans</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>v12 Saddam world danger</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v20 Young American lives at risk</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>v18 Inspections failed</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v24 Will create civilian casualties</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>v485 Need for show of force</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v33 Deterrence can work</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>v505 Don’t need UN</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v26 Will foster anti-U.S. sentiment</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>v493 War will be easy</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v27 Will be threat to regional Allies</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>v14 Deterrence not working</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v25 Create Middle East instability</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>v491 Right to self-defense</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v19 Illegal domestically</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>v502 Risks inaction &gt; action</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v495 Imperialism</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>v487 War continuation, not preemption</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v41 Will legitimize force</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>v489 Civilization vs. terrorism</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v23 Illegal internationally</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>v501 Legal domestically</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v38 Will be another Vietnam</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>v484 Maintain U.S. hegemony</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v498 Need more talk</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>v17 Serve our economic interests</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v31 Costs issues</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>v490 Inaction irresponsible</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v42 Will provoke terrorism</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>v488 U.S. intl sheriff</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v21 War aggressive, unprovoked</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>v492 Just per JWT</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v45 Will create global stability</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v28 Iraq has no delivery system</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v35 War will be easy</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v34 War immoral, unjust</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v36 A Bush vendetta</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v481 Against American values</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v500 Bush reckless</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neutral Argument                  | Citations (%) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>v39 Preemptive policy bad</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v40 Will hurt U.S. image</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v497 Unbecoming of intl. leader</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v48 Unjust per JWT</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evident from Table 2 is the general diffuseness of the argumentative points. Only a few points were cited by 10% or more of the op-eds. Although there are more of them, the opposing points are more diffuse than the points supportive of administrative policy. Only three argumentative points opposed to administration policy are considered by 10% or more of the op-eds: Facts have not been proven (17%); a fight with Iraq will distract
from the war on terrorism (12%); and it is prudent to consult Congress (10%). In contrast, five argumentative points in support of administration policy were considered by at least 10% of op-eds: Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMDs (40%); his connection with terrorism (18%); the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime (18%); Saddam Hussein’s violation of UN resolutions (15%); and malevolence (12%).

The most frequently cited points supportive of administration policy are cited with greater frequency than points opposed, indicating a president’s ability to set the agenda for debate. True, some of the administration’s own major points—Cheney’s point, for example, that the risks of inaction outweigh the risks of action—received surprisingly little attention within the opinion pages. Yet the five most frequently cited supportive points—three of which are most cited overall—all emanated from the administration first. Such points, emanating from the administration, are not like other points. They need to be countered and must, necessarily, show up in pieces opposing administration policy as well as in pieces supporting it.

The asymmetry further shows up in what were and were not statistically significant differences in point presence between pro and con pieces. There were no statistically significant differences between pro and con pieces in how frequently Iraq’s possession of WMDs was mentioned, its ties to terrorists, or Saddam’s villainy. The con pieces, in other words, had to discuss these points almost as much as pro pieces. As indicated before, there was a significant difference on the brutality of Saddam’s regime ($\alpha = .01$), which was mentioned by 30% of the pro pieces, but even the con pieces mentioned it 15% of the time.

On the con side, it is perhaps not of much significance to find that whereas 40% of con pieces say the administration has not proven its claims, that sentiment is expressed by only 5% of the pro pieces ($\alpha = .002$). It is more revealing to find a statistically significant difference in the worry that a war with Iraq will distract from the war against terrorism. This worry was mentioned by 22% of the con pieces but by only 6% of the pro pieces ($\alpha < .001$). Similarly, 16% of con pieces speak of options other than war, as compared with only 2% of pro pieces ($\alpha = .001$). Altogether, both in what is statistically different between pro and con pieces and in what is not, the effect of the president’s power to set the discussion is clear. That power is twofold. On the one hand, it is the power to establish which points must be discussed by both sides. At the same time, it is the power often to ignore points raised by the side that opposes the president.

Although the elite publications differed in the frequencies with which certain points were raised, most of the differences were not statistically significant. The differences that were statistically significant are presented in Table 3. With which points are the pieces in each publication distinctly preoccupied?

Most obvious in this regard is the WSJ. Its commentary is uniformly preoccupied with points in favor of war: the brutality of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Saddam’s violation of UN resolutions, and the threat Saddam poses to the United States and the world. The frequencies with which these points are cited in the WSJ are not only substantially higher than for the other publications, but they are also high absolutely. These points were among the WSJ’s chief concerns.
Opinion in *TIME* and *Newsweek* also frequently cited the brutality of Saddam’s regime. What makes the opinion expressed in *TIME* and *Newsweek* distinct is the 20% frequency with which the contrary point was cited—the war’s potential to destabilize the Middle East. At most, other publications cited that point only about half as frequently.

Opinion in the *NYT* most distinctly raised the concern that war with Iraq would create a distraction from the war on terrorism. To a lesser extent, *Post* opinion also raised this concern as did opinion in the *WSJ*, but the latter raised the point only to argue against it.

The opinions in the *NYT* and especially the *Post* are distinct because of the frequency of metacritique—how often there was criticism of how the issues were being debated. Such criticism addressed both individual parties to the debate and the nature of the debate as a whole. Considerable commentary, for example, urged against politicization of the debate, and the *NYT* especially continuously criticized the Democrats’ hesitance to debate at all.

One last distinctive pattern that shows up in Table 3 is the total absence of any commentary in either the *Post* or the two newsweeklies challenging the international legality of an attack on Iraq. Of course, as could already be gleaned from Table 2, that particular challenge is sparse even in the other elite publications. Indeed, in the *WSJ*, international law is raised only to be dismissed—as in a piece by Lee Casey and David Rivkin (2002), entitled “War Is Not Against the Law.” In the *NYT*, too, one of the few pieces that raises the issue (Keller 2002) does so only to dismiss it. One of the others is purely informational on the response of the nation’s liberal religious leaders (Steinfels 2002). In the *NYT*, only a solitary piece—by Bruce Ackerman (2002) of Yale Law School—made its central focus the international illegality of the contemplated military action.

### Table 3. Distribution of Arguments by Periodical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th><em>NY Times</em></th>
<th>Wash. Post</th>
<th><em>Wall Street Journal</em></th>
<th>Christian Science Monitor</th>
<th><em>TIME and Newsweek</em></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AG: Illegal internationally*</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG: Create Middle East instability**</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG: Distraction from terrorism*</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG: NAC / Imperialism*</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR: Brutal Saddam regime*</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR: Saddam violated UN resolutions*</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOR: Saddam a threat*</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEU: Criticism of debates**</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*α = .05

**α = .01
Table 4 indicates how opinion differs across the publications when we distinguish between unsigned editorials, which represent a publication’s official position, and signed pieces, representing the individual opinions of regular or guest columnists. There were no unsigned editorials for the newsweeklies, and so they do not show up in Table 4a.

Perhaps the first noticeable feature of Table 4a is the near absence of any of the listed pro arguments in the editorials of the WSJ. In particular, the WSJ editors alone never evidently found any of the administration’s assertions about Iraq needing further proof. The other discernable patterns concern the distinct preoccupations of the editors at the NYT and the Post. NYT editorials distinctly emphasized both that the United States possessed options other than war—an emphasis shared by the CSM—and that war with Iraq would be a distraction from the war on terrorism. For their part, Post editorials distinctly emphasized the need for support from allies.

Table 4b presents the distinctive emphases of the signed opinion pieces across the different publications. Unsurprisingly, the WSJ takes a strong lead in mentions of Saddam Hussein’s brutality. At most, opinion writers in the other publications mention this point only half as often. The WSJ also leads in mentions of Iraq’s link with terrorism, although on this point, the emphasis is shared—albeit less strongly—by opinion in the CSM and the newsweeklies. In fact, on Saddam’s link with terrorism, the NYT and the Post constitute the outliers with only 13% and 16% mentions of the point, respectively. In comparison with the other publications, signed opinion in
these two major newspapers likewise underemphasizes Saddam’s possession of WMDs. A final, quite striking pattern to be discerned in this table is the newsweeklies’ distinct preoccupation with a lack of postwar plans. Whereas that concern shows up in 20% of the signed opinion pieces in the newsweeklies, it hardly appears in the signed opinion of the others—and not at all in the \textit{WSJ}.

All in all, the data presented in Tables 3 and 4 indicate a diversity of opinion in the elite press. Certainly, there are major differences of opinion between the \textit{WSJ} and the other elite publications. Even excluding the \textit{WSJ}, different emphases remain across publications. There is also diversity of opinion within publications, not just among columnists, but also between signed and unsigned columns.

In the end, what do these data signify for the different relations posited between the government and the elite press? The data fail to confirm either of the two more extreme views—that the press does little more than support U.S. foreign policy or that it reflects a strongly liberal point of view.

Is the indexing model supported by the data? To an extent, yes. The dissenting points most frequently cited in the press (again, see Table 2) do match the dominant points against war raised by elite politicians. That, for example, the United States should exhaust other options, that it should not “go it alone,” and the specter of another Vietnam were all points found not only in the press but also on the lips of elite politicians.

Was the elite press then just echoing elite political dissent as the indexing model alleges? If a specific causal direction is implied by that allegation, such direction is difficult to determine from these data. Any causal interpretation is further complicated by the fact that opinion in the elite press is interpenetrated by political elites. As noted earlier, 13% of the pieces in this corpus were written by politicians.

What most tells against the indexing model and more toward Entman’s cascade model is that, in this case, elite dissent was so desultory. Over and over in this period, the press was in the position of cajoling Congress and the political opposition to engage in more debate (e.g., \textit{NYT} 2002; \textit{Post} 2002c). Such a posture is hardly indicative of a press merely expressive of elite dissent. On the contrary, in its effort to keep aflame a faltering opposition, press opinion was trying for some independence, much as Entman suggests.

If so, the line was semi-independent only. If the elite press was not echoing the political elite, it was nevertheless expressing much the same perspective. The range of acceptable debate was the same for both. In particular, for both the politicians and the press, morality and legality were marginalized. Friel and Falk (2004) accuse the \textit{NYT} in particular of ignoring legal objections, and Funk (2004) likewise finds moral arguments sparse in its pages.

As already seen, Friel and Falk’s complaints about the \textit{NYT} are true of the elite press in general. Specifically, in only 4% of the pieces in the elite press is there any mention of the international legality of a preemptive assault on Iraq—and only a third of those occur in pieces arguing against war. To be sure, the press considered it prudent for the president to secure both congressional and UN support (see Table 2), but counseling prudence is different from affirming a legal necessity, and the word
“support” is likewise different from “approval.” In effect, the elite press gave the White House a pass on matters of legality.

Could it be that in actuality the press ignored legal matters because there were no legal matters at issue? A number of considerations suggest otherwise. Domestically, there is a huge literature on the War Powers Act, the interpretation of which remains highly contested. Certainly, more on this topic should have surfaced in the press. On international law, as indicated, the press did publish a few pieces, which suggests at least recognition of an issue at stake. When a Yale law professor declares a proposed U.S. policy illegal internationally, there clearly is room for debate. The international illegality of an unprovoked military action against Iraq was further affirmed by considerable commentary in publications of both the secular and religious left such as The Nation and Commonweal and by a spate of books (e.g., Sands 2005) published subsequently. The absence of such issues does not explain the press’s neglect of legal matters.

Not only legal matters were neglected. Equally neglected was any kind of moral criticism of the proposed policy. It is one thing for moral criticism to be absent from reporting in straight news pieces. It is something else for moral criticism to be absent from pieces that are supposed to evaluate and appraise.

Moral appraisal in general is not absent from the corpus. In aggregate, 15% of the pieces made arguments that were moral in nature, most frequently in the WSJ (28%) or CSM (25%) and least frequently in the NYT (10%). Half of such pieces, however, were prowar and another 12% of them neutral about the war plan itself. Thus, throughout the elite press, only about 6% of the op-eds offered principled moral or legal arguments against war.

As indicated in Table 2, even at the micro level of analysis, moral points critical of the proposed war were raised only infrequently. No piece made an argument that the proposed war would violate the standards of Just War Theory (JWT). True, JWT was originally a religious doctrine, but so was the golden rule. We need not be specifically religious to employ its reasoning as is demonstrated by Michael Walzer’s (2000) well-known book on the subject.

If not JWT, there are other ways to morally appraise a proposed war. It is possible, for example, to employ the kind of communitarian reasoning commended by Bellah et al. (1985), formulated in terms of the U.S. role in the world or its traditional values. Yet we see again in Table 2 that just one piece argued that the contemplated attack was unbecoming of the world’s only superpower (0.3%), and just two pieces (0.7%) argued that such an unprovoked attack was counter to American values. In only 2% of the op-eds was there clear wording to the effect that war would be morally bad or wrong; in only 2.4% was the war described as unprovoked or aggressive; and only 1% of the pieces suggested it would be “immoral” or “unjust.” Apprehension about Iraqi civilians, which is a moral concern, was mentioned in over 5% of the pieces, although only 3.8% of the time did such mention occur in a piece that argued against war.

What explains the elite press’s avoidance of specifically moral criticism of the proposed attack? It is possible, for example, to employ the kind of communitarian reasoning commended by Bellah et al. (1985), formulated in terms of the U.S. role in the world or its traditional values. Yet we see again in Table 2 that just one piece argued that the contemplated attack was unbecoming of the world’s only superpower (0.3%), and just two pieces (0.7%) argued that such an unprovoked attack was counter to American values. In only 2% of the op-eds was there clear wording to the effect that war would be morally bad or wrong; in only 2.4% was the war described as unprovoked or aggressive; and only 1% of the pieces suggested it would be “immoral” or “unjust.” Apprehension about Iraqi civilians, which is a moral concern, was mentioned in over 5% of the pieces, although only 3.8% of the time did such mention occur in a piece that argued against war.
privatization of morality, that is, the contraction of morality from the public sphere to the private sphere so that it applies exclusively to personal lifestyle matters and not at all to anything macrosocial.

The avoidance of moral language in the elite press may also reflect the hegemony of political realism, which from World War II until very recently has dominated establishment discussion of international relations. Realism specifically calls for withholding moral judgment about war for fear of a Manichean framing through which belligerents cast each other as evil, the result being an inflammation of mutual hatred. Of course, it was in just such Manichean terms that President Bush framed the U.S. war against terrorism. Indeed, in telling the West Point graduates that "America will call evil by its name," President Bush, like neoconservatives generally, was explicitly challenged to orthodoxy with an injection of morality.

Opinion writers also likely avoid moral language in order to adhere to what they consider the governing standard of objectivity. One of the lessons to be drawn from the demise of positivism, however, is that not only is there no such thing as value neutrality but also that the very effort to appear value-neutral can create its own considerable bias. President Bush and the neoconservatives are, after all, correct that in the refusal to call an action evil, the implication ineluctably conveyed is that the act is not evil. Just so in this case. As Friel and Falk (2004) contend, in the elite press's avoidance of hard-hitting objections of principle to U.S. foreign policy, the government's side of an argument is lent an appearance of moral and intellectual parity that it does not possess but that, rather, is ideologically fabricated.

The ideological nature of the result is evident in one last look at Table 2. The elite press was only asymmetrically successful in avoiding moral language. Whereas no single moral or legal point against war is mentioned by even 10% of op-eds, three moral or legal points in favor of war are: the brutality of Saddam's regime; Saddam's violation of UN resolutions, and Saddam's villainy. In aggregate, only 12% of op-eds mention at least one or another (but rarely more than one) of the moral points against war (in descending order of frequency, v24, v23, v21, v34, v481, v39, v497, v48). In contrast, 36% of op-eds—three times as many—mention one or another (often more than one) legal or moral point in favor of war (in descending order of frequency, v10, v13, v486, v491, v489, v488, v492). If the promotion of democracy (v15) were added, also frequently cited as a moral reason for war, then the frequency of mentions of legal or moral arguments for war rises to 39%. Such asymmetrical treatment of moral and legal points for and against war not only reinforces ideologically the impression that the United States is not in the wrong but also may even foster the impression that it is in the right.

**CONCLUSION**

Against the hegemony model of the press, this paper showed that the opinion pages of the elite press cannot be accused of blind support for administration policy in the months preceding the congressional vote authorizing force against Iraq. Nor, given the feeble opposition of the Democratic leadership, can the press be accused as in the
indexing model of merely echoing elite dissent. On the contrary, as Entman suggests can sometimes happen, the elite press—aside from the *WSJ*—was, if anything, more consistently critical of the proposed attack than the oppositional political elites.

Yet, if in this case the opinion pages of the elite press offered a semi-independent channel of communication on foreign policy, it was, nevertheless, still a channel in which the range of respectable opinion was as narrow as the indexing model maintains. In particular, critical opinion in the elite press was predominantly of a prudential nature. Rarely was there moral or legal criticism of the proposed policy. Instead, as critical theory might put it, the elite press seemed to retreat from values rationality to an almost exclusive concern with instrumental reason.

Yet speaking of a retreat from values rationality understates the problem, for the retreat was not symmetrical. Rather, there was more retreat from legal and moral *self*-criticism than legal and moral criticism of the *other*, who continued to be demonized in legal and moral terms. Political realism has called for the withdrawal of moral judgments on war to avoid a Manichean tendency of each nation to align itself with good and its enemies with evil. An evident effect of realist discourse observed here, however, is that the moral demonization of the enemy remains, almost unnoticed as such, while moral self-criticism is all but filtered out. Such ideological result is precisely what realism seeks to avoid.

Even apart from such moral asymmetry, it is troubling to see a retreat from moral language in the opinion pages of the elite press. Is it important that in its foreign affairs the United States conduct itself in a legal and moral manner? If so, how will that happen without collective legal and moral deliberation? The sector of the public sphere represented by the opinion pages of the elite press presented little such deliberation. On the contrary, the near absence of legal and moral thinking in those pages helps reinforce the impression among the population as a whole that in foreign affairs there are no moral or legal considerations legitimately to be thought about.

Alexander G. Nikolaev is an assistant professor of communication in the Department of Culture and Communication at Drexel University in Philadelphia. He earned his doctorate from Florida State University, where he also taught for four years. His areas of research interest and expertise include such fields as public relations, political communication, organizational communication, international communication, international negotiations, international news coverage, and discourse analysis. He authored several articles in these areas in trade and scholarly journals as well as book chapters in the United States and overseas. He edited *Leading to the 2003 Iraq War: The Global Media Debate* with E. Hakanen. He has practical work experience in the fields of journalism and public relations in the United States and Eastern Europe. His current research focuses on international political rhetoric, international news coverage, international negotiations, and transformation and applications of the two-level game theory.

REFERENCES


The Microlevel Discourse of Social Movement Framing: Debating Antiwar Protests on a University Listserv

Mark Hedley*
Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville
Sara A. Clark
Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville

Over the past two decades, researchers have increasingly employed frame analysis in attempts to understand the genesis, development, and outcomes of social movements. Relatively little attention, however, has focused on the microlevel processes involved in generating social movement frames. This paper is an effort to link theories of social movement framing with the methodology of discourse analysis. In the following, an online debate over the legitimacy of protests against the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States provides qualitative data for a discourse analysis of microlevel framing processes. The debate occurred on a university listserv and involved more than 100 messages offered by 67 individuals over 16 days. Analyses reveal four distinct framing contests in the discourse. An initiating contest regarding a specific antiwar protest is found to generate three additional contests, the first about antiwar protests more generally, the second about the war in Iraq itself, and the third about the appropriateness of holding such a debate on a listserv sent to university employees. A framing process schema is offered to represent conflict between social movement and countermovement participants across the discourse.

On March 19, 2003, a campus peace organization (CPO) at a public university of approximately 13,000 students located in the midwestern United States posted the following email announcement:

CPO, a university-recognized organization, announces the intentions of its members to join the National Strike called for tomorrow, March 20, the day after the war on Iraq began.

We will not go to work. We will not go to class.

All are welcome to join us on the quad, in front of the library, in a vigil for peace and justice.

This email was posted on the university’s faculty and staff listservs. It inspired a sometimes contentious electronic discussion composed of approximately 120 separate messages posted by 67 different individuals over the course of 16 days.

*Please send all correspondence to the first author at mhedley@siue.edu.
In the following, we treat this listserv discussion as data and apply the sibling logics of frame and discourse analysis. Our data provide an excellent opportunity to contribute to the social movement framing literature because this discourse does not present some of the problems associated with data typical to social movement framing research (see Johnston 2002). Such research typically relies on documents generated by social movement organizations and/or interviews with activists; some complement these with documents and/or interviews representing social movement adversaries and others focus on media representations of social movements.

These documents, interviews, and media products do not provide actual texts of microlevel framing processes. Documents directly reveal only the products of such processes. Interviews and media products may provide texts about such processes, but not texts of the actual processes themselves. Therefore, relatively little attention is paid to the microlevel processes that generate social movement frames and counterframes. Our data, however, do provide a text of microlevel framing processes related to the social movement against the war in Iraq. This text was produced through the voluntary participation of a self-selected group of individuals that included active opponents and supporters of the invasion as well as others who stated no position regarding the war.

THE FRAMING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT DISCOURSE

The application of frame analysis specifically to the sociological analysis of social movements is a relatively recent occurrence. Such applications have, however, experienced a significant growth in popularity since the introduction by David Snow and colleagues (1986). While the current application of the concept of frame dates back at least to Bateson (1972), the sociological application of frame analysis owes more to the work of Erving Goffman (1974).

According to Goffman, frames are the elements from which definitions of situations are constructed; they are “schemata of interpretation” (1974:21) that condition our perception of and involvement in social interaction. Here, Goffman reveals an understanding of frames as cognitive structures that are triggered by environmental stimuli. When a student enters a classroom, she observes a chalkboard, a large desk in front of the chalkboard, a chair and podium at the large desk facing away from the chalkboard, and some number of smaller desks facing the chalkboard. Observing these visual stimuli elicits in the student a cognitive framework that informs the student about the meaning of the situation at hand. Moreover, the elicitation of this frame informs the student about what behavior may be expected of her in that situation.

With respect to social movements, Snow and Benford (1992) define frames in terms of beliefs that may motivate and legitimate social action. Like Goffman, Snow and Benford recognize that frames, when triggered in the mind of an individual, may influence that individual’s behavior. The relationship between frame and behavior, however, is viewed in neither case as deterministic. Frames in both cases are viewed as potential influences on behavior, not as deterministic causes of behavior.
The location of a frame in the brain of the individual does not suggest that the frame originates in the individual’s brain. Goffman explicitly defines social frameworks as conditioned upon the social experience of malleable human beings. Individuals’ responses to elicited frames are “guided doings” that are subject to “standards of social appraisal” (1974:22). Social frames are learned frames; individual responses to these frames are likewise social and conditioned upon individuals’ learned understanding of and attitude toward relevant social norms. It is not surprising, then, that sociologists who apply frame analysis to social movements view wholly cognitive approaches to frame analysis as “overlooking the interactive, constructionist character of movement framing processes” (Benford and Snow 2000:613).

The fact that social movement framing processes involve communication among competing interest groups has a definite influence on the quality of these processes. They are competitive processes in which opposing factions contest the relative legitimacy of movement goals and the status quo (McAdam et al. 1996). These factions exist in relation to one another, and, therefore, engage in processes of framing and counterframing as they seek to legitimate themselves and to delegitimate others. In attempting to accomplish this, they carefully distinguish their frames from opponents’ frames by establishing symbolic boundaries in between (Hunt et al. 1994).

Given the reality that social movement frames exist in relation to each other, these schemata are flexible. They respond and adapt to interaction with others. Meaning generated within a given frame may be transformed by the recognition of particular cues in the social environment. In Goffman’s terms, such cues, or keys, serve to signal that “participants in the activity are meant to know and to openly acknowledge that a systematic alteration is involved, one that will radically reconstitute what it is for them that is going on” (1974:45). In other words, keys change the subject from one topic to another related one.

The recognition of keyings and rekeyings that transition discourses from one frame or framing competition to the next demonstrates the relevance of framing processes to Goffman. In fact, Goffman provides the term “strip” to refer to a “slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity” (1974:10). Thus, Goffman recognizes frames as involving both psychological structure and social process.

In addition to locating cognitive frames within social processes, the keying and rekeying of frames also creates a layering effect to which Goffman refers as “lamination”: “Given the possibility of a frame that incorporates rekeyings, it becomes convenient to think of each transformation as adding a layer or lamination to the activity” (Goffman 1974:82). The addition of laminations to a strip increases the complexity of its framing process. This is partly because any given transformation may elicit competing frames among different participants. The reality that one lamination may involve multiple framings of the same subject reveals that lamination is not synonymous with frame. In the absence of contestation, frames and laminations may exist in a one-to-one ratio. The presence of contestation, however, produces multiple alternative frames within a single lamination.
THE DISCOURSE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT FRAMING

In the most general terms, discourse analysis involves the systematic search for meaning in human communication (Coulthard 1985). More specifically, Wetherall et al. (2001) define it as the analysis of how language is used and identify two disparate goals of such study. The first treats language as the topic of study and seeks to understand how language is used to generate meaning. The second and more sociological approach treats meaning as its topic and uses language as a resource in which meaning may be found. Verbal records of language use serve as the data of discourse analysis and are referred to as texts.

Given its focus on language and meaning, discourse analysis is perhaps less concerned than framing analysis with outcomes and more concerned with external factors that influence discourse. The external environment, often referred to as the discursive field (Wuthnow 1997), provides rules for language use, cultural values and beliefs, and norms for social interaction (van Dijk 1997).

Discourse analysts appreciate that the discursive field is rife with conflict. Consequently, discourse analysis has undergone a process of “dialectification” in recent times (Van Emeron et al. 1997:215). Language and meaning are recognized as social constructs generated through reflexive and often antagonistic social interaction. Therefore, texts are artifacts of social processes in which every act of communication is conditioned upon previous acts of communication and anticipated future acts of communication; communicative acts are interdependent (Halliday and Hasan 1976). Under conditions of conflict, the desire to generate meaning implies the desire to undermine alternative meanings (Edwards and Potter 1992; Wetherell et al. 2001). Theoretically speaking, this compliments the emphasis of framing analysis on how competing frames vie for positions of power and control in the social system by focusing on how competing frames also reveal preexisting friction in the discursive field.

The fact that social movement framing processes necessarily involve communication suggests that discourse analysis is a potentially valuable tool for social movement researchers (see Johnston 2002). At macrolevels of analysis, such discourse is often facilitated by mass media and involves the exchange of preconstructed frames. Relevant discourse may also involve the use of preconstructed frames by social movement organizations for purposes of recruitment and mobilization (see Snow et al. 1986). These frames are initially constructed, however, via discourse at the microlevel. Consequently, Fine suggests that it is helpful to go so far as conceptualizing social movements as “bundles” of microlevel narratives (1995:128). Using participant observation methods rather than discourse analysis, Benford (1993) has explored the microlevel development of frames among antinuclear social movement organizations in Austin, Texas. However, this research involved conflict only within a social movement. We seek to expand on Benford’s example by using discourse analytical techniques and by applying these techniques to a text that involves both movement and countermovement participants.
METHODOLOGY

Our analysis of the discourse involved a multistage application of constant comparison (Altheide 1987). Constant comparison, while time-consuming, is both simple and intuitive. It involves the case-to-case comparison of every unit of analysis in a sample in an attempt to classify cases into categories based on theoretically relevant and emergent variables. In applying constant comparison, neither the complete list of relevant variables nor lists of relevant categories for each variable are determined in advance. Instead, variables and categories emerge as relevant with researchers’ exposure to data. We collected our data using the individual posting as the unit of analysis by downloading and printing emails according to subject heading. We organized the text temporally according to date and time of posting, as well as by recognizing strings of postings generated by participants’ use of the reply button to generate a new posting in response to a previous posting.

Two qualities of this data warn against the generalization of any findings to other contexts of discourse. First, our data represent only a partial sample of the discourse. Any relevant posting addressed to an individual rather than one of the listservs could not be downloaded. Evidence suggests that such postings did occur. One participant explicitly mentioned receiving “many emails” in response to one posted on the listservs. None of these, however, showed up on the listservs. We have no way of estimating the prevalence of this practice.

Second, the location of this discourse on two university listservs is unique. In terms of listservs per se, the available academic literature on computer mediated communication (see Jones 1999) suggests that computer mediated discourse is likely to display a relatively low level of etiquette because of the absence of norms made salient in other contexts. According to this literature, the relative anonymity of online communication as well as the increased social distance involved in electronic communication relative to face-to-face interaction serves to (1) deemphasize the constraining influence of offline identities (Jordan 1999; Lee 2006) and to (2) increase the likelihood of criticism and negative attacks (Coffey and Woolworth 2004; Myers 1987; Nguyen and Alexander 1996; Putnam 2000; Schultz 2000). While our data involve a text in which anonymity was impossible, as user names were provided by the university in question and based on the real names of participants, the social distance involved in electronic communication remained operant. Further, the fact that membership in the listserv in question was mandatory for all university employees distinguishes them from most other formats of electronic communications. We are not surprised, then, that several participants called for a more intimate and voluntary forum of discourse that might inhibit negative and personal attacks.

We initially applied constant comparison in order to identify the central topics of the discourse. Two such topics emerged: (1) the U.S. invasion of Iraq (and protests against it) and (2) the appropriateness of the discourse for its setting. We treated those postings that referenced both topics as relevant to both groupings.

Next, we used constant comparison to identify frame laminations within each topic grouping. For the war topic, we identified an initial framing contest and two
laminations. For the second, we identified only a single framing contest. In the first case, the initiating contest concerned the status of the strike announced by the CPO. Laminations included (a) the status of antiwar protests in general and (b) the legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the second case, the contest concerned the quality of the discourse itself and whether or not it was appropriate to the listservs in question. Within each lamination, we identified individual postings according to their stance (pro vs. con) on the relevant issue. Finally, we analyzed each posting to identify its justification for its stance and used constant comparison to generate lists of justifications (pro and con) regarding each lamination of the discourse. Again, we treated postings that referenced multiple laminations and/or justifications as relevant in multiple contexts.

The final stage of this process was informed by Van Dijk's (1988a; 1988b) methodology developed for the content analysis of news discourse. Echoing Snow and Benford's (1992) definition of social movement frames as sets of beliefs that motivate and/or justify activism, this methodology seeks to identify propositions in the text that explain or justify an author's position regarding a controversial social issue. Propositions may be grouped according to position on any issue (see Klandermans and Goslinga 1996), thereby summarizing alternative propositions offered by various factions involved in framing contests. In this case, we used the methodology to identify competing propositions regarding the legitimacy of the strike proposed by the CPO, the legitimacy of antiwar protests in general, the legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the appropriateness of the related discourse to the faculty and staff listservs of the university.

**Ethical Considerations**

While doing this research, we entertained the idea of gathering basic demographic information about participants as well as information regarding their departmental affiliations and teaching/research interests. Such information is either public or of public record and is easy enough to obtain. We realized, however, that to do so might be considered by some to be an unwarranted invasion of privacy. These considerations led us to carefully evaluate the ethics of our project.

The primary ethical standards operating here include informed consent and confidentiality. According to Section 12.01 (a) of the American Sociological Association's Code of Ethics (1999), the acquisition of informed consent is required when researchers gather data by communicating or interacting with human subjects, when researchers gather data by intervening in subjects’ lives, or when data involve the observation of subjects’ behavior that occurs in private. As neither of us in any way had any contact with participants regarding the discourse and in no way participated in the discourse ourselves, and as the discourse did not take place in a private situation or setting, we made no attempt to gain informed consent prior to downloading and printing the discourse. We did, however, make every attempt to focus our analysis on the discourse itself and to minimize, if not eliminate, any focus on the participants involved.
In terms of confidentiality, Section 11.01 (a) and (b) of the code requires that researchers “take reasonable precautions” to maintain confidentiality “even if there is no legal protection or privilege to do so” (9). We interpret these tenets broadly and have endeavored to maintain the confidentiality of participants by providing no personal identifiers in this text and by removing them from our data. Further, we decided to take the additional step of not pursuing the demographic and occupational data discussed above. We made this decision, in part, because a strong majority of the participants in this discourse were faculty members of a single ethnic group. Since our sample is small, the identification of nonfaculty occupational status and/or minority ethnic status would unduly hamper our ability to hold the identity of some participants in confidence. We decided, therefore, to forego relevant analyses. In the unlikely event that the reporting of extensive or complete quotations may be traced to an individual, we have also minimized the use of such quotes in reporting our findings. While we may have sacrificed the discovery of some relevant sociological information, we do not want to be responsible for influencing anyone to refrain from participating in similar electronic discourses in the future.

Creating a Schematic Representation

In addition to performing this discourse analysis, we also seek to build on Johnston’s (1995) work on the use of discourse analysis to generate graphic representations of frames. While Johnston’s method depicts only the positioning of symbols within a single frame’s structural hierarchy as variable, we seek to represent multiple frames involved in a framing process by a single schema. We also seek to represent two additional variables in this schema, variation in position (pro vs. con) regarding an issue and temporal order within a framing process.

Johnston’s representation of frame schemata is founded upon three propositions (1995:237). The first concerns the existence of frames as cognitive structures, the second that groups of individuals who share similar worldviews will also share similar frames, and the third that frame structures are conditioned by the situations that elicit them. Johnston’s orientation toward representation assumes that the “true location” of frames lies in the “black box” of the mind (Johnston 1995:218). If discourse is to reflect the underlying structure of one mind, then that discourse will be monologic rather than interactive. Johnston’s own research does concern interview data as a form of monologue. After conducting one-on-one interviews with subjects, he uses discourse analysis to tease out symbols relevant to a given frame and orders them in a frame schema from concrete to abstract. Since his texts do not involve communicative interaction between subjects, his data are appropriate to his conceptualization.

Our data, however, involve interaction among a group of individuals who do not share similar worldviews. Therefore, they do not share similar frames. In fact, the discourse at hand indicates much opposition in terms of worldview. If we were to apply Johnston’s method of representing single frames, we would be required to construct different frame schemas for each point of view expressed in the discourse regarding each framing contest. Not only would this complicate a representation intended to simplify matters, but such parsing of the discourse would neglect its interactive
nature. Because the frames evidenced in the discourse have been expressed in relation to each other, they exist within one interactive context.

Therefore, we construct a three-dimensional representation of a framing process. This representation seeks to complement Johnston by including oppositional frames offered by competing factions and by ordering the introduction of these frames over the process of the discourse.

FRAME CONTESTATION: AN INITIATING FRAME AND THREE LAMINATIONS

The CPO’s announcement, provided on the first page of this article, initiated the discourse. In addition to the implied antiwar stance, it emphasized the legitimate status of the CPO as a “university recognized” organization. It also emphasized the collective and inclusive nature of the CPO and its proposed action by using the plurals “members,” “we,” and “us” and by stating that “all” are “welcome” to “join.”

Further, this initiating frame attempted to align its specific purpose with the more general goals of attaining “peace” and “justice.” It represented the seriousness of this pursuit by referencing its action as a “vigil,” a somber and respectful form of collective action. The choice of words in the posting serves to link the action proposed with more universally recognized frames, or master frames (Snow and Benford 1992).

The CPO’s announcement was posted a little before 10:00 p.m. on a Wednesday night. The first response was posted before 6:00 a.m. the following morning. Several others were posted before noon. By the following Saturday morning, 15 postings were offered directly referring to the strike announcement. Twelve of the 15 revealed negative reactions to the strike. Derogatives such as “nonsense,” “destructive,” “worst,” “disservice,” “abdication,” “wrong,” “remiss,” and “misplaced” marked these postings. Disagreement with the strike fell along three dimensions.

The most common dimension of criticism viewed the strike as running counter to students’ interests. Rather than canceling a class to protest the invasion, these criticisms suggested that students could be better served by being given an opportunity in class to discuss the invasion: to voice their opinions, their concerns, and their fears. By providing a safe place for such discussion, the classroom could serve to help students deal with the stress generated by the war. One posting emphasized the importance of such a place for international students.

These criticisms viewed the classroom also as a place in which students could learn about the invasion from an informed teacher, an expert of sorts. The “callousness” of some students could be broken down, thereby improving their “citizenship.” One posting provided citations of literature that could be used to guide active class discussion; another even suggested holding an extra class session devoted to such discussion, rather than canceling an existing one.

The second dimension of criticism viewed participation in the strike as contrary to the more general responsibilities of academia as a discipline. According to this criticism, the strike represented an act against the university. Since the university did not
start the war, the strike was seen as misplaced aggression. In a slightly different vein, academia was also presented as transcending the mundane realm of world events. Academic pursuits, when viewed as “the very stuff of life,” should not be treated as “pastimes for leisure” that may be cancelled at the whim of an instructor.

The third dimension of criticism was the least common and focused specifically on the invasion itself. It equated the strike with a failure to “support our troops.” The author of one such posting reported having two sons in the military. Another reported serving in Vietnam and knowing what “misplaced dissent” can do.

Only three of the fifteen initial postings did not express clear disagreement with the action announced by the CPO. All three were responses to previously posted critical e-mails and served to counter each of the dimensions of criticism discussed above. Each expressed ambivalence toward the strike but support for participants. One viewed “civil discourse,” such as the strike, as a “hallmark of academia.” Another suggested that the participation by professors in the strike was potentially valuable to students as an expression of “international solidarity.” The third stated that one way to show support for student-soldiers is to do whatever is necessary to help them “graduate in May.”

**Anticwar Protests**

Concurrent with the framing contest concerning the legitimacy of the strike, a second framing contest was initiated concerning the legitimacy of anticwar protests more generally. This contest arose as a reaction to the contention that support for the strike implied a failure to support the troops involved in the war, a contention that may be read as an effort in boundary framing (Hunt et al. 1994). In this discourse, the boundary did not take.

This framing contest continued into the second week of the discourse. While linked to the discussion of strike specifically, these postings referred to protesters as an abstract group and made no specific references to the CPO. Seven of the nine postings in this section proposed that there exists no necessary contradiction between actively opposing the war in demonstrable ways and supporting the women and men ordered to participate in it. Only three of these expressed a personal opposition to the war. Others recognized that the troops in Iraq are simply following orders and, therefore, are not responsible for the war. One stated that the fact that soldiers are in Iraq “doesn’t mean that they want to be there.”

Only two of these postings supported the proposition that anticwar protest is incompatible with the support of troops. The first provided a metaphor linking supporting troops to nurturing children, the implication being that neither can be effective if offered with ambiguity. The second added that any distinction between opposing the war and opposing the troops “almost certainly gets lost on our troops.” Both emphasized that the real issue at hand involved the perception of troops in the field; regardless of what a protester may think of those involved in waging the war, it is her/his actions that are meaningful from the point of view of the soldier. One posting directly rebutted this contention by emphasizing that the troops in question are adults who are members of a voluntary military and “mature enough to handle” the reality that foreign wars involve protests at home.
After this brief email exchange, the discourse was quiet for a few days. This pause effectively eliminated the strike itself as a point of contention. However, the CPO did not cease in its active opposition to the war and posted a new announcement a few days later. This posting announced that the CPO’s weekly peace vigil would be held as scheduled and that the organization would also be involved in a larger peace rally in a nearby metropolitan area. The posting also announced the involvement of the organization in a campuswide “Support Our Troops Volunteer Project,” stating that the organization’s disagreement was with “the policymakers who have sent our young people to war, not with those who have been ordered to fight.” This elaboration of the CPO’s framing may be read as an example of frame extension (Snow et al. 1996). In reaction to critics’ efforts at boundary framing regarding the issue of supporting the troops, protest supporters here attempt to deconstruct that boundary as invalid. Thereby, they attempt to extend their own frame into symbolic territory claimed by critics. Response to this posting was swift; the majority of responses were negative.

About 20 additional postings visited the issue of antiwar protests without any mention of the strike. Over half of these were explicitly negative; most of these justified their antiprotest stance with arguments regarding troop morale. Some conditioned this proposition by stating that protests should end when war begins. Anecdotal stories regarding the experiences of veterans and family members supported these claims. A few postings rebutted this proposition using their own anecdotes, which demonstrated that not all military personnel and families are opposed to antiwar protesting.

A second dimension of antiprotest argument involved the failure of public demonstrations to clearly express and achieve objectives. One posting expressed skepticism regarding the ability of mass protest to “hasten the end of the war.” Given the assumption that the protests could not achieve their goals, another posting warned of the “self-righteousness” of protesters. In response, an antiwar protester contended that one main goal of the protests was to “speak” for those dying in Iraq.

The final criticism launched by those opposed to antiwar protests concerned the perceived tendency for protesters to break laws and disrupt social order. This criticism suggested that protests drew police attention away from “issues of necessity,” such as “homeland security.”

In addition to defending against these criticisms, proponents provided one unique argument in support of antiwar protests. This dimension of the debate concerned the constitutional rights of citizens of the United States. Rights to free speech and lawful assembly, both tenets of the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights, are democratic freedoms that the U.S. military protects. Therefore, according to these postings, it is not logical to support the use of our military to promote democratic freedom in Iraq while discouraging the same freedoms at home. The only rebuttal to this proposition came from one participant who called for “restraint” from protesters.

*The War in Iraq*

Participants offered opinions regarding the legitimacy of the war early on and throughout the discourse. Instead of providing a frame for their position on the war,
however, most simply stated a position in order to help frame another argument. For example, one early posting stated that the author was a “dove” with respect to the war but could not support the strike announced by the CPO. Another stated support for the war as well as for the constitutional rights of protesters. Thus, stating one’s position regarding the war in Iraq served to amplify a frame regarding antiwar protest. An argument supporting antiwar protests may be taken more seriously when its author claims to be in support of the war; an argument criticizing such protests may be taken more seriously when its author reports being opposed to the war.

In all, 25 postings explicitly referenced opposition to, support for, or ambivalence regarding the war. Posting #31 was the first to offer any framing of opposition to the war; it critiqued the war as the result of a “unilateral invasion.” Twelve other postings expressed similar opposition to the war, while only four expressed unambiguous support. Frame contestation around six topics dominated this lamination of the discourse.

The first topic of contention concerned the alleged tyranny of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq as justification for regime change. Both supporters and opponents of the war agreed that Hussein was an oppressor of his people and a threat to the international community. Both groups also agreed that regime change in Iraq would be positive. They disagreed, however, as to whether the perceived need for regime change justified the military actions launched by the United States. Opponents of the war viewed regime change in Iraq as a lower priority than pressing domestic issues. One posting suggested that the United States should be more worried about protecting “democracy in our own country” than about imposing it on Iraq.

The second concerned the perceived efficacy of the United Nations in dealing with countries that refuse to respect its protocols. Supporters of the war referred to the United Nations as weak and ineffective. One posting suggested that UN regulations were useless and that Iraq’s ability to maintain its weapons stockpiles proved this point. Another proposed that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, should have made us all intolerant of Hussein’s defiance of UN regulations. Opponents of the war simply stated that the United States should not have gone to war without the international support offered by the United Nations.

The third topic concerned the degree to which the war with Iraq was deemed integral to the broader war against terrorism. Supporters invoked the Bush administration’s contention that no distinction should be made in the war on terror between terrorists and those who harbor them. Assuming that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq harbored terrorists, supporters viewed the U.S. invasion of Iraq as integral to the war on terror. Opponents of the war were not willing to make such an assumption. Therefore, if the Bush administration was “truly interested in fighting Islamist terrorism” it should not be diverting public attention and straining military resources by waging war in Iraq.

The fourth topic involved military preemption. In relation to the war on terror, the Bush administration’s position legitimized preemption as the most effective, if not the only, way to stop a significant terrorist threat. Interestingly, debate in this discourse
regarding this position did not concern the legitimacy of the policy itself but the effectiveness of applying the policy to the situation in Iraq. Supporters of the war contended that a link existed between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda and that Hussein’s regime may have had something to do with the September 11 terrorist attacks. Assuming that Hussein at least supported the attacks, supporters of the war found it likely that he would try something similar in the near future. Further, assuming that Iraq held stockpiles of biological, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons, an attack backed by Iraq could prove much more devastating than what we had seen before. Therefore, rather than waiting for Iraq to “bash our nose … again,” we should strike first. While opponents did not necessarily question the logic of this position, they did question whether or not overthrowing the Hussein regime in Iraq could succeed in its goal of preempting future terrorist attacks. Clearly referencing the destruction by terrorists of the World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, one posting argued that even a successful conclusion to the Iraq war would not guarantee that “our other towers will remain standing.”

The final two topics involved in this framing contest concerned its cost. The evaluation of cost included cost in terms of human lives, including civilian casualties and cost in more strictly economic terms. Opponents of the war viewed such costs as too high to justify the war. In terms of human life, an early posting supported antiwar protesters by criticizing those who believe that they “should be silent about a war that is killing Americans and Iraqis alike.” Specifically, in regard to civilian casualties, opponents of the war recognized the potential for masses of innocent bystanders to be killed and injured and posited that even one civilian casualty was one too many. In response, supporters of the war viewed death, including civilian casualties, as an unfortunate but unavoidable outcome of war. Further, they argued that the fact that the U.S. military strategies “demonstrate an extraordinary effort” to minimize such casualties evidenced the legitimacy of the United States relative to Hussein’s regime.

In terms of economic costs, both sides agreed that the Iraq war would be a very expensive endeavor. Opponents argued that funds earmarked for Iraq could be better spent at home on “healthcare, education, and research.” Conversely, supporters asserted that Americans should be willing to sacrifice “a few soft drinks” or “a movie” to pay for the war. One supporter stated that the economic costs of the war were irrelevant; money made from Iraq’s oil industry would pay for the expenses incurred.

The Appropriateness of the Discourse

The elicitation of framing competition concerning antiwar protests in general and the legitimacy of the war in Iraq drew from the content of the CPO’s initial announcement. The context of the discourse, however, generated an additional framing competition. This framing competition concerned the appropriateness of the discourse itself for the listservs on which it took place.

Critics here focused not only on the topic, but also on the tone and quality of the discourse. In terms of tone, critics commented negatively on the tendency of the discourse to generate anger and divisiveness in its use of “inflammatory” and “over the top” language as well as “personal attack and name calling.” A common theme here
concerned the perceived need to maintain a united front as a university for the good of the student body. One posting encouraged participants to “be sensitive” while exercising their free speech. Another responded to an especially angry posting by stating that “these types of attitudes and comments don’t help.” Interestingly, two postings followed their critiques with their own attacks. One followed its criticism with the accusation that angry participants lower the “quality of the debate” and warned that the use of inflammatory language would “tarnish the reputations of those who use it.” Immediately after criticising another participant for name calling, the second referred to antiwar protesters as “naïve” to think that their protests might help the troops.

Criticisms of the tone of the discourse were motivated, at least initially, by a severe criticism of the quality of arguments levied against the CPO in the 31st posting. While the initial criticism was offered by an explicitly pro-CPO participant, the criticism itself was “bipartisan” in that it argued that extremism on either side of the debate was “foolish” and “stupid.” Subsequent critiques of the quality of the discourse followed this pattern, focusing less on partisanship and more on rhetoric. Critics even criticized each other’s criticisms as not being sufficiently “logical.” Such criticisms of criticisms contributed to the angry tone of the discourse, leading one participant to criticize the “arrogance” of another. Overall, according to critics, the quality of the discourse was marked by too much “value bias” and “overemotional thinking” and not enough “logical argumentation” and “evidential rationality.”

Those who criticized the tone and/or quality of the discourse did not explicitly do so in order to argue that the discourse per se was inappropriate for the listservs. None called for the elimination of the discourse, and only a few argued that it should “move” to a more public venue offline where willing participants and a willing audience could have a “real life, real-time discussion.” Rather, most suggested improvements and encouraged participants to be more “sensitive” and “constructive” with their statements. They were also careful to emphasize that they did not support censorship but, rather, questioned the “utility of these debates via email.” One proposed that the medium of the Internet itself was part of the problem; it might influence users to get “testy” and “petty” and to make statements from the comfort of their offices that they would never make in person.

Those who criticized the discourse with regard to its topic, however, were less careful about expressing a desire to exclude it from the listservs altogether. The first negative postings regarding the presence of the CPO’s announcements and the resulting discussion were the 30th and 35th. While siding with antiprotest arguments equating protests with failure to support U.S. troops, they specifically identified the “public” nature of antiwar protests and the consequent media exposure afforded them as the mechanism through which protests actually make troops feel “discouraged” and provide a “devastating blow” to troop morale.

Posting number 40 follows in this vein and goes one step further. Recognizing the legitimate status of the CPO and the rights “guaranteed in the Constitution,” this participant asked to be “deleted” from the discourse. A subsequent posting informed participants that they could not be removed from the listserv, as it is an obligation of
employment at the university. Another disgruntled participant, this time an antiwar advocate who sarcastically lamented the failure of democratic processes to prevent the invasion, regarded the discourse as futile and informed others that s/he was “setting up a filter.”

The first direct call to censor the discourse from the listservs came on the 61st posting. While recognizing that the discourse made it “quite evident” that the university’s faculty and staff were “deeply concerned” about the issues, this posting went on to suggest that the discussion should “move away” from the listservs “out of respect” for individuals who did not desire to be exposed to it. The university administration’s response followed shortly. On the 67th posting, a university representative wrote to “remind” all about the “etiquette” of the listservs. While referring to the discourse as “fascinating” and “important,” this posting stated that it should “probably” be located in a “different setting.” This posting also announced the establishment of a new listserv on which the discourse could proceed. While the CPO’s announcements could continue on the regular lists, any discussion of these announcements, antiwar protests more generally, or the legitimacy of the war in Iraq would have to move. As membership to the new list would be voluntary, no one would to be exposed to it unless she/he chose to.

Prior to the announcement, arguments supporting the presence of the discourse on the listservs were of two kinds. The first focused on rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The second focused on the institutional mission of a university in a democratic society.

In the first case, participants focused specifically on “freedom of speech” and how the exercise thereof “demands” a public outlet. Therefore, it is “never appropriate to stop debate” and any attempt to censor the discourse would be “unpatriotic.” One participant pointed out the irony of trying to censor debate about the war while “allegedly” fighting “in the name of democracy.” Another pointed out the special role of the “public university” in a democracy.

In the second case, participants viewed the discourse as central to the university’s mission. Such open, public discussions were viewed as part of the “life of a university—that is, the life of the mind.” This sentiment was echoed by those who found it “shocking” and “discouraging” that some might even consider removing the discourse from the listservs. To do so, according to one, would reduce the role of the university to its “least common denominator.” It would represent a failure to students and serve to “delete” the university as an institution that values the “rational” discussion of issues. Furthermore, the fact that some found the discourse to be “pedagogically useful” was demonstrated by several participants who offered various teaching resources as useful for class discussions.

Several of these postings were clearly antagonistic toward the university’s administration. One asked why “official university announcements” were considered more important than the discussion of important issues and accused the administration of wanting workers to “listen to what we’re told and then shut up.” Another remarked that she/he felt like “I’m back at the factory.” A third exclaimed, “My God, isn’t this a university?”
It is interesting to note that, while both of these dimensions of critique were about equally voiced prior to the administration's announcement of an alternate listserv, only the second was maintained afterward. The administration's announcement made absolutely no mention whatsoever of democracy or freedom of speech. Rather, it focused solely on the official role of the listservs and the rules governing their use. Further, it sidestepped issues of censorship by providing an alternative venue for political expression. Intentionally or not, this announcement successfully framed the debate around the second critique. The legitimate question, according to the administration's announcement, had nothing to do with the First Amendment and everything to do with the efficient running of a university.

Only four postings expressed agreement with the decision to move the discourse from the faculty and staff listservs. Two of them framed their agreement around the notion that having the emails show up on their computers interfered with their ability to do their jobs properly. One called for an end to the “chatter” so that “the rest of us” could “do our jobs.” The other found the discourse “disturbing” for someone who is “trying to continue a good job performance” and expressed grief concerning the death of one of the university’s student/soldiers in Iraq. This posting claimed that the fallen student/soldier would “be hurt and ashamed” by the discourse; another shared this sentiment in urging all to “show some respect.” The final such posting politely requested subsequent emails be sent to individuals rather than “the entire university.”

**Schematic Representation**

Figure 1 presents a framing process schema that encompasses the discourse in its entirety. The horizontal axis represents the unfolding of the discourse as a process from its inception with the CPO’s strike announcement to its termination by the university’s administration. The vertical axis represents the addition of laminations to the discourse upon the initial framing contest regarding the strike. The discourse involves three laminations layered upon the initial framing contest. The first concerns the legitimacy of antiwar protests, the second the legitimacy of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the third the appropriateness of the discourse for the listservs that carried it.

Each text box in the schema concerns a distinct framing contest located in the discourse. Within each text box, variable propositions for and against the issue in question are reported. The bracketed arrows mark the duration of particular framing contests from their first to final mention in the discourse.

The pragmatic advantage of this three-dimensional framing schema relative to the one-dimensional frame schema offered by Johnston (1995) is its ability to encapsulate a larger quantity of information. A one-dimensional model would require a minimum of eight schemas, two for each framing contest (one pro and one con), to capture the same amount of information. Perhaps more important, however, the ability of this schema to represent the discourse as a process reminds us that related framing contests do not occur independently of each other. They overlap. At any given time, multiple framing contests are underway. Any individual contribution to such a discourse may cover multiple laminations of the fundamental contest.
Figure 1. Framing Schema of Micro-Level Discourse

DISCOURSE?
- Con: Inflammatory and over-emotional
- Lack clarity
- Inappropriate for discourse: distracting from job, promotes thoughtlessness, overly exclusive
- Destroys or burdens morale
- Devalues the roles of student-soldier

U.S.-IRAQI WAR?
- Con: Promote democracy at home first
- Need support of United Nations
- A diversion from War on Terror
- Pre-emption to guarantee of self-defense
- Human toll too high
- Costs better spent at home

- Pro: Human evil: regime change justified
- United Nations is irrelevant
- Iraq supports Hamas terrorists
- Pre-emption necessary for self-defense
- Collateral damage minimized
- Economic sacrifice small

ANTI-WAR PROTESTS?
- Con: Fail to support U.S. troops
- Disturb social order; divert needed resources
- Ineffective

- Pro: Against policy-makers, not soldiers
- Not all soldiers support the war
- Voluntary service makes enough to handle it
- Exercise free speech

CFO'S STRIKE?
- Con: Disserve to students
- Disturb to university
- Failure to support U.S. troops

- Pro: Civil discourse - ballistics of academia
- Expression of overseas influences
- Students' graduated role of student-soldiers

LAMINATIONS
In the discourse at hand, for example, all three laminations of the original contest are referenced within the first 20 postings. The first mention of antiwar protests in general occurs on the sixth posting. The first critical mention of the war itself occurs on the tenth, and the quality of the discourse is made relevant on the sixteenth. All three of these laminations were referenced during the period of the discourse in which the initiating framing contest still dominated.

Further, these three laminations served to silence the initiating framing contest even though no consensus was achieved regarding the legitimacy of the strike announced by the CPO. Therefore, this discourse provides supporting evidence for Goffman's contention that the addition of laminations in social interaction may serve to decrease the viability of an initiating frame contest by increasing the complexity, or “transformational depth” (1974:157), of the interaction. A lamination is not completed until it comes to replace, at least temporarily, the previous frame as the focus of attention. This requires more than a simple suggestion. It requires more than the “will” of single individual. It needs to be made salient enough to be taken on by multiple individuals and, thus, cannot be reduced to the “black box” of a single mind.

This discourse demonstrates two different ways in which a necessary level of salience may be achieved. In terms of the laminations regarding antiwar protests in general and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the topics themselves proved relevant enough to the discussion of the strike to motivate multiple responses. We view these issues, then, as organic to the discourse, in that the participants viewed them as somehow connected to the initial point of contention. Returning to Goffman, frames vary in terms of their logical organization. While “some are neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates, and rules; others . . . appear to have no articulated shape” (1974:21). Thus, at the level of the individual, the connection between a frame and a lamination may or may not be “rational.” The connection is perceived by the individual. Be it rational, emotional, or of some other sort, the connection must be acknowledged by a sufficient number of others if a lamination is to organically take hold in an interactive discourse.

Such a process, however, does not suffice when considering the final lamination. While the initial critique of the discourse’s quality did occur early on in the discourse and subsequent comments continued throughout, this lamination did not take hold until late in the discourse. The key that ultimately transformed the discourse from one debating war and antiwar protests proved to be the authoritative announcement from the representative of the university’s administration. The issue of pulling the discourse from the listservs simply did not have enough resonance to transform the discourse until it was supported by someone with the institutional power to impose such a transformation.

The fact that the exercise of administrative power silenced the discourse supports the contention that social movement framing processes are essentially about power relations. According to Benford and Hunt’s dramaturgical approach, “social movements can be described as dramas in which protagonists and antagonists compete to affect the audience’s interpretations of power relations” (1994:39). In this case, the power advantage clearly goes to opponents of the discourse. By successfully “appro-
appropriating, managing, and directing audiences and performances” (44), the administration demonstrated its legitimacy in defining the listserv as an inappropriate venue for political discourse.

**DISCUSSION**

Research presented here advances the literature on the social movement framing perspective in several ways. It does so as the result of a serious emphasis on social movement frames as the products of microlevel social interaction. By applying discourse analysis to an actual text of a microlevel framing process, we were able to explore the process in some detail. This detail allowed us to see keys, transformations, and laminations at work and verified Goffman’s contention that laminations add complexity to a framing process, and, consequently, decrease the likelihood that the process might resolve contested framing issues.

A further contribution of this work is the design of a framing process schema that provides a graphic representation of a contested framing process across multiple laminations of a discourse. This schema clearly suggests that the generation of laminations in framing processes generates permutations regarding the probability that individual frame schemas will line up in predictable ways. When dealing with a specific event such as the CPO’s strike announcement, expressions of support or opposition may be justified situationally as well as ideologically. Therefore, the probability that one who opposes the specific event will also oppose all similar events is uncertain. Furthermore, this discourse suggests that even those who express opposition to a specific event and to an entire class of similar events may not respond accordingly to a yet more abstract lamination. At least one participant in the discourse expressed opposition to the strike and to antiwar protests in general but also expressed opposition to the war. At least one other supported antiwar protests, while supporting the war itself.

In addition to framing the discourse in terms of laminations, this schema also summarizes important information regarding conflict. In terms of framing contests between social movement advocates and opponents, interaction involves conditional patterns of anticipation, action, and reaction. Within these patterns, every action offered by one actor generates a set of response alternatives for others (McFarland 2004). While McFarland’s research deals with framing contests between high school teachers and students rather than between social movement advocates and opponents, his dramaturgical approach does demonstrate that framing tactics do exist in relation to each other and that, therefore, concepts developed by social movement researchers do imply other conditional concepts.

For example, attempts made to amplify (Snow et al. 1986) a given frame in order to increase its salience to an audience imply “frame dampening” as a response alternative aimed at canceling out the amplification (McFarland 2004:1277). In this case, the initiating frame contest regarding the CPO’s strike announcement demonstrates the reflexive relationship between frame amplification and frame dampening. As the CPO attempted to amplify the resonance of its framing of the strike by linking it to peace and justice master frames, critics used explicit pejoratives to dampen the frame.
Since the legitimacy of a frame in a framing contest exists relative to competing frames, the contest involves a predictable pattern of amplification and dampening.

A second example of such reflexivity involves the relationships between boundary framing (Hunt et al. 1994), frame extension (Snow et al. 1986), and frame contraction (McFarland 2004). Boundary framing involves attempts to clearly distinguish one’s own frame regarding some event or activity from that of an opponent. Frame extension and contraction represent efforts to move that boundary. By moving a boundary away from oneself and toward an opponent, frame extension serves to grow the ideological territory controlled by a given frame. Frame contraction, on the other hand, serves to shrink that territory. Since social movement supporters and opponents often seek to maximize the ideological territory they control, the motivation is to apply frame extension to one’s own frame and frame contraction to others.

In this discourse, boundary framing was evidenced when opponents of the strike accused the CPO and other antiwar protesters of failing to support U.S. troops in Iraq. This strategy triggered frame extension as a response alternative to supporters of antiwar protests and motivated them to justify the proposition that protests are directed at politicians and do not imply a lack of support for military troops. In turn, this attempt at frame extension triggered frame contraction as a response alternative to critics of antiwar protests who made further attempts to paint protesters as doing harm to troop morale.

While the discourse analyzed in this study is centrally about frame contests between supporters and opponents of relevant issues, within-group conflict is also evident in social movements. Building on previous research concerning the work of framing processes (Snow and Benford 1988), Benford (1993) refers to conflict within a social movement in terms of frame disputes and identifies three types: diagnostic, prognostic, and resonance. As the participants in this discourse directed their competitive rhetoric toward opponents, frame disputes were not explicitly evidenced. However, the potential for such disputes is evident in the summary propositions provided in Figure 1.

Diagnostic disputes concern disagreement as to the reality of the problem at issue and/or the problem’s causation. The potential for such a dispute is evident among propositions expressed by critics of the discourse in the final lamination. While these critics agreed that the discourse was problematic, those expressing the first proposition—that the discourse was inflammatory and overemotional—found the cause of the problem in the behavior of some individual participants. The remainder of the propositions—that the discourse lacked utility, was inappropriate for the listserv, or was destructive to troop morale and disrespectful to fallen soldiers—viewed the cause as more related to the fact that any critical discussion of the war was allowed on the university listservs in the first place.

Prognostic disputes have to do with the viability of proposed solutions to the problem. An example of such a dispute is evident as a potential among supporters of the discourse in the same lamination. The first two propositions offered by supporters—that the discourse was protected by the First Amendment and that censorship of the discourse would be unpatriotic—identify the elimination of the discourse as an affront to democratic values. The final two propositions—that constructive debate is the “life of the university” and that the discourse may be pedagogically useful—focus instead on academic values. If supporters of the discourse were to formally petition the uni-
versity's administration to allow the discourse to continue, which of these frames should be primary in terms of implementing a strategy?

Benford's final type is resonance disputes, which reveal disagreements regarding how to best motivate people to actively support a cause. Propositions expressed by supporters of antiwar protests demonstrate a potential resonance dispute. While the final proposition offered in defense of protesters relies upon the U.S. Constitution's guarantees of free speech, the remainder—that protests are against policymakers, that not all soldiers support the war, and that our troops are mature volunteers—the remainder offer apologetics regarding the alleged negative affects that antiwar protests have on military troops. Given that protests need not expressly support troops while challenging policymakers, to what degree would the explicit support of soldiers make protests more resonant in attracting newcomers to the movement?

In sum, our focus has also allowed us to address several of the issues identified in Benford's (1997) “insider's critique” of the social movement framing perspective. The use of discourse analytical techniques on an actual text makes this a systematic empirical study and overcomes the static tendencies common to framing research. The production of the text by a self-selected group of individuals also addresses the tendency in the literature to ignore rank-and-file participants in social movement framing processes. Further, the recognition of laminations in the discourse acknowledges the complexity of framing processes as multilayered phenomena. Finally, the presence in the text of individual voices that, through social interaction, generate a whole that is not reducible to the sum of its parts strikes a balance between tendencies to reify social movements as things unaffected by human agency, on one hand, and to reduce social movements to actions of individuals on the other.

The remaining critique offered by Bender, namely that the social movement framing perspective is overly descriptive and insufficiently explanatory, is not successfully addressed in this research. While small attempts at theoretical explanation are offered, the data are simply insufficient to do more because the sample is small, unique, and singular. Continuing research in this vein is possible to the degree that additional texts of microlevel framing processes are identified or made available. While such discourse on the Internet necessarily leaves texts as trails that simply need to be identified, downloaded, and printed, face-to-face interaction among social movement activists and between social movement and countermovement participants leaves no such trail. However, with sufficient methodological and ethical preparation, relevant interactions could be recorded and provide texts for future analyses.

Mark Hedley is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville. His research interests include gender and sexuality, social movements, and popular culture. He has written and published papers in Sex Roles: A Journal of Research, Teaching Sociology, and the Journal of American and Contemporary Cultures.

Sara A. Clark earned her Master's degree in sociology at Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville. Her research interests include criminology and the application of the death penalty in the United States.
REFERENCES


Greedy Media: Army Families, Embedded Reporting, and War in Iraq

Morten G. Ender*
U.S. Military Academy
Kathleen M. Campbell
U.S. Military Academy
Toya J. Davis
U.S. Army
Patrick R. Michaelis
U.S. Army

Embedded reporting in Operation Iraqi Freedom provided real-time coverage of soldiers in war that was viewed and read by publics around the globe. Most constituents, such as the military, media, and the larger U.S. public perceived this coverage as positive; however, live television coverage had an intense and uncalculated impact on some U.S. Army wives and others on a military post at the individual, community, and institutional levels. This study provides a qualitative perspective on U.S. Army wives (N = 23) and their children on a military post whose soldiers deployed in the earliest phase of the war in Iraq in 2003. Live coverage created three types of viewing for Army wives and their children—compulsive, controlled, and constrained—and hastened use of other types of communication media. Live coverage also contributed to the expansion of the traditional definition of the military family and extended the reach of the Family Readiness Groups and the role of the Rear Detachment Command. We argue for an extension of Mady Segal's “greedy institution” application to the military family to include the mass media—specifically live television coverage of war.

The so-called “digital age” with its myriad communication technologies provides a new context in which to study families (Wartella and Jennings 2001). The electronic-rich environment and mass media have had an impact on military families (Ender 2005a). The new communication media are an important part of their lives, the impact being most acute during military deployments, especially deployments during war (Ender and Segal 1996). Military sociologists must reconsider the traditional

*The authors wish to thank Louis Hicks, Tom Kolditz, three anonymous reviewers, and the Rear Detachment Command at the military installation for their assistance, ideas, and insight on previous drafts of this manuscript. An earlier iteration of this paper was presented at the annual Defense Advisory Commission on Women in the Armed Forces (DACOWITS) meeting in Arlington, Virginia, May 24–25, 2004. Some support for this research was provided by a U.S. Military Academy faculty research grant from the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The views of the authors are their own and do not purport to reflect the position of the U.S. Military Academy, Army Research Institute, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. Contact information for the senior author: morten.ender@usma.edu.
conceptualizations of experiences in military families as communication media of all sorts may challenge and contest fundamental ideas about military families during deployments.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this study we adopt Mady Wechsler Segal’s (1986; 1989) application of “greedy institutions” to military families as the theoretical framework. Indeed, much of the social science scholarship on military families for the past 20 years has relied on this orientation. Building on the earlier and more general agenda-setting work and family analysis of Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977), who posited the inextricable link between work-family life, Segal outlined the range of military family life demands collectively unique to military life. Focusing primarily on spouses and soldiers, she linked four crucial levels of analysis: institutional, organizational and structure, interpersonal, and individual. Segal applies Coser’s (1974) more general “greedy institutions” conceptualization to the demands of military family life where both the military and the family expect relatively total devotion on the part of the soldier. In the military, two societal institutions intersect—the family and the military. Both make significant demands on the service member. Military members are normatively restricted with significant social controls on their lives especially during wartime deployments. Family devotion and loyalty are normative as well. In many cases conflict arises as the soldier tries to maintain fidelity and allegiance to both; thus, greediness on the part of both institutions has remained acute, especially during times of war. Present-day communication and mass media has become ubiquitous conduits that may foster expanded greediness beyond even the immediate military family. The availability of mass and communication media has generated both new opportunities and new demands that require closer study.

In times of war, both soldiers’ separation from the family for the deployment and the risk of injury or death place major demands on the military family. However, does the greediness completely wane for members of the family during the deployment—do family members have expectations and needs for contact and support during the deployment? What role do mass media perform in this process? The most comprehensive study of the research literature on Army families—What We Know about Army Families—confirms Segal’s theoretical model for studying families and concludes that greediness continues during military deployments (Booth et al. 2007). Before turning to the present study to answer these questions, we review the literature on the role of all media forms in the lives of soldiers and their families. We then question whether the greediness of the two institutions—military and family—is expanded by a third greedy institution—the mass media—specifically, the role of television coverage, and we examine mass media’s possible role as a catalyst for increased use of other communication media. We hold that the definition of a military family and its circle of others expands and contracts with the degree of coverage of the war—there appears to be a direct relationship between increased media coverage and the expansion of the military family.
Communication media use and consumption of mass media among soldiers has a long research tradition traceable back to World War II (for review see Ender 1998; Ender and Segal 1996). Communication media use among soldiers is linkable both to undermining traditional leadership hierarchies and to lowering soldier morale when devices are unavailable (Ender 1995). Yet, most studies have yielded mixed results. Studies of type and amount of media (such as telephones) used by soldiers showed both positive and negative perceptions associated with their use (Applewhite and Segal 1990). Groups of soldiers and family members vary in their access to and use of single sources of communication such as email (Ender 1997) or telephones (Schumm et al. 1999) when a variety of communication media is available (Ender and Segal 1998). More recently, soldiers and U.S. Army spouses have varied in the range of uses for communicating specific kinds of information; telephones and email rank as the most popular for all communication activities (Ender, 2005a; Schumm et al. 2004).

Considerable research has been conducted on U.S. military families in the past 20 years (see Castro, Adler, and Britt 2006; Martin, Rosen, and Sparacino 2000 for reviews of the most recent research) and, more recently, on European, Korean, and Israeli military families (see Moelker and van der Kloet 2003). Much of the early research focused on a co-residing traditional nuclear family consisting of male soldier, female spouse, and children. By the time of the first Persian Gulf War, practitioners were synthesizing the knowledge about stress and families and proactively assisting military families with soldiers’ return, reunion, and reintegration (Hobfoll et al. 1991). By the late 1990s, there was an increased presence of civilian employed spouses, single parents, dual-career families, and female soldier-headed households to warrant greater recognition (Segal and Segal 2003; 2004). Other military family forms are expanding to include extended families (Parker et al. 2003).

Few recent sociological studies have provided insights about the nexus of mass media, soldiers, and military families. Despite an early emphasis on studying media and the military—see the World War II–era Experiments in Mass Communication in the American Soldier series—there is now a lacuna in the literature. Recent mass media exceptions are studies of portrayals of soldiers in print and televised media (Dauber 2001), films (Harper 2001), and representations of military children in film (Ender 2005b). Thirty-year-old studies in Israel found that civilian women greatly increased their use of communication and mass media devices and experienced more stress during times of war compared to peacetime (Cohen and Dotan 1976), but that television fulfilled their media-related needs in time of war (Dotan and Cohen 1976). A more recent study captured the attitudes of a small sample of spouses of Army soldiers reporting support for embedded reporting, with just over half finding the reports informative, but too general (Johnson 2003a). Further, there is a lengthy research tradition examining the military-media debate (Ethiel 2000; Moskos and Ricks 1996). Certainly, many scholars have considered the meeting point of the public’s right to know and military operational security—the intersection of the media and the military (see Paul and Kim 2004). In contrast, mass media outlets subscribe to an ethos of the public’s right to know about war and other military affairs (Ethiel 2000; Moskos and Ricks 1996).
New qualitative research has gauged military spouses’ past use of and satisfaction with mass media during a military deployment, finding that live media coverage of journalists embedded with soldiers created undue stress on family members (Caliber Associates 2006). However, real-time deployment research is insufficient; most is based on retrospective analysis. The present study fills this gap. We begin with some background on the war in Iraq followed by a review of the unfolding literature on embedded reporters in war. Next, we present our empirical analysis of mass media use. We have adopted a grounded theoretical approach, which allows for an inductive analysis, where the salient themes emerge from the data and are then linked to larger theoretical perspectives (Strauss and Corbin 1998). We focus on mass media during the deployment in general followed by thematic experiences of wives, children, and elements of the military community, such as the Family Readiness Group and Rear Detachment Command, both of which are connected to the experiences of the military family.

BACKGROUND

The War in Iraq

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) officially began with an announcement by U.S. President George Bush from the White House Oval Office at 10:15 EST on the evening of March 19, 2003. The so-called, and perhaps only temporarily labeled, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) had begun some time before on October 7, 2001, when the president launched Operation Enduring Freedom to dismantle the Taliban regime in Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. October 19, 2001, marked the first day that U.S. soldiers were killed in the GWOT. President Bush first addressed Iraq before the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002. On October 16 of that same year he signed Public Law 107-243—the Iraq war resolution. Following a meeting on March 16, 2003, in the Azores with Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spain’s President Jose Maria Aznar to discuss the Iraq situation, President Bush dispatched a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his administration to leave Iraq.

The war against Iraq began at 5:30 a.m. Baghdad, Iraq, time and 9:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on March 19. By May 1, 2003, from aboard the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush declared the major combat operations in Iraq to be over. At this writing, U.S. and coalition forces remain in Iraq with just over 2,865 [Editor’s note: Now over 3,000] U.S. soldiers killed and thousands more wounded—and reported on—daily and globally in the mass media for over three years.

Embedded War Reporting

Embedded reporting from a war zone is not new; the newness is that the reports occur in real time, and the extended coverage is viewed and read by the public (Cooper 2003). It is, however, notable that much of the pre–Civil War reporting came from letters written by soldiers; these letters share some features with soldier blogs written from Iraq today (Knickerbocker 2005).
During previous U.S. wars, including the Spanish American War, World Wars I and II, and the Korean War, reporters roamed the battlefield unimpeded, though censorship was normal. By Vietnam, censorship restrictions lifted as reporters roamed and reported relatively freely with some lag time. Beginning with U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama, forward reporter access became greatly restricted with limited censorship (Cooper 2003). The first Gulf War saw a precursor to embeds with escort pools attached to fighting units (Kellner 1992; Mowlana, Gerbner, and Schiller 1992; Paul and Kim 2004). In Somalia and Haiti the international press arrived prior to the U.S. forces and reported with relatively significant access. According to Paul and Kim (2004), the reference “embedded press” was first used in Bosnia in 1995 to describe a reporter assigned to eat, sleep, deploy, and report with a specific military unit for an extended period of time.

By the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there were 1,500 to 1,600 unilateral reporters covering the war outside of Iraq (Laurence 2003) and 600 to 700 U.S. and international reporters from both televised and print media serving as “embedded press”—“they traveled with the troops in their units, ate with them, and were billeted with them; they saw what soldiers saw, were under fire when troops were and endured the same hardships” (Paul and Kim 2004:1). Research comparing 2003 television reporter stories of either embeds or unilaterals found the former to be more “jingoistic” (Aday, Livingston, and Hebert 2005). In the same study, researchers found the major U.S. networks and Al Jazeera to be relatively balanced in reporting war-related stories. The exception was the Fox News Channel (FNC)—with a strong bias for the U.S.-led war. By May 1, 2003, the U.S. military lifted the formal embedding of reporters.

All indications are that embedded reporting will continue in the future (Cooper 2003; Paul and Kim 2004). There is legal precedence for maintaining reporter access to the battlefield (see Cooper 2003). Media executives praise the system—requesting more military-style training and preparation for reporters (O’Neil and Rosenthal 2003). Public approval appears to exist (Paul and Kim 2003). What does live media coverage mean for military families?

Military families and their circle of significant others have an obvious vested interest in the mass media emanating from the embedded reporters with the soldiers. For example, family members can follow the dispatches of a reporter embedded with their soldiers’ unit. A case in point is that of Katherine M. Skiba, a reporter for the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, attached to the 101st Airborne Division in the spring of 2003. The paper’s editors were surprised by the increased readership and letters from new readers around the world (Johnson 2003b). However, a significant gap exists in the social and psychological research literature on key constituent groups associated with and affected by embedded reporting. This paper takes up the constituencies in this process—the garrison of the soldiers being reported on—particularly their wives, children, and the rear detachment and their circle of others. No recent studies have examined the role of live television in the real-time experience of these groups. We began our study of these families with some core knowledge of issues associated with Army families, but we also explore frontier knowledge associated with mass media
use. The serendipitous discovery is the new saliency of mass media in the lives of wives and others in and around the Army community.

METHODS

Sample

The four authors first visited a large military installation in the southeastern United States for a three-day period from March 30 through April 1, 2003—the height of the U.S. and coalition forces ground war in Iraq. We conducted a second three-day follow-up visit April 30 through May 1, 2003, to share some preliminary findings with the leadership. The military post is typical of the largest military posts in the United States. It is a fairly self-contained community with work and residences on the post. Housing units are occupied by roughly 85% enlisted ranks and 15% officers. Officers and enlisted families are segregated into separate housing areas. Single soldiers generally live in separate facilities in closer proximity to their work units.

The spouses we interviewed \((N = 23)\) came from a larger surveyed group \((N = 62)\) who were married to soldiers and were the most forward deployed when the war began—in military jargon known as “the tip of the spear.” We focused on a specific combat unit with approximately 600 soldiers. The vast majority of them had initially deployed to a staging area near the Iraqi border in early January 2003. Soon after, they engaged in direct combat with Iraqi forces. At the time of the interviews, 16,317 service members were officially “stationed” at this Army post (U.S. Army Community and Family Support Center 2006), with the majority deployed. Of those, 57.2% (9,338) were married, 48.5% (7,910) were parents, and 12.2% (966) were single parents. The military unit we studied was an Army combat unit in which 15% were officers. About half of the unit was married at the time of the survey and most of the married had children. There were very few male spouses of female soldiers in this unit—it is a combat arms unit that prohibits women in direct military occupational specialties. Some females were indirectly attached as combat support, for example, as helicopter mechanics.

In terms of sociodemographics, the wives in our survey somewhat reflect those of the Army post. Most are white (79%), typical of a combat arms unit, and the majority have children (70%). Three reported being pregnant at the time of the survey. They differ from most Army spouses in general and spouses at this post specifically as one-third have husbands oriented toward Army careers with 10 or more years in service and ranked from midlevel NCO and higher. Officers and warrant officers comprise 27% of the sample. The wives were slightly older—with ages ranging from 18 to 50—with 33% over 30 and almost 80% having at least some college.

Some wives had left the military community during the deployment of their husbands. For the interviews, we had contact with 23 wives based on an availability sample. We were purposeful in seeking a representative sample of the unit in terms of ethnicity, husband’s rank, and age. In a number of cases, the wives were leaders in the Family Readiness Group—both a formal and informal collective of mostly military spouses—and this may have predisposed us to wives who are proactive and more fully
integrated into the unit and military life in general. There were 55 children in these families with a few more expected during the deployment. There were several families without children, but the average number of children per family was 2.4, well above the national average of 1.7. These children ranged in age from several months to 19 years of age, with most 5 and under. In all other respects, the interview group looks like the survey group.

Additionally, we interviewed and were nonparticipant observers with people considered key informants and strategic members of the military community who interact directly with families from day to day on the post during both deployed and nondeployed times. Their roles are defined in more detail below but include (1) the Rear Detachment Commander (RDC); (2) the Director of the Army Community Service (ACS) office; (3) the Casualty Affairs and Memorial Operations director; and (4) a Red Cross representative. We observed and spoke with other spouses and some soldiers in the units whom we did not interview formally. The RDC was an officer with eight years of military experience. He was married with a young daughter. He is typically the highest-ranking officer remaining behind to lead and manage the affairs of the unit. The ACS representative was the wife of a deployed senior noncommissioned officer. She had over 20 years experience as a military wife, with three teenage daughters. The Casualty Affairs director was a retired noncommissioned officer and had served in the position for over 10 years. Finally, the Red Cross representative was in her 20s and the fiancée of a deployed soldier. These are typical positions during a military deployment, and we can, based on experience, speculate that such people are representative of people in these positions.

Procedures

Given the swiftness of previous wars, the timeliness of the present war, the desire to better understand the experiences of the spouses during the height of deployment, and the necessity to conduct research that involved minimal risk to the participants, we needed to forgo an initial human subject review protocol. However, we instituted some steps to assure protection of our subjects. First, we offered our research consulting services to the civilian and military leadership of the unit to assist them with providing services and resources to military families. The command and leadership fully approved and endorsed the project. Second, we utilized a survey instrument protocol from another study of military families that has approval from our institutional review board (Campbell et al. 2004). It included a signed consent form that we implemented. Third, we informed all spouses of the ability to voluntarily participate and they provided verbal consent to be interviewed on tape with the understanding that under no circumstances would any information about individuals be released to anyone nor would the unit or post be identified. Fourth, the institutional authority at our campus reviewed and endorsed the project at the pre- and postdata collection stages. This strategy of informed consent complies with section 12.01 of the Code of Ethics of the American Sociological Association (2006). Finally, we later submitted a successful institutional research review protocol to study military families under deployed conditions.
Access to the spouses was obtained through two procedures. First, we gained access through one member of the research team who had previously worked with the husband of the Family Readiness Group (FRG) leader. We made telephone contact. She connected the research team with the Rear Detachment Commander (RDC). We offered our consulting services to the unit military and civilian leadership, as the senior author had worked with FRGs during previous wars and military deployments involving peacekeeping and military deployments other than war. Within two days of initial contact, we had established a research visit window, and the FRG leader and the RDC used their established telephone tree and e-mail distribution system to notify all of their spouses about the research team’s visit and the opportunity to participate in a confidential evaluation and research project through completing a survey and/or being interviewed. Every spouse who contacted us received a survey and/or was interviewed. When the research team arrived at the unit headquarters on the third day, an interview and survey completion schedule had been filled. The second procedure involved utilizing a snowball sampling technique to gain access to other spouses not already included in the study. This was accomplished by establishing a rapport with wives and asking at the time of the survey for references to others.

Using electronic and face-to-face communication and the telephone, we established a supplemental interview schedule. Many wives in the study were somewhat involved in the FRG network (involvement can range from providing contact information to serving as the leader). However, the second snowball sampling procedure proved to be especially useful, as we gained access to a number of wives not involved in the FRG and located, for example, in remote locations with no transportation resources. Given the technique of contacting the spouses, our rejection rate is unobtainable. We know that all spouses were contacted but are unaware of their reactions to the call other than whether or not they responded. Many of the wives connected us with a friend; however, time, finances, and resources proved our greatest limitations and not all could be contacted to be interviewed.

Wives could complete the surveys before, after, or without being interviewed. The survey could be completed in approximately 15 minutes. Interviews were approximately one hour in length and conducted in the early morning to late evening. Interviews were conducted within the three-day visit. The research team conducted (1) 20 face-to-face interviews with civilian wives; (2) two face-to-face interviews with Army wives themselves in the active Army; and (3) four face-to-face interviews with key members of the Army community—one of whom was an Army wife (N = 23).

Members of the research team established a research base in the unit’s main work area during the visits. Most interviews were conducted at the work area in offices; some involved visiting wives in their homes or other alternative sites. Interviews were usually conducted with teams of two interviewers—one female and one male. On some occasions, interviews were conducted with an individual interviewer. On some occasions, the two female members of the research team conducted the interviews. All interviews were between 30 minutes to 1½ hours in length. Interviews were taped following verbal consent of the wives and later transcribed. Interviews with key informants and observations were not transcribed. No children
were interviewed for the present study; however, we often spent time with the children as wives brought their children to interviews. We also attended two Family Readiness Group meetings.

**Measures**

The majority of the survey items were not used in the present analysis. Most items cover traditional issues associated with military family life during deployments. They include closed-ended items associated with life happiness, life satisfaction, marital satisfaction, attitudes and satisfaction with the spouse's work and Army life, spouse career intentions, communication with spouse, health and well-being, and sociodemographics. We included seven items related to media use. The items are both closed and open-ended (see Appendix).

The interview protocol was semistructured and fairly open-ended. It covered three phases—the family's life prior to the deployment, during the present deployment, and the remainder of the husband's Army career. Probes and more depth were solicited from the heart of the interview—consistent with grounded theory—involving the present deployment. Open-ended questions were asked about communication in general, television use, family issues, and support services such as community, church, Army services, schools, and so forth.

The data analysis of the interviews followed methods described by Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Creswell (1997). We used a descriptive coding of the interviews and identified commonalities, general categories, and themes within the data. In this way, we developed a selective coding strategy. Here the categories, subcategories, and their interrelationships are combined to create a “story line” or a composite description of wives and key leaders’ perceptions of mass media. Members of the research team triangulated the interview, survey, and observation data. The study is characterized by a small and manageable sample of interviews, a limited number of survey items, four researchers, a narrow observational window of a few days, and a homogeneous sample of women with a shared experience. These features strengthen the analysis around commonalities, but limit differences. The validity of the coding strategy and categories was enhanced by using a team approach that is highly supported in the qualitative literature (Richie et al. 1997) and has been used successfully with other military populations (Dolan and Ender, forthcoming).

What follows are the results of the analysis in relation to the major themes along with supporting evidence in the form of verbatim quotes from the wives and rear leaders. We supplement the interview and survey data with observational data where appropriate. We begin with a focus on mass media during the deployment in general followed by thematic experiences of wives, children, the Family Readiness Group, and the Rear Detachment Command.

**FINDINGS**

The purpose of the research was to explore military family experiences when a spouse or family member is engaged in military service in a combat environment. We were
somewhat aware that live television might intervene and contribute to the experiences
of spouses and family members, but unsure how and with whom. The major
outcome of this paper is to report family reactions, management strategies, Family
Readiness Group (FRG), and Rear Detachment Command issues under the new and
unique condition of live media coverage from the warfront. OIF represents the first
combat situation reported live and continuously with embedded reporters on
television, and this mass media appears to connect with the institutions of military
work and the family.

Mass Media Uses

The role of communication media in military missions is not new (Ender and Segal
1998). However, during the first two weeks of OIF, mass media coverage was
extensive and continuous and this coverage played a prominent role in the lives of
soldiers, military units, their families, the military community, the nation, and the
world. By mass media we refer primarily to live television coverage of the war from
embedded reporters. But this can also include daily print media and the Internet.
Live television coverage is tied directly to other mass and communication media use.

The 24-hour news services such as CNN, FOX, MSNBC, and others carried the
war live. Family members closely monitored their soldiers on television via the CNN
reporter embedded and traveling with their husbands’ unit. All of the wives we sur-
veyed watched television news coverage of the war. Time viewed ranged from 15 min-
utes per day to 24 hours with the television coverage on while they slept. The mean
viewing time was approximately six hours per day. Thirty percent of wives taped the
television news ranging from 30 minutes per day to taping all day. The modal taping
time was two hours. More than half (57%) allowed their children to view the televi-
sion news coverage. In terms of stations viewed, CNN and FOX News Channel had
the most viewers, but CNN dominated.6 Many wives listed multiple stations but
only a single CNN reporter was embedded with their husbands’ unit. Spouses learned
more quickly than the viewing public that reporters were embedded in smaller subor-
dinate units of larger ones in both Iraq and Afghanistan—in the present study, a unit
of perhaps 25–50 soldiers in a 600-person unit. Essentially, the CNN reporter was
reporting on only a handful of soldiers, but could still tell the big picture. Wives and
significant others are more concerned about the soldier in most cases. This phenome-
non of embedding reporting is sometimes transparent to the viewing public.

From the survey data and our interviews with spouses, three patterns of live televi-
sion viewing emerged that we labeled “Compulsive,” “Controlled,” and “Con-
strained.” “Compulsive Viewers” watched television coverage of the unit six hours per
day or more. Roughly one third (N = 7) of wives fell into this category. These family
members monitored the news for more than one hour at a time, viewed at any hour
of the day and night, and in some cases slept with the news on, waking periodically
during the night to monitor reports. One wife told us: “I watched TV all day even though
I knew it was not good for me . . . I felt anxious about things when not watching—then
I’d go online and monitor.” Another shared: “There are certain things like if I hear
***** *****’s voice [reporter embedded with husband’s unit], I will be like, hey, my
husband's unit is on . . . I wake up when I hear his voice—like every hour.” In contrast, one wife shared this comment concerning her temporary roommate during the deployment, a pregnant wife of a combat medic in another unit: “Last night it was 2 o’clock in the morning and I was up watching it. My eyes were hurting. I went to her room to turn the TV off and she automatically wakes up. Her husband calls from Iraq and tells her to stop watching TV all night. She was so ecstatic to finally hear from him . . . she didn’t even get to tell him they were having a boy.”

In comparison, “Controlled Viewers” made a conscious and systematic attempt to monitor news coverage of the war using a prescribed formula—for example, one half hour in the morning, one half hour in the afternoon, and 30 minutes to a few hours in the evening, watching only at specific times and usually for only one to four hours per day. This accounted for almost two-thirds \((N = 13)\) of the wives. A wife explained: “I didn’t realize the TV coverage would be every day. I saw the captain on TV and my first thought is that I know he must be safe. Then I felt pride, they must be good if the news chose them. So I wake up every day and turn on the TV.”

Finally, we identified a third group in our interviews but not from the survey data that we designated as “Constrained Viewers.” This group represents roughly 10\% \((N = 2)\) of our interviews. They indicated that they refrained from any television coverage. One wife said: “I don’t watch TV at all, I get too upset. I don’t want to use the computer or Internet because it might block his call. I get information from other people.” A female soldier, nondeployable because of pregnancy, had a two-sided perspective—as both soldier and wife. She asserted: “I try not to watch [TV] . . . it would drive me crazy. I have mixed feelings about the embedded reporters. The media needs to be careful about what they say. For example, one reporter said on the air, referring to soldiers firing on a tower ‘we’ll have to give them a hard time for missing that tower.’ I wouldn’t want to find out something happened to my husband from TV. This is a huge fear for most wives. The coverage is ok but I would prefer if it were not live. They go into details that scare me.”

Most wives confided that they watched extensive coverage—meeting our definitions of “Controlled” and “Compulsive Viewers”—though by Day 10 of OIF, only a minority remained in the latter category. In addition, FRG leaders soon recommended to wives that they greatly limit their viewing—essentially adopting our “Controlled” or “Constrained Viewer” strategies. As one wife confided, “I think the coverage is good so that I can know what is going on. I watched the news a lot the first week. It caused my blood pressure to rise and I started to get sick. I went to the hospital.” Another wife shared: “I saw my husband’s unit on TV. I thought my husband must be having the time of his life—he probably doesn’t like being shot at but he likes shooting the live rounds. I didn’t sleep that Thursday night, I stayed up watching TV. I taped the news all day Friday . . . I had all this taped news. I started backing off after that. Now I watch in the morning to see if there is anything new and then right before bed.” Another wife related: “I have mixed feelings about the embedded reporters. It is good to see what the conditions are like but sometimes it is bad to see. Reporters shouldn’t say anyone is killed, a POW, or MIA until afterwards. The coverage makes me mad, the slant the reporters use make it sound like we are bad soldiers.
During the first week I watched eight to ten hours per day—I wasn’t living—just watching. Now I watch four to six hours and watch the last half hour before going to bed. Seeing the Army generals [retired] on TV doesn’t make me feel better. They are not a good representation because they are not down in the trenches.”

The television coverage of the war was pervasive throughout the military community both on and off the military installation. In many common community areas on the military installation such as the Post Exchange (PX) food court, the Red Cross office, numerous office environments on post including the Army Community Service center, the Casualty Affairs office, and military day rooms were tuned continuously to the war. In addition, off-post restaurants popular among soldiers and families, such as Ruby Tuesday’s, had continual coverage of the war on multiple televisions as soldiers and families dined, drank at the bar, and conversed. An example of commenting on TV viewing is provided by a wife of a lieutenant: “My mom came down from New York. I picked her up at the airport. She wanted to stop at Applebee’s [a chain restaurant]. I saw on one of the televisions that the soldier had been killed. I got up, stood next to the salad bar and watched the TV. I started to flip out . . . we had to go home.”

Finally, many wives commented that there was some concern about media exploitation. In an attempt to gain access to the “human interest story” of the war, media outlets were increasingly contacting family members directly to coordinate interviews rather than using the on-post Public Affairs Office sources. This was most difficult for those living off-post as reporters from print and televised media at international, national, and local levels frequented a popular café immediately outside the back gate of the Army post and had easier access to military families. A wife protested: “The media definitely needs to tone down by CNN coming here to Fort *****. I feel like they exploit the wives that are left behind—‘oh, well what does your husband do? What does your husband say?’ I am like, ‘look, can I just do an interview and tell my husband that I love him, I don’t really want to answer any questions or nothing, I just want to tell him that I love him.’ I think that they exploit the situation to the point that it is almost sickening.”

Expanded Definition of the Army Family

Parents of single and married soldiers, in-laws, adult children, fiancées, girlfriends, and other extended kin, including friends in the community, demanded information concerning their soldiers—especially during and immediately after the war was featured on the televised news. Frequently, these people did not live on or near the post. Their initial information was primarily from the television. They would then email or telephone spouses living on-post (especially those with leadership positions in the FRG), the Rear-Detachment Commander, or other on-post personnel and request information updates and clarifications. One wife said, “I only got three hours sleep because everyone was calling me—like his family was calling me, they were like—‘did you see him?’” Another wife mentioned her unit’s experience with a host of others. She said: “As far as our troops over there, we had a lot of people, family members and extended family members, sending stuff over there. [We and the] troops were hearing
from people that we had never heard from or hadn’t heard from since high school.” Another wife stressed: “I didn’t even know they were on TV and my dad, who gets up at some ungodly hour in the morning, like 3:30 a.m. or something, said that he had seen my husband’s unit and so I turned on CNN then and they were on. I called my husband’s mom just to let her know and then she called her mom and her sister and then they started calling me . . . they called just to see if I was watching it and to find out. They don’t really know a lot just because they don’t live here and so I was explaining to every one of them.” Finally, a wife provided insight to her viewing habits that connected her to both the push and pull of the media and extended family. She said: “When they first declared war, I watched all day, every day, for five days. Then I realized that, okay, like my mother-in-law watches it all day, every day too and she has like, no idea about the military or anything and she would call me and say, ‘I don’t understand this, what is going on?’ I have stopped watching it. It is very hard. I do fear I am going to be watching and I will see his tank, or whatever he is riding, blow up and I don’t want to find out that way. But then, when I don’t watch it, she calls me and she says, ‘oh, I saw his profile, he was eating.’ I’m like, ‘damn it! I didn’t see it, I didn’t see it.’”

The Red Cross volunteer on the post reported that their normal business is 4 to 10 message requests per day from families trying to locate mostly single soldiers who have not called home in some time. During the first week of the war, they received 80 message requests in one week. She said the number and timing of messages directly related to news broadcasts of the unit in Iraq.

**Army Wives**

Consistent with research on military spouses of previous deployments, the roles of wives expanded to include increased responsibilities in the FRG as well as assuming the roles their husbands held in the family prior to deployment. Wives developed new skills (or called on skills acquired during previous deployments) in managing yardwork, family finances, expanded parenting roles, and so forth. Some wives reported extreme difficulties in these role expansions; others reported receiving or giving informal support to other families. For example, one wife helped with shopping for a wife with three children who lived in a rural area and could not drive. This same wife helped her new protégé to learn to drive—thus helping her to learn a new skill. In one dramatic case among our interviewees, an Army wife of a deployed soldier with two children of her own (aged 10 and 12 years) had become the legal guardian for the 10-month-old daughter of a dual military couple, both deployed with her husband’s unit.

We find a notable change with OIF—the expansion of roles found in previous deployments but increasingly beyond the space of the immediate military community to a host of other people who become significant because of initial television coverage and communication media access. One wife felt she lacked agency in her expanded role due to her husband’s access to her and the many duties she was involved in: “I feel like I have a million and one things to do every day and half of the stuff has to deal with him and his job and they [the Army] won’t give the leeway to do it. I feel like my husband is going to come back and be like, ‘Honey, why didn’t you take care of this, this, and this?’ And I’m going to be like, ‘I couldn’t.’”
Another wife of a senior NCO noted to us that some of the younger wives are “devastated” by the deployment, news coverage, and the attention it brings and “they are new to this and don’t know how it works.” She feels responsibility for the younger wives and sends emails to wives and families who are far away from the post—more often when there’s news coverage. Another shared that she attributes her strength to being pregnant, which they discovered three days before her husband deployed. Her husband is excited about their baby and asks questions when he writes and she shares information about the pregnancy. She says: “I have to be strong for the baby . . . I think that if I wasn’t pregnant, I would probably be very depressed.”

We have already mentioned the expanded roles of many of the wives that now include offering support and information to extended family and to the families of single soldiers. One informal coping strategy used to overcome the overwhelming information about the war and unit involved collecting the news about the unit in combat from various television news coverage as well as print news media and web sites. Some wives began these “scrapbooks” for their husbands but are now sharing them with other families. In one office, one member of the research team was waiting to interview a key informant. An administrative assistant had a large television with CNN on next to her desk with a remote control and stacks of VHS tapes all around. The administrative assistant asked whether the researcher was an Army criminal investigator. Learning he was not, she confided that she was videotaping the television news broadcasts for her husband’s military unit who was in Iraq, but doing so on work time.

Military Children

Again, the research team had informal interactions and interview contact with 23 families of deployed soldiers. There were 55 children in these families, with more expected during the deployment. Most research on military families assumes “as go the parents, so go the children” as little research has been conducted on military children dating back to WWII and Vietnam (see Booth et al. 2007; Ender 2002, 2006). Our research is limited to findings for the children based on reports from their mothers. We found varied direct and indirect reactions to the deployment on the part of children that differed, in some cases, markedly, based on interviews with the mothers but informally as well. Some children coped very well. One mother with four young children and a Master of Arts degree in psychology said: “Earlier, they just went through that helpless, almost a depression phase. Now they are acting out some. Not all of them. My daughter is not. She is like the social butterfly; he is gone, and she could care less. She is six and she knows she gets to go to Disneyland when the war is over and that is all she’s worried about right now.” Other children were not doing so well. One mom said: “You are not going to tell me that my two year old does not understand that their daddy is fighting and I am going to look them in the face and tell them . . . you are a liar, he does. My two-year-old sits there and looks at the TV. He may not know what the word fight means, but he knew what hurt meant. He understands. He stood there in tears, ‘Daddy.’”

Mothers reported that they observed personality changes in their children and in some as young as two years of age. Other observations of mothers within and
between children in military families included isolation, antisocial behavior, attempts at harming themselves, and the assumption of adult roles such as caretaking. These behaviors are fairly consistent with previous research on deployments (Ender 2006; Pincus et al. 2001; Smith 1998).

One mother informally shared the attempted suicide of her teenage daughter. The son had assumed a support role but was angry about the attempt. The mother attributed the suicide attempt more to the recent move to the post rather than the father deploying to Iraq. They were working with school counselors as well. The mom, son, and daughter decided to write independent letters to their husband/father in Iraq explaining what happened. They mailed the letters together, but had not heard from him at the time of the interview.

The mothers conveyed that the schools in the community, both on- and off-post, public and private, supported children whose parents had deployed. In many cases, the schools exceptionalized the status of children of deployed parents. One middle school allowed the students to establish a “support board” where children could post pictures of their deployed parents. Schools that highlighted the deployment and the specific children impacted were said by mothers to have helped their children cope best.

Many of the mothers reported using “Controlled Viewer” strategies with their children. However, many wives reported that their adolescents insisted on watching more coverage than the younger children. We labeled such adolescents “Compulsive Viewers.” For example, an Army mother of teenagers said she would prefer if they did a wrap-up instead of live coverage. Her son watches compulsively and she needs to explain what is going on. Discussions in school about the war helped, and her husband provided some anticipatory socialization, informing their son that there would be live coverage and how to process it.

Army Family Readiness Groups

Most U.S. Army units have a Family Readiness Group. Formerly called Family Support Groups, these loose collectives of mostly Army spouses have an extended function during military deployments. Real-world, small-scale deployments in the 1980s—specifically the first Sinai peacekeeping mission—became the impetus for such programs. For the past few decades, these groups have provided a formal and informal social network critical to overcoming the natural effects of separation. FRGs have promoted positive coping responses, reduced parent and child psychological problems, and increased soldier deployability and cohesion in the combat zone, despite low spousal attendance and some burnout among FRG leaders (Booth et al. 2007).

Our interviews confirmed what we know about FRGs. An enlisted wife commented that there is not good communication within her FRG. She says, “We have no unity . . . it is divided between the officer and enlisted wives, but probably because the officer wives have teas and already knew each other.” A mother of three and wife of a sergeant divulged that she had been sexually assaulted during a previous deployment while her husband was in Egypt. She was afraid to venture on the post alone. She has attended the FRG meetings since the deployment and has found support there—the FRG leader reached out and befriended her. The wife of the first sergeant,
highest ranking NCO in the unit, told us that she consciously plays down her status—
she says, “The FRG is really important and the FRG should not be about rank.”

We found that the wives varied in their responses to FRG support. Some groups
were perceived as exceptionally supportive and others less so. Some spouses, primarily
those married to enlisted soldiers, feel there is an unwelcome rank structure in the
FRG (that is, spouses wear the rank of their husbands). FRG leaders noted an extra
effort to reach out and support wives of soldiers from their units and even those from
other units. One spouse shared: “We have a little bit more participation [in the FRG]
now that the guys have left. I think that we have one of the best ones and that is
another reason that I didn’t want to leave the community. I think we are very close-
knit like our points of contact. We are very, very close. All of us are very close. We do
stuff since the guys have been gone. It makes it a little bit easier.”

Wives, children, and the RDC at a military post are significant to the FRG leader-
ship. Concomitantly, the added constituent of televised “live” war with an embedded
television reporter in the families’ unit amplifies the duties of FRG leadership linking
these and additional groups closer together. As a wife told us about the FRG leader to
whom she was emotionally close: “She discovered that during the war she was spend-
ing a lot more time watching TV and talking on the phone to the FRG after watch-
ing TV and that is when the kids would act up. They were actually acting out. She
thinks that it was because she was involved in that and they were acting out.”

The Rear Echelon Command

Finally, the Rear Detachment Commander (RDC) is a fairly new element of military
deployments. Developed in the 1980s, the Army instituted an RDC that had a more
focused perspective operationally and provided family support from the home base of
the unit. The RDC is usually a commissioned officer with the responsibility of
providing information, assistance, and resources to the families of deployed soldiers. At
the RDC’s disposal are nondeployed or nondeployable soldiers who assist with a range
of activities. This RDC is inextricably linked to the experiences of the families as they
work directly with families on and off the Army post—military leaders expect the role
will likely increase in significance in the future as Army posts will have increased
national and international inclusion and approachability during deployments.

In the unit we studied, the RDC was a male officer, holding the Army rank of cap-
tain. He was married with a three-year-old daughter. His staff included 17 nondeploy-
able members and 4 preparing to deploy. The unit had about 600 members deployed.
Essentially, the RDC was overwhelmed with attention—especially in the high profile
media environment. He operated in a crisis action mode to an ever-increasing expres-
sion of needs—to include reporters’ questions, to answer requests for specific forms of
support, and to provide “context” for families—in other words, filling in what the
mass media does not provide. His staff’s duties became most taxing immediately after
the unit had received some television airtime. For the most part, they appeared to
work diligently and over many hours including weekends, evenings, and holidays to
help meet the needs of soldiers’ immediate and extended family and friends.
The RDC told us that the youngest spouses spent the most time watching TV, especially those with young children at home and without jobs outside the home. Our survey findings did not support this correlation between spousal age and TV viewing. We did not ask about spouses’ employment status but would agree that stay-at-home wives would have more access to television than their work-outside-the-home peers. The RDC went on to say that because of compulsive viewing: “They then want to know where their husband is relative to cameras and how protected they are. Thankfully there was a lull in coverage around 24–25 March. Once it came back on, there was a report of a guy being shot—it was actually superficial and he moved forward with his unit in a helicopter. It was reported as a gushing blood wound and the soldier was evacuated. This caused panic back here.” One wife, reflecting on the RDC and news about armor piercing ordnance said: “He did a real good job—the RDC—explaining what exactly my husband does. My husband is patrolling. Then he talked about ‘destructability’ of armor. He talked about what happens when a tank is hit. He was saying that if all else fails, they can still live. He speculated about positive scenarios.”

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Military family demands, adjustment, and live media coverage of forward deployed soldiers are linked. The initial purpose of this study was to provide an in-depth examination of military family experiences during the height of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in early 2003. Few studies have captured the qualitative experience of military families during combat. Further, little is understood regarding the connections between soldiers, units, families, the larger society, and the ubiquitous relationship with mass media such as live television and the Internet during a war. Clearly, the technology is available and now many wars are fought on the battlefield and projected live into the homefronts. The immediacy facilitated by the technology, for both soldiers and their families, appears acute. Mass media—in particular, live televised war with reporters and camera crews embedded in military units—have significant support from both the military and the public. There is a perception that the public desires and consumes information about the war. We found that one audience—the military family and its significant others—has an intense and calculated relationship with such media because they increase the social presence of the absent soldier.

We are careful here not to overstate our findings. The sample is small. Career Army wives are overrepresented in the sample. The research was conducted early in the unit’s deployment, forcing caution in generalizing to the broader experiences of military spouses during war and lengthy deployments. We do not know about wives who left the community during the deployment. Further, we found an overwhelming negative impact of mass media on military families using our study design; but we suspect there are more positive impacts worth exploring. However, the qualitative study dimension does provide some depth of understanding at three important levels—individual, community, and institutional.

At the individual level, findings reported here identify how Army families might experience and adjust to live televised reporting of their soldiers from the front lines of
combat. The major finding is that family demands and coping link to the new and unique condition of live media coverage of troops actually engaged in combat. During OIF, families, friends, and others around the world could view soldiers on live television via embedded reporters traveling with the troops. The research identified three patterns of wives’ television viewing: “Compulsive,” “Controlled,” and “Constrained.” Most of the wives settled into controlled viewing through informal self- and reference-group regulatory strategies. Yet a minority had more extreme reactions to the coverage. Many wives were able to adapt readily to this new deployment situation, while others experienced difficulty in achieving some level of relative normalcy. Some evidence here suggests that military children demonstrated similar patterns and had a wide range of reactions to the deployment and subsequent live media coverage. Some children coped well; others less so. Generally, mothers controlled their children’s viewing of war coverage, though, especially with adolescents, they were not always successful. More research is needed to understand the impact of real-time war coverage and military children and adolescent reactions.

At the community level, another important finding is that spouse roles expand and contract in this new media-rich environment of combat coverage. Spouses may take on additional caretaking and information processing roles for extended family, friends, and those significant in the lives of single soldiers. Some spouses felt obliged to appear in front of cameras and reporters. These spontaneous voluntary media appearances may come to represent military wives of all deployed soldiers across the nation in the minds of some viewers. Further, both the FRG and the RDC now occupy salient roles in the lives of military families during a deployment. Both of these institutionalized groups and their representatives reacted almost continuously to requests for interviews for reporters and information from extended family members and other people significant to soldiers. These formal groups both assist military families and expand the responsibilities of some wives. We have no direct findings of how extended family members and those significant to soldiers viewed the live coverage. However, the findings from wives suggest that, during war, the military nuclear family interacts far beyond its peacetime boundaries as other people become electronically invested and interested in the experience of soldiers, want to “support the troops,” and seek information about their well-being. In this sense, extended family and others contribute to the greediness of the military family and the range of others significant to the soldier are brought into the social milieu of the military community directly involved in the war.

Finally, the findings point toward mass media as a greedy institution when it intersects with the military and the family. Clearly, mass media fulfill basic social needs such as reporting events at local, national, and global levels and gathering and disseminating information vital to public interests. Further, journalists and the others making up the mass media enterprise have a system in place that values accurate, reliable, uncensored, and timely information to fulfill the public’s right to know. As such, the press has three main goals—gaining access, providing information to the public, and maintaining journalistic standards (Paul and Kim 2004). Moreover, scholars have previously identified the macrolevel role of live 24-hour television coverage having an impact on foreign policy, that is, the “CNN effect” (Livingston 1997). In the pursuit of the story in
wartime, the reporters and the war news they produce become greedy by placing significant demands on soldiers and families. In the present study, significant pressure is placed on wives in Army families and their major sources of support—the Family Readiness Group and the Rear Detachment Command. Future research should continue to explore the themes identified here with a larger group of military family members, in different types of missions, and across different cycles of the deployment, clarifying further the scope of the intersection of the military, the media, and the family, as most have concentrated on either the first two or the military and the family.

Morten G. Ender received his B.A. in sociology from Sonoma State University and M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Maryland. He is an associate professor of sociology and director of the Sociology Program in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He teaches “Cinematic Images of War and the Military” and “Marriage and the Family.” He recently completed a study of representations of military children in film published in Armed Forces & Society and is currently completing a study of Iraqi adolescents from data collected in Baghdad, Iraq.

Kathleen M. Campbell has a B.A. from Fordham University, NYC, an M.A. from Hunter College, CUNY, and a Ph.D. in psychology from Purdue University. Kathleen is an associate professor of Leadership and Management Studies in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. She teaches “Cross-Cultural Organizational Behavior,” “Group Dynamics,” and “Leading Organizations through Change.” Her research interests are in the areas of work and family and leadership. She has recently completed a book chapter on leadership and psychological resilience and is currently working on research on the various aspects of leadership in “critical response organizations” (the military, police forces, fire departments, etc.).

Toya J. Davis is a Major in the U.S. Army Adjutant General’s Corps. She graduated with a bachelor’s degree in psychology from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and a Master of Arts in academic educational psychology from the University of Texas, Austin. Toya has served in a variety of assignments including a teaching post at the U.S. Military Academy. She currently serves as the Deputy Director for Theater Replacement Operations in Korea.

Patrick R. Michaelis is a Major in the U.S. Army. He received a B.A. in history from Texas A&M University and an M.P.A. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has taught at the U.S. Military Academy and served in various command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, Bosnia, and more recently Iraq. His most recent publication appears in Military Review and examines the triangulation of strategy, tactics, logistics, economics, politics, diplomacy, and history necessary for winning the peace in Iraq.
NOTES

1. Like the Booth et al. (2007) review, the present study takes a more sociologically social psychological perspective with a focus on how family members are impacted by the social structure. There is a significant military family literature from a more psychological orientation. See the recent volume edited by Castro et al. (2006).

2. Beginning with the 1989 invasion of Panama, major U.S. military missions have received operational nicknames to identify them—Operation Just Cause, for example—the specific terms chosen to shape public perceptions about the mission (Sieminski 1995).

3. Both letters and blogs are written by individuals. The major differences between letters and blogs are time lag and privacy. Letters involve lag time and are more private as the audience of intent is an individual rather than a group. Blogs are more real time and intended for a broader, public audience of readers.
4. At this writing, 71 reporters have died covering the war in Iraq. For an in-depth discussion of the decisions surrounding embedded reporting in Iraq see Paul and Kim (2004:51–61). There is, however, no discussion of military families and press coverage in the decisions to implement embedded press in military units.

5. Based on queries of key informants in the community, we estimate that 5% to 15% had left the community.

6. Other stations viewed with less frequency included NBC, CBS, ABC, and local affiliated stations.

7. We suspect that on the surveys, the wives were forced to list a time amount. We should have included a “no viewing” option. In practice, we estimate that they probably viewed coverage once or twice and then constrained themselves thereafter.

REFERENCES


The Making of Heroes:
An Attributional Perspective

Gregory C. Gibson*
Richard Hogan
John Stahura
Eugene Jackson
Purdue University

Through the use of posed vignettes in a telephone survey, we investigate the construction of heroes. We examine the extent to which respondents attribute hero status to three potential 9/11 and “war on terrorism” heroes: Todd Beamer, Army Private Jessica Lynch, and President George W. Bush. Findings suggest the importance of the extraordinary nature and the rarity of action(s) performed by heroes in the attribution of hero status; the role of class, status, and party in the attribution process; and the moral consideration of what should be done in each posed vignette. In addition, the study indicates the utility of attribution theory for the sociological examination of heroism and the viability of normative constructs in examining heroic behavior.

Between the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, heroism has received much mass media coverage and clearly warrants greater attention by scholars. Every day, many people put their lives on the line to save others or to uphold principles that are dear to them, but they are not always perceived as heroes. This research explores the social construction of heroism, particularly the case of reputed heroism in the course of professional versus nonprofessional roles. We present the actions of three persons linked to the triggering events of 9/11 and the War on Terrorism campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq: Todd Beamer, Army Private Jessica Lynch, and President George W. Bush, and ask how and to what extent they achieved the status of “hero” in the eyes of the general public. Data from a national telephone survey conducted during the spring of 2004 support our expectation that nonprofessionals (such as Todd Beamer) who place themselves in harm’s way, doing what is right under conditions where most people would fail to act, are, in the eyes of the general public, heroes. Even so, it seems that class, status, and, of course, partisanship shape judgment on who should be honored as heroes.

*Direct all correspondence to Greg Gibson, Purdue University, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 700 West State Street, Room 337, West Lafayette, IN 47907; e-mail: gibsong@cla.purdue.edu.
DEFINING HEROISM

What qualifies as heroism ranges from short-term life-threatening acts, such as those honored by the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission (Gibson 2003), to long-term, repeated acts of courage in standing up for principles, despite political or personal consequences, such as those that John F. Kennedy (1961) has immortalized. Students of altruism and prosocial behavior view heroism as the ultimate act of altruism—putting one’s life on the line to save the life of another (Gibson 2003; Oliner 2003). The Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, an endowment established by Andrew Carnegie because of heroic rescue efforts in a 1904 coal mine explosion, echoes this criterion—putting one’s life on the line—in awarding hero status: “a civilian who voluntarily risks his or her own life, knowingly, to an extraordinary degree while saving or attempting to save the life of another person is eligible for recognition by the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission” (Gibson 2003:3). The Carnegie Hero Fund Commission excludes acts of heroism performed by uniformed heroes or paid persons, that is, the military, police officers, and fire fighters, although it made an exception for heroes of 9/11.

Durkheim (1951) pioneered sociological research on altruism and prosocial behavior with his work on suicide. Durkheim’s model of suicide centered on two dimensions of society: (1) integration—the degree to which a social actor is a member of a group; and (2) regulation—the “normative or moral demands” experienced by a member of a group (Bearman 1991:503). As an ideal type, “altruistic suicide” is a social action performed for the sake of a group and denotes high integration. Altruistic suicide, particularly in its “voluntary” or “heroic” forms, is associated with military service (Durkheim 1951:228, 240), where heroes are uniformed professionals. Oliner (2003) includes these professional heroes, but only in exceptional events. Oliner (2003:21–22) distinguishes three categories of heroes, based on payment and duration of heroic activities: (1) paid professionals (military, police, fire fighters) in one time events of short duration, (2) unpaid nonprofessional people (civilians) in one time events of short duration, e.g., Todd Beamer, and (3) unpaid nonprofessionals in events of long duration (e.g., rescuers of Jews in Nazi Germany). Using these criteria, the long duration, routine professional activities of soldiers or police would not qualify as heroic.

Yet we assert that people might be seen as heroes without risking life and limb. For many Americans, Abraham Lincoln (140 years after the end of the Civil War), is still considered a hero because (1) his life was threatened from the moment he took office to the time he was assassinated, and (2) he continued to press on with the Civil War in the face of military fiascos and staunch opposition (Holzer 2004). Thus, we can add to Oliner’s (2003) criteria the idea of “presumed courage”; that is, heroism can be and has been applied to acts that, over time, culminate in great accomplishments, despite the objections of others, with no recognizable benefit to oneself. One question we address in this research is whether Americans take the same broad view of heroism, recognizing courage even without physical danger.

Heroism should, however, be limited to cases where deeds exceed the typical response of persons in similar situations, what Klapp (1954:57) termed “transcending
the mediocre.” “Hero” is the title bestowed upon the person who performs these extraordinary acts. The title “hero” in our culture is an honored status when other members of the culture bestow “homage, commemoration, celebration, and veneration” (Klapp 1954:57). Insofar as heroes can reflect the values and moral exemplary ideals of a given society, they are often viewed as “moral beacons” (Porpora 1996:210) or “the standard bearers of the ‘best’” (Schwartz 1969:82). Additionally, heroes can serve as role models for others by virtue of their status, honor, and reflection of cultural values. This is exemplified in the recent death of professional football player Pat Tillman, who gave up a lucrative contract and the potential for athletic fame and glory to serve in the U.S. Army as a Ranger in Afghanistan. War heroes like Tillman can be important sources of psychological gratification for societal members (Elkin 1955:98), even if the heroic act was not an act of will. Tillman did not choose to die. Jessica Lynch did not choose to be captured by the enemy. Nevertheless, we consider the possibility that Lynch (like Tillman) could be considered a hero, even though she was, to a large extent, a victim.

For purposes of this paper, we shall define heroism broadly, as performing “exceptional acts of courage or bravery that might involve great risk—including ‘life and limb’” (Todd Beamer and Private Jessica Lynch). We will include acts performed by both professional (Private Jessica Lynch and President George W. Bush) and nonprofessional persons (Todd Beamer). These can be acts of either short duration (Todd Beamer) or long duration (Jessica Lynch and George W. Bush), which are acts of will or volition (Beamer and Bush) or actions uncontrolled by victims of circumstance (Lynch). Although the above hero criteria generally limit heroism to situations where there might be risk to life and limb, we have elected to include President George W. Bush for consideration based on the assertion that for some people, Bush has shown courage and bravery against individuals, organizations, and nations opposed to his stance on Iraq. Based on the literature, we suspect that more respondents will agree that Todd Beamer is really a hero, compared to Jessica Lynch and George W. Bush, because he was a nonprofessional who acted willingly at risk to life and limb in a short-term effort to save the lives of others. We also suspect that President George W. Bush will receive lower hero ratings since his actions did not pose great risk to his own life and limbs. Beyond confirming these expectations, the challenge is to determine how and why respondents might agree that any of these persons might be heroes.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Role Theory

In this study, we examine when and why people bestow the status of hero upon persons performing professional or nonprofessional roles. For sociologists, “roles” have been analyzed largely from either structural or constructionist approaches, but Meadian conceptualizations of roles have served to bridge this gap in the literature (Callero 1986, 1994). According to Mead, a role is both a “social object,” which is socially constructed, and a “perspective,” which is adopted but then operates as an
external constraint (Callero, Howard, and Piliavin 1987:248). Viewed as socially constructed “social objects,” roles are performed in a community setting, within which these roles are “dependent upon social interaction for their existence” (Callero 1986:346). Nevertheless, the community setting is not simply the site of role performances but also the repository of available roles and definitions of situations within which roles might be more or less appropriately performed (Goffman 1974). The “perspective” feature of roles entails the constraints associated with role-taking, the community standards or expectations for behavior in roles, which represent structural influences at both the individual and the community levels. For Mead, roles exist as “objectively real features of the social environment” (Callero 1986:346). This aspect of roles helps actors organize perceptions, influence future actions in the community setting, and frame the social world (Callero et al. 1987).

Actors “self-identify” with the roles they adopt or perform and label others by the roles they are performing. Thus roles are an important component of the self. “Role-person merger” is the term used by Ralph Turner (1978) to describe the process of roles being adopted to define oneself. As Callero et al. (1986:249) indicate, the notion of role-person merger is well developed theoretically in the work of sociologists, particularly Rosenberg (“role centrality”) and Stryker (“identity salience”).

According to Burke and Reitzes (1981), a social actor’s identity—his or her sense of self—depends upon the roles performed, and there is a link between identity and role performance: others evaluate one’s actions and determine their appropriateness for the individual’s identity. In this way, others evaluate a social actor’s action (role performance) against a standard of action deemed appropriate for the role selected and portrayed by the social actor. This evaluative component provides a normative or “should” perspective to role behavior by casting light on how a person “ought” to behave in a particular role (Thoits 1986:259); that is, addressing whether or not one has learned the proper role pattern for the given role (Znaniecki 1965). In the social community, there is an implied link between self-identity, other-identity, and performance that appears to be situated in common or shared meanings among social actors (Burke and Reitzes 1981:85). In this regard, researchers have posited the notion of “role consistency” or the degree of congruency between the role selected and one’s role performance (Burke and Reitzes 1981; Stets and Burke 1996). Since we view heroism as exceptional courage or bravery, the “normative” and the “consistent” are critical concepts that we shall borrow from these authors to apply in our analysis.

To date, structural symbolic interactionism (Stryker 2002; Stryker and Macke 1978:58) has been primarily concerned with an individual’s sense of self. We believe, however, that role theory and structural symbolic interactionism can be usefully extended to take into account features individuals may share with others, particularly characteristics that one can identify with in another person. We believe this is important and relevant to our research because in the vignettes we pose, characteristics of the actor, including class, status, and party (Weber 1978) may be important reference group markers for the respondents (Merton 1957, chapter 8). When respondents identify with or match the characteristics of individuals in our vignettes, we believe that these characteristics become pertinent and influence how respondents formulate
their judgment of hero status. This is, in fact, consistent with Weber's discussion (1978, Vol. II: 932–933) of how status communities honor their members. Only members of the same status community would honor the exemplary behavior of another member.

Structural symbolic interactionism does not provide a roadmap for how characteristics of self might affect judgments of others, so we have chosen to supplement role theory with attribution theory, which is oriented toward the judgments and assessments that people make about others.

**Attribution Theory**

Building upon Heider's (1958) pioneering formulations, psychologically focused attribution theorists examine people’s ideas regarding the causality of behavior (Brown 1986a). By observing an actor's behavior, attribution theorists posit that people attempt to “trace back” to the causal factors for the behavior under their examination (Michener and DeLamater 1999). In this tracing process, attribution theorists start with two primary causal “locations” termed “causal locus” in relation to the behavior of an actor—(1) internal and (2) external (Eccles and Wigfield 2002). According to Howard and Levinson (1985:192), an internal locus refers to the “ability, efforts, or intentions” of the behaving actor, while an external locus refers to “task-related factors, [or] luck.” Generally speaking, an internal locus presents the actor as causal agent, while an external locus views situational factors as the causal agent.

Actions that generalize across social actors are termed “high consensus,” while actions low in generalizability across social actors are termed “low consensus” (Brown 1986a; Michener and DeLamater 1999). Weiner (2000) posits two additional causal properties: (1) stability, and (2) controllability. “Stability” refers to the duration of the cause—that is, whether or not a cause changes over time. “Controllability” refers to the changeability of the cause—to what extent an actor can change or affect the results of an event, or to what extent causal factors related to an event are beyond an actor's control, termed “uncontrollability” (Wilson, Cruz, Marshall, and Rao 1993). For example, some attribution theorists view “ability” as internal and stable, while viewing “effort” as internal and unstable (Eccles and Wigfield 2002:117).

Salience in perception is a critical factor. According to Brown (1986b:182–183), when the situational setting for an actor's behavior becomes salient to the observer, “there should be overestimation of the power of the situation” (external locus). Of course the opposite would also be true: when the actor becomes salient, overestimation of the actor (internal locus) occurs. Brown (1986) suggests that the process of attributing causality rests with either the situation or the actor being most salient. Accordingly, noticing only the actor's behavior or actions attributes causality to the actor; when noticing only “expressive behaviors, not gross actions” causality tends to be attributed to situational factors (Brown 1986b:190).

Turning our discussion of attribution theory toward a sociological perspective, we note that Weiner (2000) reminds us that behaviors occur in settings rich in social aspects. These social settings obviously include other social actors within the broader
social structural landscape of society. In her work on responsibility judgments, Hamilton (1978) argues for the inclusion of what a social actor does and what a social actor should have done. For judgment of causality, this implies a union of what an actor actually does (behavior) and a comparative normative structure: what an actor ought to do or should have done (Hamilton 1978:316; Hamilton and Sanders 1981). As Hamilton argues, the sociological site or concept for comparisons of normative behaviors and expectations are “roles.” For sociologists, roles provide a sense of ordering and/or orderliness for a society. As such, roles can be seen as the site for inspection of the “normative order” (Hamilton 1978:321). This usage of “roles” as providing a normative order is in alignment with Hamilton’s discussion of Heider’s (1958) treatment of “ought”: “oughts are neither internal nor external sources of action; instead, they are internal manifestations of an external social or moral order” (Hamilton 1978:321; emphasis in original). Simply put, examination of responsibility—attributing responsibility to a social actor—requires inspection of an actor’s roles, expected role behavior (appropriate), and the actor’s actual “deeds” (Sanders et al. 1996). Additionally, the judgments of responsibility for an action can be affected by the observer’s social structural position. Hamilton (1978) suggests that one’s social class, level of education, and occupation can be important demographic variables to consider in studying the process of judgment formation. This sociological perspective on the attribution process complements the social psychological work considered above, especially in consideration of status or reference groups and role consistency and norms.

According to the tenets of attribution theory, we can hypothesize how others attribute causal factors to behaviors and events. This is accomplished by determining the following: (1) locus (internal or external; actor or situation), (2) consensus (commonality among social actors; that is, something many or most social actors do, or the uniqueness of the action being confined to specific actors), (3) stability (whether or not a cause changes or can change over time), and (4) controllability (the degree to which a causal factor is under the control of the social actor). According to Hamilton’s sociological insights into the attribution process, we are presented with a comparison mechanism for attributing judgment for behavior. This comparison mechanism consists of the actual doings of a social actor and the normative standard implied in roles and role performance expectations. The role performance expectations (“oughts” and “shoulds”) are compared to the actual behavior. Thus Hamilton’s insights into the attribution process provide a viable bridge between the sociologically oriented structural symbolic interactionism, supplemented by role or reference group theory, and the psychologically oriented attribution theory. This is just the sort of bridge that we shall require in making sense of heroism in the minds of the general public.

**HYPOTHESES**

In Table 1 we present hypothesized conditions for the vignettes. In each vignette we propose to examine the presence of these conditions: being (1) “in harm’s way,” (2) being in a nonprofessional role, and (3) performing the actions of the potential hero’s own volition.
Table 1. Hypothesized Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Hero</th>
<th>In Harm’s Way</th>
<th>Nonprofessional Role</th>
<th>Acted of Own Volition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Todd Beamer</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jessica Lynch</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. President George Bush</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In examining the condition “in harm’s way,” we are relying upon Oliner’s (2003) and Gibson’s (2003) work on heroism, which states that heroism consists of actions performed at great risk to the potential hero. As such we hypothesize:

H1: Level of perceived risk to the potential hero is positively related to how strongly he or she is perceived to be a hero.

In examining the vignette condition of nonprofessional role for potential heroes, we draw upon the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission’s longstanding criterion of excluding from consideration those in professional roles. Therefore, we hypothesize:

H2: Nonprofessional status for a potential hero is positively related to how strongly he or she is perceived to be a hero.

And, finally, in examining the vignette condition of “acted upon own volition,” we call upon the work of attribution theorists Wilson et al. (1993) and Eccles and Wigfield (2002) on locus of control. We hypothesize that:

H3: The extent to which a potential hero is perceived to be acting on his or her own volition is positively related to how strongly he or she is perceived to be a hero.

For purposes of examining the attribution of hero status, this study will focus primarily on two attribution processes for the vignette conditions: (1) consensus or role-consistent conditions: what respondents report that they would do or most people would do in the same circumstance; and (2) normative role expectations, consisting of what the respondents report that people should do (normative measure). Based upon the two attribution conditions—consensus (“I would do” and “Most would do”) and normative (“People should do”)—we will test these hypotheses:

We view heroism as exceptional bravery or courage attributed to the individual (internal locus) rather than the role (external locus). Thus heroic action differs from consensual or consistent role behavior.

H4: Intensity of agreement with consensus measure one (“I would do”) is negatively related to how strongly he or she is perceived to be a hero.

H5: Intensity of agreement with consensus measure two (“Most would do”) is negatively related to how strongly he or she is perceived to be a hero.

At the same time, we view heroic behavior as normative. It is the action that one should take.
H6: Intensity of agreement with the normative measure (“People should do”) is positively related to how strongly he or she is perceived to be a hero.

Based upon our proposed extension of role and attribution theories, we predict that aspects of respondents’ roles—class, status, and power—will significantly affect their judgment on whether persons in the vignettes are heroes. Since this is an exploratory effort, rather than posing specific hypotheses (e.g., Republicans are more likely to attribute hero status to George W. Bush), we will, initially, use class, status, and power indices as controls in our Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models predicting heroism judgments. If there are significant effects, we will disaggregate and see which components of these indices yield significant effects.

DATA

Sampling and Data Collection

All data were collected during the spring of 2004 through random digit dialing telephone interviews. The targeted population for the survey consisted of individuals 18 years of age and older in the 48 contiguous states comprising the continental United States. The site of data collection was the Department of Sociology’s Social Research Institute Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing Lab (CATI) at Purdue University. The response rate was 21.1% and the cooperation rate was 46.2% (see Appendix B for all disposition numbers).

Table 2 indicates that the sample was primarily white (85.9%), female (70.5%), with just over half (59.0%) of the respondents indicating at least some college education. Respondents are primarily conservative (70.5%) with approximately an equal percentage of Republicans (35.9%) and Democrats (35.3%). The median income category is $35,001 to $50,000, while the mode is $50,001–$75,000.

Following a Weberian model, we constructed three indices: “status,” “class,” and “party.” Race, gender, age, level of religiosity, and marital status comprise the “status” index. The “class” index consists of level of education, annual income, employment status (full-time or not), and occupational status (professional/managerial or not). The “party” index consists of two political scales used in the survey: (1) Political Orientation (conservative to liberal), and (2) Political Party (strongly Republican to strongly Democrat). The coding for each of the variables used in the indices can be found in Appendix A.

Independent variables used in the statistical models are designed to measure the attributional bases used by people in their judgments of heroism. Agreement with the statements: “I would do” or “Most people would do what (the person in the vignette) did” indicates the degree of consensus or role consistency (or external versus internal locus) attributed to the action posed in the vignettes. These variables are called “consensus one” (“I would”) and consensus two (“Most would”). Normative aspects of attribution theory, posed by Hamilton (1978), are indicated by agreement with the statement: “People should do what [person in vignette] did.” This variable represents normative or moral judgment.
Table 2. Sample Characteristics (N = 199)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>% (N)</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>% (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Variable Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>Less than $15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>$15,000–$25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>$25,001–$35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marital Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$35,001–$50,000</strong></td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>$50,001–$75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$75,001–$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$100,000 or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never Married</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Religiosity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Missing</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at All Religious</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Religious</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Religious</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Religious</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Political Orientation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;High School</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Extremely conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Very conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Somewhat conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Somewhat liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Very liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Extremely liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Party Affiliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaning Republican</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Rep. or Dem.</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaning Democrat</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE HERO VIGNETTES

Questions on the three heroism vignettes were framed with the following: “In the wake of the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a lot of talk about heroism and what it means to be a hero. In the first group of questions, I’m going to describe several recent events and ask you to comment on the acts of heroism.”

The first vignette posed to the respondents concerned the September 11, 2001, actions of Todd Beamer on American Airlines Flight 93:

The first event was the crashing of American Airlines flight 93 in Pennsylvania reported to have been done by Todd Beamer and several other passengers to keep the terrorists from reaching their Washington, D.C., target. I would like for you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

The second vignette was concerned with the reported events surrounding Jessica Lynch’s capture and subsequent rescue in the war in Iraq:

In the recent war in Iraq, it was reported that Army Private Jessica Lynch was captured and tortured by Iraqi forces. Lynch was rescued by U.S. forces and returned to the United States. Again, tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about this event.

The third vignette centered on the actions of President George W. Bush and his decision to go to war with Iraq despite nonparticipation by the United Nations:

The next events occurred when the United Nations decided not to participate in the recent war against Iraq. President George W. Bush decided to “go it alone” and attack Iraq with a small coalition of “willing nations.” Again, tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.

In each of the three vignettes, respondents were presented with and asked to respond to these four Likert-type responses (Strongly Agree = 5, Agree = 4, Neither Agree nor Disagree = 3, Disagree = 2, and Strongly Disagree = 1):

1. If the person in the vignette was a hero;
2. If the respondent would do what the hero posed in the vignette did (consensus measure one);
3. If most people would do what the hero posed in the vignette did (consensus measure two);
4. If people should do what the person in the vignette did (normative measure).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Table 3 indicates strong support for the statement that “Todd Beamer was a hero.” The mean response attributing hero status (4.33) is between “agree” (4.0) and “strongly agree” (5.0). Even one standard deviation below the mean is closer to “agree” (4.0) than to “neither agree nor disagree” (3.0). Clearly, the respondents
agreed overwhelmingly that Todd Beamer is a hero. A comparable pattern of disagreement is evoked by the statement that “I would do” what Beamer did (consensus measure one). Here the mean response (2.13) is “disagree” and a standard deviation above yields “neither agree nor disagree” (3.0). Respondents were less certain about what “most people would do” (consensus two), reporting a mean response (3.34) of “neither agree nor disagree” within a standard deviation of either agreement or disagreement. There was more agreement on the normative issue (“people should do”), which elicited almost as much agreement as Beamer’s status as a hero.

In the Lynch vignette, respondents indicated that they were unsure as to her hero status (mean = 3.39, with one standard deviation [1.03] indicating either agreement or disagreement). There is similar uncertainty on the consensus and normative conditions, with mean ratings clustering just below 3.5 with standard deviations around 1. Compared to the Beamer ratings, the range of mean ratings is very limited, but the standard deviation is fairly high, indicating more uncertainty on normative and consensus measures, as on her status as hero.

This pattern continues for the Bush vignette, although the mean ratings are even lower, and the standard deviations even higher. Here, respondents all but disagree (mean = 2.64) as to Bush’s hero status, but the standard deviation is large (1.29), so that one standard deviation from the mean covers the range from strongly disagree (1.35) to agree (3.93). In the Bush vignette, this tendency to disagree continues through both consensus and normative conditions.

The higher mean hero ratings for Todd Beamer and Jessica Lynch suggest support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, but mixed results on Hypothesis 3. The hypothesized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Todd Beamer Vignette:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Todd beamer is a hero.</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>.719</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would do what Todd Beamer did.</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>.914</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people would do what Todd Beamer did.</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should do what Todd Beamer did.</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>.804</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessica Lynch Vignette:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Private Jessica Lynch is a hero.</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would do what Jessica Lynch did.</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>.986</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people would do what Jessica Lynch did.</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should do what Jessica Lynch did.</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>.973</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George W. Bush Vignette:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President George W. Bush is a hero.</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would do what George W. Bush did.</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people would do what George W. Bush did.</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should do what George W. Bush did.</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 5 = strongly agree; 4 = agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 2 = disagree; and 1 = strongly disagree.
vignette conditions, reported in Table 1, correspond to these three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicts that, compared to Bush, hero rating for Beamer ($t = -16.274; p < .001$) and Lynch ($t = -6.574; p < .001$) will be significantly higher, since they were in harm’s way. Hypothesis 2 predicts that Beamer’s hero rating will be higher than that of Bush ($t = -16.274; p < .001$) or Lynch ($t = -9.557; p < .001$), since only Beamer was a nonprofessional—a civilian airline passenger. Hypothesis 3 predicts that Lynch will have a lower hero rating than Beamer ($t = -9.557; p < .001$) or Bush, since Lynch was not acting on her own volition (she was kidnapped). In this case (as noted above) the finding is contrary to prediction, since Bush received significantly lower hero ratings than Lynch ($t = -6.574; p < .001$). Within the limited comparison of these three vignettes, it is clear that respondents attribute a higher hero status to the potential hero who is in harm’s way and who is a nonprofessional. The effects of acting of her/his own volition are mixed.

Bivariate correlations are presented in Table 4. Since the total matrix is rather large, we have elected to present only the variables of particular interest, relegating the entire matrix to Appendix C. The statistically significant correlations ($p < 0.05$) are indicated in bold with an asterisk (*). Starting with column one, the Beamer vignette, consensus condition one (“I would do”) is negatively correlated ($-0.350$) with Beamer’s hero status (as predicted in Hypothesis 4). Consensus two (“Most people would do”) is positively correlated ($0.274$) with Beamer’s hero status (contrary to Hypothesis 5) and the normative condition (“People should do”) is positively correlated ($0.521$) with Beamer’s hero status (as predicted in Hypothesis 6). Additionally, hero status for Beamer is positively correlated with level of education, marital status, race, and the status index, indicating that highly educated, married, white, high status persons gave Beamer higher hero ratings.

Column two, the Lynch vignette, indicates that consensus condition one (“I would”: $0.495$) and two (“Most would”: $0.173$) and the normative condition (“People should”: $0.533$) are positively correlated with Lynch’s hero status. Also, female, single, low-income, lower-class respondents scored Private Jessica Lynch higher on hero status.

Column 3 indicates that Bush’s hero status is positively correlated with both consensus conditions (“I would do”: $0.817$ and “Most people would do”: $0.531$) and the normative condition (“People should do”: $0.781$). Bush’s hero status is also negatively correlated with political party and party index (which includes conservative-liberal) and positively correlated with race. Thus white, conservative, Republicans score Bush higher on heroism.

Thus we find, in bivariate correlations, limited support for the hypothesized effects of consensus conditions but strong support for normative effects. Hypothesis 4 (“I would do” negative correlation with heroism) is supported only for the Beamer vignette. For Lynch and Bush, respondents reporting that they would do likewise reported higher heroism ratings. Hypothesis 5 (“Most would do”—negative correlation with heroism) is uniformly opposite of the prediction. On all three vignettes, respondents reporting that most people would do likewise offered higher heroism ratings. Only the hypothesized normative effect (“People should do”) was consistently observed. On all three vignettes, persons agreeing that people should do likewise
offered higher heroism ratings. Beyond the hypothesized normative effects, we also found significant effects of class, status, or party identification, with higher status associated with heroism for the Beamer vignette, lower class associated with heroism for Lynch, and Republican/conservative partisanship associated with heroism for Bush.

Table 5 presents the net effects of these variables when used to predict heroism in multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models (estimated separately for each vignette). Model 1 includes only the attribution conditions: consensus one ("I would do"), consensus two ("Most would do") and the normative ("People should do") condition. Each of the three vignettes produced a significant $F$ value indicative of the model's predicative strength. The Beamer vignette model explains 32.7% of the variance, the Lynch vignette model explains 33.5%, and the Bush vignette model explains 69.7% of the variance. Variance Inflation Factors (V.I.F.) for all three vignettes were well below the multicolinearity “benchmark” of 10.0 proposed by Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman (1996).
Consensus condition two (“Most people would do”) was not significant for any of the three vignettes. Apparently, the bivariate relations are spurious and disappear after controlling for consensus one (“I would do”) and the normative condition (“People should”). Therefore, no measurable support is found for Hypothesis 5, which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beamer</td>
<td>Lynch</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>Beamer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attribution Condition:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus 1</td>
<td>-.186*</td>
<td>.345*</td>
<td>.504*</td>
<td>-.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.060)</td>
<td>(.096)</td>
<td>(.076)</td>
<td>(.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus 2</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(.074)</td>
<td>(.070)</td>
<td>(.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>.408*</td>
<td>.354*</td>
<td>.333*</td>
<td>.325*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indices:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>.080*</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-.055*</td>
<td>.049*</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td>(.090)</td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>-.126*</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status Components:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.110)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. Status</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.104)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.107)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>.446*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.150)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.033)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class Components:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.127*</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.053)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.038)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mgr/Prof.</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>-.156</td>
<td>(.229)</td>
<td>(.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.182)</td>
<td>(.144)</td>
<td>(.182)</td>
<td>(.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Components:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Orientation</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.063)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>-.300*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.065)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.595)</td>
<td>(.855)</td>
<td>(.720)</td>
<td>(.545)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.269</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>.717</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05 All variance inflation factors (VIF) are well under benchmark set by Neter et al. (1996).
predicted that respondents would attribute less hero status in conditions of high consensus (“Most would do”). Perhaps it is some consolation that the net effect is only insignificant rather than opposite to the predicted sign.

Consensus one (“I would do what [person in the vignette] did,”) and the normative condition (“People should do what [person in vignette] did”) remain significant in all three vignettes, and the pattern of relations mirrors the bivariate correlations. In the Todd Beamer vignette, “I would do what Todd Beamer did,” produced a negative coefficient of −.186, providing additional support for Hypothesis 4. The normative measure in the Todd Beamer vignette, “People should do what Todd Beamer did,” produced a positive coefficient of .408, providing support for Hypothesis 6.

In the Jessica Lynch vignette (Model 1, Table 5), both consensus one and the normative condition yield significant positive coefficients (.345 for “I would do what Jessica Lynch did” and .354 for “People should do what Jessica Lynch did”). Contrary to Hypothesis 4, consensus one yields a positive effect in the Lynch vignette. Respondents who agreed that they would do what Lynch did also agreed that she was a hero.

The same pattern of results obtains in the George W. Bush vignette, where both consensus one and the normative condition yield significant positive coefficients. “I would do what George W. Bush did,” produced a coefficient of .504, while “People should do what George W. Bush did,” produced a coefficient of .333. Once again, unlike the Beamer vignette, support is shown for Hypothesis 6 but not Hypothesis 4.

Model 2

In Model 2 (Table 5), status, party, and class indices are added to the equation. Model 2 produced significant $F$ values for all three vignettes, although in the Todd Beamer vignette, inclusion of the indices actually reduced the explained variance of Model 1 from 32.7% to 26.9%. The consensus one variable (“I would do what Todd Beamer did”) is reduced to insignificance with inclusion of the status, party, and class, although only the status effect is significant ($b = .080$).

In the Jessica Lynch vignette, inclusion of the three indices increases the explained variance almost 10% from 33.5% in Model 1 to 42.7%. Consensus condition one (“I would do what Jessica Lynch did”) and the normative condition (“People should do what Jessica Lynch did”) remain significant, with the unstandardized coefficient for the normative condition (“People should do what Jessica Lynch did”) increasing from .354 to .423. Class is the only significant index in Model 2 for the Jessica Lynch vignette ($b = -.055$).

In the George W. Bush vignette, inclusion of the indices slightly increases the explained variance from 69.7% to 71.7%. Both consensus and normative effects remain significant and both the class ($b = .049$) and party ($b = -.126$) indices are significant.

Model 3

In Model 3 the components of the significant indices are included, in lieu of the index, to determine which specific elements exert an effect on attributed hero status.
Additionally, insignificant indices for each vignette have been removed from the analysis. All three vignettes in Model 3 produced significant $F$ values.

In the Todd Beamer vignette, removal of the nonsignificant indices (class and party) along with the presentation of the elements of the status index increased explained variance from 26.9% in Model 2 up to 37.4%, which is also higher than in Model 1 (32.7%). The increase in explained variance from Model 1 to Model 3 is statistically significant ($F = 2.61, p < .05$). As in Model 2, the consensus one measure ("I would do what Todd Beamer did") remains insignificant. The only measured component in the status index found to be significant is race ($b = .446$), indicating that white respondents are more likely to attribute hero status to Todd Beamer than nonwhite respondents.

In the Jessica Lynch vignette, the explained variance drops from 42.7% in Model 2 to 40.3%, which is still higher than 33.5% in Model 1, but the increase in explained variance from Model 1 to Model 3 is significant ($F = 4.95, p < .05$). Only the income variable in the class index produced a significant effect, with an unstandardized coefficient of $-1.127$. The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that an increase in income decreases attributed hero status for Jessica Lynch.

In the George W. Bush vignette, explained variance increases from 71.7% in Model 2 to 74.6% in Model 3, which is also higher than Model 1 (69.7%). As in the Beamer vignette, the increase in explained variance from Model 1 to Model 3 is statistically significant ($F = 5.56, p < .05$). Decomposition of the class and party indices together produced one significant variable of these indices—political party affiliation. At $-.300$, the unstandardized coefficient for political party affiliation indicates that as respondents move up the political party affiliation scale from Strong Republican (equals 1) to Strong Democrat (equals 7), George W. Bush's hero status declines.

**Attributing Hero Status**

Mean heroism ratings offer consistent support for the hypothesized effect of being in harm's way (Hypothesis 1) and the effect of nonprofessional roles (Hypothesis 2), but the effect of volition (Hypothesis 3) is not clear. Perhaps it is the combined effects of being nonprofessional, in harm's way, and acting of one’s own volition that distinguishes Beamer as a real hero. Lynch was not acting of her own volition but she was in harm's way and, like Bush, was a professional. In any case, she received, on average, higher hero ratings than Bush, although significantly lower than Beamer.

From these results, one might infer that only Beamer was really a hero and drop the other vignettes from the analysis. If we limit our attention to the Beamer vignette, we find considerable support for our hypotheses. Respondents who rated Beamer highest on heroism reported that they would not do what he did (Hypothesis 4: consensus one condition) but that he did what people ought to do (Hypothesis 6: normative condition). Of course, contrary to Hypothesis 5, they also reported that most people would do what Beamer did (consensus two condition), but that effect proved to be insignificant in the multivariate model.

Contrary to expectations and unlike the Beamer vignette, in both the Jessica Lynch and George W. Bush vignettes, respondents who agreed that these actors were
heroes also reported that they (consensus one: “I would”) and most people (consensus two) would do likewise. They also reported that people should do what Bush/Lynch did, suggesting that there was no moral dilemma here. Lynch and Bush were doing their jobs (according to these respondents)—doing what anyone would and should do in the same circumstances. Thus, in these cases, there is no exceptional valor or courage involved. These respondents perceived the actions taken by both Lynch and Bush as related to duty (professional), and focused on task orientation (external locus), rather than the personal choice (internal locus) as in the Beamer vignette (nonprofessional).

These findings might lend support to the claim that heroism does not include the routine action of uniformed and professional actors. This is, of course, the position adopted some time ago by the Carnegie Foundation in its consideration of hero award status, because its standard of heroism—along with most of our respondents—requires actions that are rare and normative, not simply normative. Additionally, these findings serve to situate the jurisdiction of individuality in the internal (and initiative) realm of attribution, versus role salience (external and task focused) in attributing hero status—respondents granted higher hero status in the Beamer vignette with its higher degree of individuality than in the two other vignettes, which apparently respondents viewed as higher in role salience; that is, they were “just doing their jobs,” and they were on task.

Ultimately, however, in multivariate analysis, what most people would do (consensus two) does not predict hero status when controlling for consensus one (“I would”) and the normative condition (“People should”). What respondents report that they would do, what they think most people would do, and what they believe people should do are related. Beyond that, however, the effect of perceptions of what others would do appears to be less important than: (1) what they would do and (2) ethical standards they have for others—the oughts of what people should do. This appears to indicate a shift in thinking from what is normal (or conventional) in the vignettes (“Most people would do . . .”) to a role standard of what needs to be done in the vignette. In addition, this appears to indicate a shift from community to personal judgment, from “Most people would” to “I would,” while maintaining the normative judgment (“People should”).

With the inclusion of consensus one (“I would”) and the normative (“should”) condition examined in Model 1, the examination of attributed hero status takes on the added role dimension posed by Hamilton (1978). For the Beamer vignette, the negative coefficient for consensus condition one (“I would do”) indicated that respondents would not do what Beamer did. Although hardly a startling finding, since his actions may have ultimately led to his death, and common sense dictates that most people would choose life over death, responses to the normative condition (“People should do”) indicate that Beamer did what he should have done. When both consensus and normative conditions are combined, for the Beamer vignette, respondents who agreed that Beamer is a hero indicated that they would not do what Beamer did, but that Beamer did what he should (“ought to”) have done. Here respondents are attributing hero status to conditions of individuality and uniqueness,
buttressing our prediction that heroic acts are rare and normative. This signals support for Porpora’s (1996: 210) position that heroes exemplify cultural and moral ideals of a society (“moral beacons”), as well as Schwartz’s (1969: 82) notion of heroes being “the standard bearers of the ‘best.’” because their actions are at once rare but also reflective of exemplary moral/value orientation (what people should do). By virtue of being “the standard bearers of the ‘best’” and being rare, attributed hero status appears to be reserved for those unique individuals who do what most of us don’t want to do or don’t feel we could do, but what we should do if one strictly adheres to societal normative role expectations.

**Models 2 and 3: Role Identification**

In the Beamer vignette, only the status index produced a significant effect. When the status index was then tested in its constituent parts in Model 3, only the variable race produced a significant effect ($b = .446$). With the variable race coded as White = 1 and Nonwhite = 0 (see Appendix A), White respondents are more likely to attribute hero status to Beamer than Nonwhite respondents. However, this finding should be weighed against the sample demographics, which indicate that only one out of every 8.5 respondents was Nonwhite.

In the Jessica Lynch vignette, only the class index produced a significant effect. In testing to determine which components of the class index were responsible for significant effects, only income was found to be significant, with decreasing respondent income serving to strengthen respondents’ attribution of hero status to Jessica Lynch. This finding is really no surprise when one considers that most members of our military forces are primarily situated in lower income brackets. For many, the military forces with their benefits packages (i.e., tuition support) are a primary avenue for upward mobility in the United States.

In the George W. Bush vignette, both the class and party indices were found to be significant. Further testing of these indices proved political party the only significant effect, for both indices. This is somewhat surprising inasmuch as the variable measuring conservative to liberal political orientations produced no significant effect. The significance of the political party variable ($b = -.300$) lies in its negative direction, which, due to scaling, indicates that Republicans are much more likely to attribute hero status to George W. Bush than Democrats. This finding points to the current bipolar nature of politics in the United States as well as the war in Iraq, and ratifies the divisive effect of the war in the 2004 presidential election.

In alignment with our proposed extension for role theory, a close examination of the correlation table in Appendix C indicates some interesting patterns of significant relationships, particularly when examining the consensus and normative conditions for each vignette. First, race appears only as a positive (“White”) effect across all three vignettes, and is significantly related to consensus conditions one (“I would do”), and two (“Most people would do”) in both the Beamer and Bush vignettes. In the Lynch vignette, race is significant only for consensus condition two (“Most people would do”).

Next, income is a significant positive effect only in the Beamer vignette for the normative condition (“People should do”) but is significant and negative for consen-
sus condition one ("I would do") in the Lynch vignette and for both the consensus conditions and the normative condition in the Bush vignette. High-income respondents think that people should do what Beamer did, but they would not do what Lynch did (join the Army). Also, they would not do what Bush did and report that most people would not and definitely should not invade Iraq without UN support.

Finally, when we look at political party, we find no significant relationships with the consensus and normative conditions for the Beamer vignette, and only negative and significant relationships for consensus condition one ("I would do") and the normative condition ("People should do") in the Lynch vignette. In the Bush vignette, party is negative and significantly related to both consensus conditions and the normative condition. For the Beamer story, it seems that both parties agree. For Lynch, Democrats (by 2004) oppose the war, so they claim that they would not and people should not be fighting in Iraq. For the Bush vignette, Republicans argue that Bush is a hero and claim that they would and that most would and should do what Bush did.

These findings suggest that role identification effects may be at work in how our respondents attribute hero status. While our findings point to Beamer as a hero largely across role components, attribution of hero status for Lynch and Bush appears to be a different story. Both Bush and Lynch appear to be heroes for Republicans, with Republicans apparently identifying with the consensus conditions and the normative condition for Bush, irrespective of political orientation (e.g., conservative or liberal). For Lynch, hero status appears to be a story of importance for single, lower-income females, while for Bush, hero status attribution appears to reflect the role or status identification of White, Republican, lower-income respondents. With education negatively related to consensus condition two ("Most people would do") in the Bush vignette, the war appears to be less popular among highly educated as well as high-income respondents.

Hence, the attribution of hero status for Lynch and particularly for Bush might be the results of party identification effects. Here the judgment says little or nothing about Lynch or Bush as individuals or even within their roles as Army private or commander in chief. The critical issue is support for the invasion of Iraq, and the basis for that judgment is essentially partisan. We would surmise, given the results of the 2004 presidential election, which was clearly bifurcated—either Democrat or Republican, and absent a middle ground—that the significant effects of political party mirror the nature of the political atmosphere in the United States and thereby indicate the viability of our proposed extension of role theory, in which identification with the actor's class, status, or party shapes the attribution of heroism.

**CONCLUSION**

Attributed hero status is clearly higher in situations in which a potential hero is viewed as being in harm's way—risking life and limb (Beamer and Lynch). Second, attributed hero status is also higher for the potential hero in the nonprofessional role (Beamer) versus those in a professional role (Lynch and Bush). Third, mixed support is found for situations of self-initiated action ("own volition"). Here the range of
conditions in the three vignettes limits us. Comparing Lynch's case to a nonprofessional kidnap victim (e.g., Patty Hearst) or a soldier who was killed rather than captured might help us to disentangle these effects and might be a fruitful area for future research. Future researchers may find that one or another of the vignette conditions may serve as a "master condition," in that it exerts control over the other conditions, or its absence may render some or all of the other conditions moot. This may have been at work in the present study given the influence of nonprofessional over professional in attributed hero status; that is, the role of nonprofessional may be a master condition for these vignettes.

Examination of role expectations (Hamilton 1978) produced several points of interest for present and future scholars of heroism. First, examination of the consensus condition one ("I would do") was negative only in the Beamer vignette. This indicates that respondents who thought Beamer was a hero would not do what Todd Beamer did but would do what Jessica Lynch and George W. Bush did. Second, the direction of the normative ("People should do") was positive in all three vignettes. For Todd Beamer, the combination of a negative consensus condition one and a positive normative condition indicates just how extraordinary (individualistic) and rare a hero's behavior can be. In both the Jessica Lynch and George W. Bush vignettes, the direction of both consensus and normative conditions were positive. This indicates that respondents who thought that Lynch and Bush were heroes would do what Lynch and Bush did and thought that they both did what they should do. The positive direction of normative condition one in the Lynch and Bush vignettes points to the nonextraordinary nature of their actions, especially when compared to Beamer's, by dismissing individuality in their situations and stressing role salience.

Our research indicates that the consensus condition two ("Most people would do") is problematic in predicting hero status attribution, at least for the War on Terrorism in the United States. Our work also indicates that a particular mix of our tested consensus and normative condition—behavior that is viewed as normative ("People should do") but not what an individual would do ("I wouldn't do")—is critical to the hero attribution process.

The testing of social structural markers comprising Weber's class, status, and power indicate the viability of extending role theory's "self-other" focus. This viability was suggested in the significant finding related to the demographics of race, income, and political party. Here the salience of race, class, and party was found to be critical in the framing of war, heroes, and villains. Our work here encourages future scholars of heroism, role theory, and attribution theory (especially those in the tradition of Hamilton and Sanders [1981]) to formulate and test different permutations of these theoretical traditions.
APPENDIX A: RECODES FOR INDICES

Status

- **Race:** White = 1; all other than White = 0.
- **Gender:** Male = 1 and female = 0.
- **Age:** Under 65 = 1 and over 65 = 0.
- **Level of Religiosity:** Very religious = 4; somewhat religious = 3; not very religious = 2; and not at all religious = 1.
- **Marital Status:** Married = 1; all other than married = 0.

Class

- **Highest Level of Education:** Z score (postgraduate degree = 6; college graduate = 5; some college = 4; vocational training = 3; high school graduate = 2; and less than high school graduate = 1).
- **Annual Income:** $100K and higher = 7; $75,001–$100K = 6; $50,001–$75,000 = 5; $35,001–$50,000 = 4; $25,001–$35,000 = 3; $15,001–$25,000 = 2; and less than $15,000 = 1.
- **Employment Status:** Full-time = 1; all other than full-time = 0.
- **Occupational Status:** Managerial/Professional = 1; all other than managerial/professional = 0.

Party

- **Conservative/Liberal:** Z score (extremely liberal = 6; very liberal = 5; somewhat liberal = 4; somewhat conservative = 3; very conservative = 2; and extremely conservative = 1).
- **Political Party Affiliation:** Z score (strong Democrat = 7; Democrat = 6; leaning Democrat = 5; neither Republican or Democrat = 4; leaning Republican = 3; Republican = 2; and strong Republican = 1).
APPENDIX B: PHONE SURVEY DISPOSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed Interview</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disconnect</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Problem</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answering Machine</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modem/Fax</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busy</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Qualified (too young)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callbacks</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterminates (partial interviews)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refusal Never Call Again</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Called</strong></td>
<td><strong>2368</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Response Rate: 21.1%
Contact Rate: 45.4%
Rates were calculated according to Groves and Couper (1998).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beamer</td>
<td>Hero</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>-0.350*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>-0.460*</td>
<td>-0.211*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.256*</td>
<td>-0.198*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>0.521*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>24</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Beamer Hero</td>
<td>−.034</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.211*</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>−.058</td>
<td>−.007</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.306*</td>
<td>.186*</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Consensus 1</td>
<td>−.069</td>
<td>−.072</td>
<td>−.066</td>
<td>−.008</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.212*</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>−.185*</td>
<td>−.054</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>−.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consensus 2</td>
<td>−.114</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>−.021</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>−.153*</td>
<td>−.133</td>
<td>−.173*</td>
<td>−.068</td>
<td>−.143</td>
<td>.187*</td>
<td>−.053</td>
<td>−.165*</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Normative</td>
<td>−.041</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>−.015</td>
<td>.171*</td>
<td>.171*</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>−.022</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Lynch Hero</td>
<td>−.060</td>
<td>−.147</td>
<td>−.158*</td>
<td>−.269*</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>−.076</td>
<td>−.076</td>
<td>−.235*</td>
<td>−.235*</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>−.105</td>
<td>−.220*</td>
<td>−.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Consensus1</td>
<td>−.106</td>
<td>−.251*</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>−.158</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>−.169*</td>
<td>−.160*</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>−.124</td>
<td>−.101</td>
<td>−.237*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Consensus2</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>−.002</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>−.081</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>−.085</td>
<td>−.089</td>
<td>−.093</td>
<td>.186*</td>
<td>−.020</td>
<td>−.120</td>
<td>−.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Normative</td>
<td>−.118</td>
<td>−.268*</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>−.098</td>
<td>.169*</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>−.043</td>
<td>−.084</td>
<td>−.008</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>−.006</td>
<td>−.025</td>
<td>−.231*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Consensus1</td>
<td>−.103</td>
<td>−.405*</td>
<td>−.132</td>
<td>.173*</td>
<td>−.041</td>
<td>−.064</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>−.199*</td>
<td>.197*</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>−.219*</td>
<td>−.331*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Normative</td>
<td>−.139</td>
<td>−.426*</td>
<td>−.103</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>−.027</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>−.182*</td>
<td>.169*</td>
<td>.161*</td>
<td>−.163*</td>
<td>−.372*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Education</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>−.088</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.176*</td>
<td>.263*</td>
<td>.241*</td>
<td>.434*</td>
<td>−.189*</td>
<td>.455*</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>−.017</td>
<td>.725*</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Pol. Orient.</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>−.016</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.742*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Pol. Party</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>−.015</td>
<td>−.021</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.758*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Gender</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>−.015</td>
<td>.182*</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.221*</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>−.276*</td>
<td>.352*</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.303*</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Marital</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>−.021</td>
<td>.182*</td>
<td>.167*</td>
<td>.294*</td>
<td>.262*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.533</td>
<td>.276*</td>
<td>.463*</td>
<td>.474*</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Age</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.167*</td>
<td>.454*</td>
<td>.239*</td>
<td>−.096</td>
<td>.254*</td>
<td>−.129</td>
<td>.234*</td>
<td>.355*</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Full-time</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.221*</td>
<td>.294*</td>
<td>.454*</td>
<td>.611*</td>
<td>−.229*</td>
<td>.407*</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.581*</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Prof Mgr</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.262*</td>
<td>.239*</td>
<td>.611*</td>
<td>−.086</td>
<td>.454*</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.668*</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Religiosity</td>
<td>−.016</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>−.276*</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>−.229*</td>
<td>−.086</td>
<td>−.161*</td>
<td>−.021</td>
<td>.803*</td>
<td>−.212*</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Income</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.352*</td>
<td>.533*</td>
<td>.254*</td>
<td>.407*</td>
<td>.454*</td>
<td>−.161*</td>
<td>−.071</td>
<td>.167*</td>
<td>.907*</td>
<td>.158*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Race</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.276*</td>
<td>−.129</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>−.021</td>
<td>−.071</td>
<td>.249*</td>
<td>−.009</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Status Index</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.463*</td>
<td>.234</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.803*</td>
<td>.167*</td>
<td>.249*</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Class Index</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.474**</td>
<td>.355*</td>
<td>.581*</td>
<td>.668*</td>
<td>−.212*</td>
<td>.907*</td>
<td>−.009</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Party Index</td>
<td>.742*</td>
<td>.758*</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.158*</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05*
Gregory C. Gibson is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Purdue University. His research focuses on the gender and social psychological aspects of heroism. His dissertation research is aimed at understanding the role of gender in contemporary heroism.

Richard Hogan is associate professor of sociology and American studies at Purdue University. His research includes studies of inequality in the United States, including the 2005 “Was Wright Wrong? High-Class Jobs and the Professional Earnings Advantage” (Social Science Quarterly 86:645–663), along with studies of community politics, including The Failure of Planning: Permitting Sprawl in San Diego Suburbs, 1970–1999 (Ohio State University Press, 2003).

John Stahura is professor of sociology in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Purdue University. He is the director of Purdue’s Social Research Institute.

Eugene Jackson is associate professor of sociology for the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Purdue University. His research areas are social psychology and mental health.

REFERENCES


A number of critical theorists of capitalist globalization argue that the power of capital is based on a consensus for global neoliberalism generated by a transnational bloc of capitalists, state officials, and intellectuals. I argue in this paper that these theorists minimize the role that coercive state power has played in supporting capital accumulation, and, as a result, they underestimate the continued significance of the nation-state in capitalism. The U.S. invasion of Iraq illustrates the central role of the nation-state in global capitalism in two ways: first, by revealing intense levels of intercapitalist rivalry; and second, by demonstrating the determination of the United States to ensure that neoliberalism is imposed unilaterally, through force if necessary.

One of the unintended, long-term casualties of the U.S. invasion of Iraq may be globalization. By this, I do not mean the institutional framework for global capitalism, but rather globalization as an ideological force that presents global capitalism as an inevitable process that is beyond the control of states. The war has brought to the forefront one of the principal contradictions of capitalism—the contradiction between the global scope of capitalist economic forces and the more spatially and politically limited boundaries of the nation-state. Calls from U.S. foreign policy officials and intellectuals for a new American imperialism, in which no threats to U.S. power will be tolerated (Foster 2003; Research Unit for Political Economy 2003), would appear to violate the basic tenets of globalization, with their emphasis on U.S. political-military might. After all, if globalization is truly an inevitable and irreversible process emerging from the logic of markets, a process that necessarily brings the benefits of prosperity and democracy to all, what need is there for coercive state power to impose this system?

The contemporary politics of global capitalism are defined by neoliberalism, which is a coherent program of market liberalization, state deregulation, and privatization that privileges market forces above all else (Tabb 2001; Teeple 2000). All nonmarket forces that might challenge the hegemony of the market run the risk of being either marginalized or absorbed through commodification. At the same time, labor and other subordinate social forces are disciplined by legal restrictions on union...
activity, punitive reductions in social welfare provision, and the extension of formal institutions of social control. In addition to these concrete policies, an essential component of neoliberalism is the ideological argument that capitalist globalization is an inevitable process that operates independently of human agency (Steger 2002). One important expression of this ideological argument is the suggestion that global capitalism has led to the supersession of the nation-state. The political authority of the nation-state is seen as inadequate to limit the transnational movement of capital, and so the best that state officials can do is make their national territories more competitive in order to attract hypermobile capital (Friedman 1999). Peripheral regions have, of course, always been subordinated to the needs of capital; thus, the disciplinary power of the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment policies and the World Trade Organization’s liberalization of trade rules are contemporary expressions of a centuries-long pattern of capitalist development. What is new, it is argued, is that core regions have increasingly been subjected to the same disciplinary power. Mainstream claims of political powerlessness have been rightly criticized as disingenuous (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Weiss 1998). Core states have served as agents of the internationalization of capital, not its passive victims.

A consistent feature of mainstream political debate, the argument that the nation-state has been increasingly marginalized by global capitalism has also found expression in more critical social science circles. Teeple, for example, argues that neoliberal policies are “the last national policies to be promulgated, the final act of the independent nation-state” (Teeple 2000: 81). A post-Fordist system of production has simultaneously dispersed and integrated production globally, accompanied by the rise of “a relatively coherent multiplicity of supranational agencies and organizations, dominated by the U.S. state, that oversee the broad reaches of the global economy in the interests of corporate private property” (Teeple 2000: 157). Sklair, in his outline of global systems theory, makes a similar argument. Global systems theory offers “a decisive break with state centrism” by examining transnational “practices that cross state borders but do not originate with state agencies or actors” at three interrelated levels: political transnational practices are institutionalized in a transnational capitalist class consisting of “globalizing bureaucrats, politicians, and professionals” (Sklair 2001: 16, 4; Sklair 2002: 10); economic transnational practices are institutionalized in transnational corporations, which provide the material base for the transnational capitalist class; and cultural/ideological transnational practices are institutionalized in the dominance of consumerism as a value system. Finally, Hardt and Negri have received considerable acclaim for their argument that the globalization of markets and production has been accompanied by a transformation of political power. The power of nation-states, which is no longer capable of regulating global economic and cultural flows, has been replaced by a network of national and supranational institutions referred to as “Empire.” Hardt and Negri define this new form of global sovereignty as “a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanded frontiers” (Hardt and Negri 2000: xii).
Proponents of transnational historical materialism have made perhaps the most important contribution to this discussion. Transnational historical materialism is grounded in the Gramscian theory of hegemony. Gramsci argued that the dominance of the ruling class is not simply based on economic power or political-military coercion, but is also a function of its ability to provide cultural and moral leadership:

The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership.” A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to “liquidate,” or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise “leadership” before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well (1971: 57–58).

In this context, a class is hegemonic to the extent that it offers an integrated system of values and beliefs that support the established social order and that project a particular set of class interests as the general interest. Hegemonic power is not imposed on subordinates, but, instead, is a negotiated process. Both within the dominant coalition of capital, state managers, and organic intellectuals and in their relations with subordinate social forces, dominant groups must negotiate with subordinate groups in order to secure the latter’s consent to their rule. This process of negotiation, which Gramsci referred to as trasformismo or “passive revolution,” can make some accommodation to the economic interests of subordinate groups and may even appropriate their symbols and discourse, but will not question fundamental social relations (Boggs 1976; Showstack Sassoon 1987).

Transnational historical materialists argue that a hegemonic bloc of transnational capital, political officials from core capitalist states and multilateral economic institutions, and global intellectuals has emerged and is exercising power through its construction of a consensus for capitalist globalization. An important part of this hegemonic power has been the fundamental reorientation of the nation-state toward supporting global rather than national capital accumulation, a process that Cox refers to as the internationalization of the state (Cox 1987, 1996). Cox explains that this is defined by the conversion of the state “into an agency for adjusting national economic practices and policies to the perceived exigencies of the global economy. The state becomes a transmission belt from the global to the national economy, where heretofore it had acted as the bulwark defending domestic welfare from external disturbances” (1996: 302).

Robinson (1996a, 1996b, 2001, 2004) likewise argues that the internationalization of the state converts nation-states “into transmission belts and filtering devices for the imposition of the transnational agenda” (Robinson 1996a: 19; see also Robinson 1996b: 368); “[t]he function of the nation-state is shifting from the formulation of national policies to the administration of policies formulated by the transnational elite acting through supranational institutions” (Robinson 1996b: 373; see also Robinson 2001: 166). The nation-state now serves to facilitate global capital accumulation as well as insulate new supranational economic institutions from democratic accountability.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE INVASION OF IRAQ

from below. It helps to secure a generalized acceptance of globalization as a “common sense” description of an uncontrollable, inevitable, and, ultimately, desirable process. Since hegemony is a negotiated process in which the consent of subordinate social forces is essential, the ideology of globalization plays an important role in the internationalized state’s efforts to win the consent of its population to neoliberal policies.

The continued U.S. war in Iraq provides an opportunity to reevaluate these arguments. In this paper, I suggest that these critical theories of global capitalism overstate the absorption of the nation-state into the processes of transnational capital; national political structures and cultures and the needs of national capitals continue to play a major role in global capitalism. By emphasizing the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism, these theories overlook the significance of nation-state militarism in shaping the contours of global capitalism.

MILITARISM AND CAPITALISM

Despite the fact that capitalism, in contrast to earlier modes of production, is defined by the apparently noncoercive nature of exploitation (Marx 1967), militarism and war have played a major role in the development of capitalism since its origins. Coercive state power, directed both within the state’s territory against the peasantry to force them off the land and compel them to serve as “free labor,” and outside the state’s territory in the form of forcible extraction of resources from peripheral regions, has been instrumental in the process of primitive accumulation. Marx’s writings on Ireland, India, and China all address how British military power was used to subjugate the indigenous population and ensure that other potential competitors were blocked from having access to colonial markets (Marx and Engels 1972). Lenin’s analysis of imperialism suggested that war between the major colonial powers was an inevitable result of the drive for capital to become more concentrated and centralized: “capitalism’s transition to the stage of monopoly capitalism, to finance capital, is bound up with the intensification of the struggle for the partition of the world” (1939: 77–78). War provided the means to defend and extend a state’s role as a colonial power, thereby ensuring access to cheap labor and natural resources, as well as markets for the core state’s manufactured goods. Lenin also pointed to how the resulting “super-profits” could be used “to bribe the labor leaders and the upper stratum of the labor aristocracy” (1939:13); by ensuring that segments of the working class would benefit from colonialism, the ruling class could be more confident in securing popular support for its military policies.

Rosa Luxemburg also argued that war is an indispensable feature of capitalist development. Like Marx, Engels, and Lenin, she examined the role that war plays in primitive accumulation, colonialism, and imperialism; her major contribution was in seeing war itself as a form of capital accumulation: “[F]rom the purely economic point of view, it is a preeminent means for the realization of surplus value” (1968: 454). In addition to being a specific means of capital accumulation, the destruction of specific capitals that is a consequence of war provides new opportunities for accumulation. Militarism can be seen as a form of indirect taxation on the working class that, by reducing its
standard of living, provides resources that can be directed toward the production of military goods and services; this reduced standard of living, in turn, ensures the existence of sufficient labor power for the military. Baran and Sweezy elaborated further on Luxemburg’s argument, stating that militarism is one way in which economic surplus can be absorbed, thereby reducing the severity of capitalist crises resulting from under-investment (1966).

Critical theories that emphasize the consensual nature of neoliberalism have marginalized the central role that coercion and militarism have played in the history of capitalism. An appreciation for the significance of militarism for capital accumulation leads to a renewed focus on the major role that the nation-state has and continues to have in global capitalism as both a facilitator for and an obstacle to capital accumulation. The U.S. war on Iraq provides a vivid illustration of this.

IRAQ AND NEOLIBERALISM

With its emphasis on the importance of the state’s coercive power, the U.S. invasion of Iraq reflects the inability of neoliberalism to suppress intercapitalist rivalry and secure a global consensus for the continued expansion of capital. Armstrong, in his analysis of the Defense Policy Guidance document prepared in 1992 during the first Bush administration, which has served as the foreign policy blueprint for the current administration, writes that this document “stated that the ‘first objective’ of U.S. defense strategy was to ‘prevent the reemergence of a new rival.’ Achieving this objective required that the United States ‘prevent any hostile power from dominating a region’ of strategic significance. America’s new mission would be to convince allies and enemies alike ‘that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests’” (2002: 78).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States remains the sole military superpower. Defense Policy Guidance sought to capitalize on this monopoly by arguing for “a ‘U.S.-led system of collective security’ that implicitly precluded the need for rearmament of any kind by countries such as Germany and Japan” (Armstrong 2002: 79). This assertion of the need for unchallengeable U.S. power is reflected in more recent policy documents. The report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses, prepared by the Project for the New American Century in 2000 and reflecting the views of the “new imperialists” in the Bush administration (Foster 2003), states: “At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible. . . . America should seek to preserve and extend its position of global leadership by maintaining the preeminence of U.S. military forces” (Project for the New American Century 2000:i, iv).

To achieve this goal, the United States must ensure that it can fight multiple wars simultaneously, and, even more interesting, that potential competitors are tightly constrained by U.S.-led institutions. Europe, for example, must not be allowed to develop a military identity outside of NATO, where the United States can continue to play a leading role in European foreign policy matters. U.S. bases must be maintained
in Japan if the United States is to remain “the guarantor of security in Northeast Asia”; increasing the U.S. military presence in East Asia is the key to coping with the rise of China to great-power status (18–19). Finally, “for U.S. armed forces to continue to assert military preeminence, control of space—defined by Space Command as ‘the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space’—must be an essential element of our military strategy” (55). To argue for the necessity to “deny others the use of space” not only means preventing military attack from space but also potentially placing constraints on other countries’ commercial space programs.

The most recent statement of these ideas, and the one that is currently driving U.S. political-military policy, is the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, published in September 2002 (White House 2002). The report refers to “the possible renewal of great power competition” (26), and then calls on a sufficiently strong U.S. military to “dissuade future military competition. . . . Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States” (29–30). One way in which the Strategy foresees this is through U.S. support for a European Union foreign policy and military identity and a commitment “to ensure that these developments work with NATO” (26). NATO is clearly seen as being led by the United States, and the Strategy states that “[t]he alliance must be able to act wherever our interests are threatened” (25). Other potential competitors, such as Russia, India, and China, are to be contained by a commitment to “our common principles” (28), which include opposition to “terrorism” and support for free markets. The latter point is especially important, as it makes explicit the connection between military and economic policy. The goal of U.S. policy is to “promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America’s borders.” This means “progrowth legal and regulatory policies,” lower taxes, “strong financial systems,” “sound fiscal policies to support business activity,” and the expansion of free trade by strengthening the World Trade Organization and creating regional and bilateral free trade agreements (17).

These documents provide the intellectual and political foundation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. They suggest that, while the direct object of U.S. military power was Iraq, U.S. advanced capitalist competitors as well as countries likely to emerge as competitors in the near future were targets of a different kind. Critics of the war who said the war was about oil are correct, but less so in terms of U.S. oil consumption needs. Iraq is one of the world’s major sources of oil, with proven reserves that are second only to those of Saudi Arabia (Klare 2001: 55). Given the central role that oil plays not only in economic growth as a source of energy and as an input for manufacturing but also in maintaining a large military, and with estimates that global oil consumption needs will increase by more than half between 1997 and 2020 (Klare 2001: 56), whoever exercises dominance in the region will necessarily exercise dominance globally: “What better way for the United States to ward off that competition and secure its own hegemonic position than to control the price, conditions, and distribution of the key economic resource upon which those competitors rely?” (Harvey 2003: 25).
While this resource provided the deep structural foundation for the war, it, more than a commitment to the United Nations or to principles of international law, was simultaneously the driving force behind the opposition of other major states to the U.S. invasion. During the 1990s, Iraq had signed contracts with French, Russian, Chinese, and Italian companies to develop Iraqi oil fields (Research Unit for Political Economy 2003: 50). With the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the granting of contracts to major U.S. corporations such as Halliburton and Bechtel for the reconstruction of Iraq, these prewar contracts were suspended. The continued opposition by France, Germany, and Russia in the United Nations to unilateral military action by the United States is thus strong evidence of the strength and persistence of intercapitalist rivalry.

While intercapitalist rivalry calls into question the omnipotence of neoliberal consensus from above, neoliberalism has been increasingly challenged from below. Popular mobilizations against the institutions of global capitalism helped derail the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment and have disrupted meetings of the World Trade Organization, the World Economic Forum, and other multilateral institutions. Organized by Brazil, a coalition of 22 countries opposed U.S. proposals for expanding liberalization, leading to the collapse of talks at the 2003 WTO meeting in Cancún. The World Social Forum has grown into an important space for the development of global opposition to neoliberalism, and Venezuela has joined Cuba in making the challenge to global capitalism a central feature of its system. It is in this context that efforts by the U.S.-controlled Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to remake Iraq’s economy along neoliberal lines must be understood. Where neoliberalism has not succeeded through political or economic means, the United States appears to be willing to impose it by force. The imposition of neoliberalism on a conquered Iraq was a central element of elite policy discussions leading up to the war (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2003; Cohen and O’Driscoll 2003; Council on Foreign Relations 2003). Under the leadership of the Ba’ath Party, Iraq’s constitution promoted a statist version of socialism through state planning, nationalization of natural resources, state-owned industries in major economic sectors, and limits on the ownership of private property. In addition, the state subsidized the prices of basic necessities, provided free education and health care, and offered extensive employment guarantees to workers (al-Khalil 1989). The Ba’ath Party saw the Soviet Union and its state socialist system as a development model for Iraq, but the Ba’ath’s commitment to socialism existed within the context of its pan-Arab nationalism; resident citizens of Arab countries were granted the same rights as Iraqis to operate or own private businesses.

In order to dismantle this statist economic system, the CPA enacted orders seizing all public property, suspending all tariffs and trade restrictions except a short-term 5% surcharge for reconstruction, limiting individual and corporate income taxes to 15%, permitting complete foreign ownership (with full remittance of profits) of all sectors except natural resources, liberalizing securities markets, creating strong protections for intellectual property, permitting foreign banks to purchase up to 100 percent of local banks, and weakening existing labor protections. This is a form of “shock therapy” consistent with that which has proceeded, with disastrous effect, in Russia and with
the structural adjustment programs that have ravaged economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It seems clear that Iraq is to serve as a lesson for the global South as well as the rest of the capitalist core of the determination of the United States to ensure the success of a U.S.-dominated neoliberalism on a world scale.

RECONSIDERING TRANSNATIONAL HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

The argument that the nation-state is undergoing a fundamental reorientation in the interests of transnational capital is revealed by the U.S. war on Iraq to be premature at best. I would go further than this and argue that the war reinforces the centrality of the nation-state in global capitalism. Calls for a renewed patriotism and “support” for U.S. troops in Iraq (as well as in Afghanistan), as well as the oft-cited theme of “homeland security,” all evoke the significance of the nation-state for domestic political forces. At the same time, efforts by the United States to unilaterally impose its will on Iraq as well as other major competing states reflect the significance of nation-state power in international politics. Finally, national political structures and political cultures, as well as direct economic interests, explain the continued opposition of France, Germany, and Russia to U.S. policy in Iraq. The war thus provides further evidence of the central role that the nation-state continues to play, even in the face of powerful multilateral institutions, within global capitalism.

While transnational historical materialists acknowledge the significance of the state in global capitalism (Augelli and Murphy 1988; Gill and Law 1993), their assertion of a transnational hegemonic bloc is problematic. Germain and Kenny are critical of transnational historical materialism for its tendency to “see this hegemony largely as a one-dimensional power relationship; hegemony is fashioned by this elite transnational class on its own terms and then forced or imposed on subaltern classes. These subaltern classes in turn either resist such frontal assaults as best they can or capitulate” (Germain and Kenny 1998: 18). This criticism is reinforced by Drainville’s conclusion that transnational historical materialism has “an exaggerated view of the coherence of neoliberalism” that comes from its emphasis on “an organic unity of global elites, and the political cogency of transnational concepts of control” (1994: 111). These critiques suggest that transnational historical materialism has inadequately addressed the methodological core of a “Gramscian materialism” (Showstack Sassoon 1987: xvii), which asks us to see social reality as dynamic, multifaceted, and contradictory. The dialectical relationship between the material and ideological found in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony suggests structural possibilities for conflict that can undermine the power of the hegemonic bloc: “[b]ecause one is acting essentially on economic forces, reorganizing and developing the apparatus of economic production, creating a new structure, the conclusion must not be drawn that superstructural factors should be left to themselves, to develop spontaneously, to a haphazard and sporadic germination” (Gramsci 1971: 247). In turn, the resolution of particular hegemonic conflicts changes the terrain of conflict itself, as each hegemonic compromise serves as the foundation for the next round of conflict: “what is this effective reality? Is it something static and immobile, or is it not rather a relation of forces in
continuous motion and shift of equilibrium?” (Gramsci 1971: 172). To the extent that transnational historical materialism posits a correspondence between the internationalization of capital and the internationalization of the state, it assumes a highly deterministic understanding of hegemony, thereby undermining one of the great strengths of Gramsci’s work, which is its “nondeterministic yet structurally grounded explanation of change” (Germain and Kenny 1998: 5).

This critique of transnational historical materialism is reinforced by its problematic approach to coercion. Gramsci clearly sees power as a dialectic of consent and coercion. Gramsci states that the state “is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci 1971: 244). The coercive power of the state’s military and legal institutions, the specific mechanisms of “dominance,” is reinforced by its role as an “educator” that constructs a worldview supportive of capitalism (Gramsci 1971: 260). For Gramsci, “State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci 1971: 263). Although transnational historical materialists acknowledge this dialectic, their work tends to emphasize the relevance of hegemony at the expense of coercion. In the work of van der Pijl, for example, the distinction is made between Hobbesian and Lockean states, one that corresponds roughly to the separation of coercion and consent (van der Pijl 1998). For van der Pijl, the more authoritarian, centralized Hobbesian state is, in part, characterized by the more explicit use of coercion. Examples of the Hobbesian state include fascist Germany, Italy, and Spain, the state socialist bloc centered on the Soviet Union, and the postwar Latin American dictatorships. The development of global capitalism, and the rise of a transnational class, results from the ascendancy of Lockean states associated with a strong civil society and market economy. While van der Pijl is clear that these are ideal types, his theory suggests that the production of a consensus for global capitalism by the major core states is a more significant factor than is coercion in explaining the strength of global capitalism.

Likewise, Robinson argues that there has been a major shift in the forms of U.S. intervention since the end of the Cold War from coercive to consensual strategies. Today, the United States maintains its position of dominance relative to the periphery through promoting “polyarchy,” “a system in which a small group actually rules and mass participation in decisionmaking is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites” (Robinson 1996b: 49). Polyarchy is a restrictive form of democracy that emphasizes procedural rules rather than substantive concerns of equality or social justice (see Held 1987). This strategy recognizes the powerful demands of subordinate social forces for the right to make the decisions that affect their lives, but it does so in a way that does not threaten the core’s domination of the periphery in global capitalism. The significance of this strategy, Robinson argues, was brought home by the military defeat of the United States in Vietnam. Coercion was judged to be counterproductive to the goal of winning the political subordination of the periphery. The strategy of “democracy promotion” grants symbolic concessions to the periphery by providing assistance in transitioning
away from dictatorship. This assistance takes the form of direct financial assistance to political parties and social movement organizations, training of officials and activists, and development of media strategies. For Robinson, polyarchy is the global political system that corresponds to a global capitalism characterized by a transnational hegemonic bloc. The United States, as the principal agent promoting polyarchy globally, “is assuming a leadership role on behalf of a transnational hegemonic configuration” (Robinson 1996b: 12). This strategy emphasizes the development of civil society rather than the direct imposition of power by force, which has become “a fetter to the emergent patterns of international capital accumulation corresponding to the global economy” (Robinson 1996b: 37). While this strategy has played and continues to play an important role in U.S. foreign policy, it is far from clear that it represents the fundamental strategic shift suggested by Robinson. U.S. support for “democracy promotion” has taken place when it has been safe for the United States to do so. For example, in the case of the Philippines and Haiti, the United States supported “democratization” only after dictatorships long supported by the United States had lost legitimacy. Elsewhere, “democratization” was accomplished only after military dictatorship had so thoroughly institutionalized neoliberal policies that dictatorship was no longer necessary (as in Chile), or after a war of such devastating social costs that people would choose the “correct” leadership (as in Nicaragua).

I would argue that Gill’s transnational historical materialism comes closest to incorporating Gramsci’s dialectical understanding of consent and coercion. Gill argues that contemporary capitalism is characterized by market civilization, which is the collection of cultural and ideological practices that define capitalism, and disciplinary neoliberalism, which refers to the structural power of capital as well as surveillance power “associated with the coercive reproduction of globalization” (Gill 2003: 182). One expression of U.S. power is its leading role in developing and deploying panoptic technologies for monitoring states and populations. The use of these technologies is an important component of global capitalism, as they serve to maximize predictability and minimize risk. The coercive nature of panopticism simultaneously generates consent, as the targets of such technologies, be they state officials or members of subordinate social groups, internalize their disciplinary power and adjust behavior to take into account the likely possibility of monitoring. The United States, as the dominant world power, has deployed panoptic technologies in its search for “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq as well as North Korea, Iran, and Libya, and has used these technologies to pressure members of the UN Security Council prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq to support U.S. policy. At the same time, the war has demonstrated the limits of panopticism as a form of power. The very detailed reports of Iraqi weapons programs that provided the Bush administration with the primary justification for war proved to be false. Future claims of transgressions by other states are likely to be greeted by even greater skepticism, if not outright rejection and resistance, than that which characterized the war in Iraq.
CONCLUSION

The invasion of Iraq calls into question the “internationalization of the state” thesis offered by transnational historical materialism, as well as other critical theorists of globalization such as Teeple, Sklair, and Hardt and Negri. Far from the nation-state becoming a “transmission belt” for global capital, “the state has, as always, been a fundamental constitutive element in the very process of extension of capitalism in our time” (Panitch 1996: 109). Globalization is not something that is happening to nation-states, but a process in which nation-states are active participants. The use of military power by the United States to shape the contours of global capitalism, both in its relations with other core countries and rising competitors and in its efforts to impose neoliberalism by force, is a powerful example of this.

Consent and coercion are the specific mechanisms through which nation-state agency is organized. Although there is a tendency to see these as opposites, they are more appropriately understood (as Gramsci suggested) in a dialectical manner. Bush administration justifications for invading Iraq—threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and later claims concerning democracy and human rights—as well as its going through the motions of seeking UN support for U.S. policy (even though it was ultimately not forthcoming) are evidence of the importance of constructing consent for the use of military power. At the same time, the lack of international legitimacy for the war, as seen by the massive, worldwide protests against the war, as well as the way in which U.S. justifications for war have been revealed to be false, place important limits on the exercise of U.S. power. Any subsequent military intervention by the United States elsewhere in the world is likely to be met with even greater opposition as a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In this light, consent is not an alternative to coercion. Rather, they are inseparable: war is simultaneously a means of generating consent (e.g., the invasion of Iraq is “doing something” about terrorism) and the product of that consent.

Likewise, militarism provides opportunities for the economic expansion state officials depend upon to win popular consent for their policies, but it also carries the potential to undermine that consent. What came to be known in the United States as the “permanent war economy” following World War II imposed substantial limits on U.S. capital (Melman 2001). Investment in military production is unproductive investment in that the resulting outputs (i.e., weapons) do not simultaneously serve as inputs for continued production elsewhere in the economy. This represents an extraordinary loss of opportunities for capital accumulation in the civilian economy. In addition, the “wall of separation” (Markusen and Yudken 1992) between military and civilian corporations, reflecting the different market environments in which they operate, their different organizational structures and cultures, and their different production practices, ensures that investment in the former will have limited applicability to the latter. Indeed, as U.S. capital-goods industries became more dependent on military contracts in the postwar period, they became less competitive in civilian markets relative to their advanced capitalist counterparts. Finally, high levels of excess productive capacity in military-related industries, which have been maintained ostensibly to
be ready to respond to the needs of military policy but just as likely to win political support for such industries (Greider 1998), represent a further loss of accumulation opportunities in nonmilitary production. These constraints on capital accumulation were not experienced as such as long as the United States maintained economic dominance following World War II. They had dramatic consequences, however, in the context of growing competition from an increasingly global economy; the postwar economic crisis that began in the United States in the late 1960s can be traced, in large part, to the costs associated with a “militarized state capitalism” (Melman 2001: 132). With the reassertion of U.S. military dominance, these constraints will continue to have a major impact on the U.S. economy, and are thereby likely to make more difficult the continued reproduction of consent.

By emphasizing consent at the expense of coercion, transnational historical materialism misses the ways in which coercion simultaneously reinforces and undermines consent for global capitalism. As long as coercive power remains centered in the nation-state, therefore, the nation-state will continue to be at the center of theoretical understandings of and political mobilizations against global capitalism.

Daniel Egan is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts–Lowell, where he teaches courses in social theory and political sociology. He is most recently editor (with Levon Chorbajian) of Power: A Critical Reader (2005). He is also codirector of the University’s Peace and Conflict Studies Institute.

REFERENCES


Notice to Contributors of Manuscripts Submitted to *Sociological Focus*

Submission of a manuscript to *Sociological Focus* clearly implies a commitment to publish in this journal. Previously published papers and papers under review by another journal are unacceptable.

A submission must include the following:

- **Two (2)** hard copies of the manuscript and one (1) identical copy on disk in Word or WordPerfect, including title page, abstract, text, notes (if absolutely necessary), references, tables, figures, and illustrations with captions. Manuscripts should be prepared following the American Sociological Association “Style Guide.” Copies must be clear reproductions.
- A cover letter giving the name, mailing address, and e-mail address of the corresponding author, title of the manuscript, and any other important information. You may cite your own work but not in a way that identifies you as the author of the current manuscript. Authors may suggest individuals as potential reviewers as long as these individuals are not close colleagues or friends. Authors may also suggest individuals to whom they would prefer the manuscript not be sent. You will receive acknowledgment, via e-mail, of the receipt of your manuscript in the *Sociological Focus* office.
- **A $15 processing fee by check or money order payable to *Sociological Focus*** office.

**Manuscript Preparation**

**Format and Length:** All copy (including cover page, abstract, text, notes, and references) must be typed, double-spaced on 8-1/2 inch by 11 inch white opaque paper. Left and right margins must be at least 1 inch; top and bottom margins must be at least 1-1/2 inches. (Bold and italic characters should be noted if not apparent in the text.) Papers should be a maximum of 35 pages, including text, notes, references, tables, and figures or illustrations. The title page, abstract, text, notes (if any), references, tables, figures, and illustrations appear, in that order, in separate sections as described below.

1. **Title Page:** Include the full title, the name(s) of author(s), and the institutional affiliation of each author, and a running head. Use an asterisk (*) to add a footnote to the title to identify the author, with full address, to whom communications about the article should be sent. In the same footnote, provide acknowledgments, credits, grant numbers, and other pertinent information about the article.
2. **Abstract:** Place on a separate page, following the title page, headed by the article title and omitting author identification. The abstract should be in italics.
3. **Text:** Begin text on a new page headed by the title. Omit author identification.
a. **Headings and subheadings** in the text organize the content. Generally, three levels of headings are sufficient for an article. Heading styles are shown below (refer to the ASA style manual or an ASA publication for additional examples).

**THIS IS A LEVEL ONE HEADING**

Level 1 headings are centered on the page, in all capital letters.

**This Is a Level Two Heading**

Level 2 headings are flush left, in italic capital/lowercase (all words capped except prepositions, articles, and coordinating conjunctions).

**This is a level three heading.** Level 3 headings are indented, run in to the paragraph following them, and end with a period. Capitalize only the first letter and proper nouns.

b. **References in the text** must be listed in the reference section, and all references listed in the reference section must be cited in the text. Cite the last name(s) of the authors and year of publication. Include page references whenever possible. References in text must be listed consistently either in chronological or alphabetical order. Subsequent citations of the same source are cited in the same way as the first, with the exception of a reference with three or more authors (see the example below). Some examples are listed below (refer to recent issues of *Sociological Focus*, the *ASA Style Guide*, or ASA publications for other examples):

- If author's name is in the text, follow it with the year of publication in parentheses: Fishbein (1975).
- If author's name is not in the text, enclose last name and year of publication in parentheses: (Benedict 1938).
- Page citation follows year of publication: Antonovski (1979:142) or (Antonovski 1979:142).
- Give both names of joint authors (Jessor and Jessor 1977); for three authors, list all three last names in the first citation (Jessor, Chase, and Donovan 1980), and in subsequent citations use “et al.” (Jessor et al. 1980). For citations with four or more authors, always use the first author's last name followed by “et al.”
- For institutional authorship, supply minimum identification from the beginning of the complete citation: (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990:216).
- For unpublished materials: Robin and Robin (forthcoming) or White (unpublished) or Johnston (personal communication).

c. **Notes in the text** should be numbered consecutively throughout the article with superscript Arabic numerals. If a note is referred to again later in the text, use a parenthetical insertion “(see note 3).”
d. Equations in the text must be typed. Important equations should be identified by consecutive Arabic numerals in parentheses to the right of the equation. Expressions should be aligned and subscripts and superscript clearly marked. Use notes in the margin to clarify symbols.

e. Notes are not required in an article; when possible incorporate the information into the text.

f. Statistical Terms: All statistical terms, such as $t$, $n$, $R^2$, $SD$ are italicized.

4. Notes: If notes cannot be avoided, list the notes in a section entitled “Notes” directly following the text. Begin each note with the Arabic numeral with which it is keyed in the text, e.g., “1 This is the first note.” Sociological Focus does not use footnotes except for the one on the first page about correspondence.

5. Reference List: Authors are responsible for ensuring that publication information for each reference is complete and correct. Listed below are guidelines and examples for citations in your reference list (see recent issues of Sociological Focus, the ASA Style Guide, or ASA publications for further examples):

- List the references alphabetically by the first author’s last name.
- The author’s last name should be inverted. In the case of multiple authors, only the first author’s name should be inverted. (e.g., Dryfoos, Joy D., David J. Hawkins, Denise M. Lishner, and Matthew O. Howard). Use first and last names of all authors, unless only initials are given on the cited publication. List all authors in the references: the use of et al. is not permitted in the reference section.
- If your reference list includes more than one item by the same author, list them in order of the year of publication. For listing more than one work by the same author(s) within the same year, distinguish them (in alphabetical order by title of article) by adding the letters a, b, c, etc. to the year (or to forthcoming, unpublished, etc.).
- If the material listed has been accepted for publication but has not yet been published, use “forthcoming” in place of the date and give the journal or publisher.

Books


Periodicals


6. *Tables:* Number tables consecutively as referenced in the text, and place each on a separate sheet at the end of the paper. Avoid the use of lines between rows in tables. Insert a note in the text indicating the approximate placement of each table: {Table 3 about here}. Each table must have a descriptive title and headings for all rows and columns (avoid abbreviations). Gather footnotes to tables at the bottom of the respective tables as “Note(s)” and designate each note as a, b, c, etc., with corresponding designations within and at the bottom of the tables. Asterisks indicate statistical significance [*p < .05; **p < .01; etc.*]. All tables should provide easily interpreted titles and labels and contain the minimum amount of formatting necessary. Authors are responsible for removing any superfluous lines, boxes, or other formatting prior to publication.

7. *Figures and Illustrations:* should be numbered in the same way as tables; place each on a separate sheet at the end of the paper. Insert a note in the text indicating the approximate placement of each: {Figure 3 about here}. Figures and illustrations submitted with the final draft must be camera-ready, executed in black ink on white paper or vellum; artistic standards must be observed in the production of figures and illustrations.